History of the New Zealand Milk Board : a study of the corporatist alliance between the state and the domestic milk sector by Gilmour, Soraiya
HISTORY OF THE NEW ZEALAND MILK BOARD
A STUDY OF THE CORPORATIST ALLIANCE BETWEEN
THE STATE AND THE DOMESTIC MILK SECTOR
Soraiya Gilmour
Research Report No. 216
August, 1992
Agribusiness & Economics Research Unit
PO Box 84
Lincoln University
CANTERBURY
Telephone No: (64) (3) 325 2811
Fax No: (64) (3) 325 3847
ISSN 1170-7682
AGRIBUSINESS & ECONOMICS RESEARCH UNIT
The Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit (AERU) operates
from Lincoln University providing research expertise for a wide
range of organisations concerned with production, processing,
distribution, finance and marketing.
The AERU operates as a semi-commercial research agency.
Research contracts are carried out for clients on a commercial
basis and University research is supported by the AERU through
sponsorship of postgraduate research programmes. Research
clients include Government Departments, both within New
Zealand and from other countries, international agencies, New
Zealand companies and organisations, individuals and farmers.
Research results are presented through private client reports,
where this is required, and through the publication system
operated by the AERU. Two publication series are supported:
Research Reports and Discussion Papers.
The AERU operates as a research co-ordinating body for the
Economics and Marketing Department and the Department of
Farm Management and Accounting and Valuation. This means
that a total staff of approximately 50 professional people is po-
tentially available to work on research projects. A wide diversity
of expertise is therefore available for the AERU.
The major research areas supported by the AERU include trade
policy, marketing (both institutional and consumer), accounting,
finance, management, agricultural economics and rural sociol-
ogy. In addition to the research activities, the AERU supports
conferences and seminars on topical issues and AERU staff are
involved in a' wide range of professional and University related
extension activities.
Founded as the Agricultural Economics Research Unit in 1962
from an annual grant provided by the Department of Scientific and
Industrial Research (DSIR), the AERU has grown to become an
independent, major source of business and economic research
expertise. DSIR funding was discontinued in 1986 and from April
1987, in recognition of the development of a wider research
activity in the agribusiness sector, the name of the organisation
was changed to the Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit.
An AERU Management Committee comprised of the Principal, the
Professors of the three associate departments, and the AERU
Director and Assistant Director administers the general Unit
policy.
AERU MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE 1992
Professor A C Bywater, B.Sc., Ph.D.
(Professor of Farm Management)
Professor A C Zwart, B.Agr.Sc., M.Sc., Ph.D.
(Professor of Marketing)
AERU STAFF 1992
Director
Professor AC Zwart, B.Agr.Sc., M.Sc., Ph.D.
Assistant Director
R L Sheppard, B.Agr.Sc. (Hons), B.B.S.
Senior Research Officer \"
J. R. Fairweather, B.Agr. Sc., BA, M.A., Ph.D.
R L Sheppard, B.Agr.Sc. (Hons), B.B.S.
(Assistant Director, AERU)
Research Officers
S. S. F. Gilmour, B.A., M.A. (Hons)
T. M. Ferguson, B.Com. (Ag)
G Greer', B.Agr.Sc. (Hons)
L S Storey, DipTchg, B.Sc., M.Soc.Sc (Hons)
Secretary
J Clark
PREFACE
CONTENTS
Page
(i)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
INTRODUCTION
(ii)
(v)
CHAPTER 1 CORPORATISM AND THE MILK INDUSTRY 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Milk Industry: Conditions Favourable for Corporatism 1
1.3 Corporatism: the Motivation of the State and Producers 2
1.4 Corporatist Relations in the Milk Sector 4
1.5 Corporatism as a Mechanism for Market Stability,
Sector Restructuring or Economic Problem Solving 6
1.6 The Continuance of Corporatist Arrangements 8
1.7 Conclusion 9
CHAPTER 2 THE THEORY OF CORPORATISM 11
2.1 Introduction 11
2.2 Corporatist Ideology 12
2.3 Corporatism and Theories of the State 12
2.4 The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies 13
2.5 Meso Corporatism 15
2.6 Private Interest Government 16
2.7 Conclusion: The Validity of Corporatism in the
Study of the Milk Industry 17
\.
CHAPTER 3
CHAPTER 4
HISTORY OF THE NEW ZEALAND MILK BOARD
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Early Organisation of the Milk Industry
3.3 Conditions of the Early Milk Industry
3.4 The Milk Commission's Recommendations
3.5 Conclusion
THE ORIGINS OF THE MILK BOARD
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Marketing Boards in the New Zealand Context
4.3 The Milk Act 1944
4.4 Conclusion
19
19
19
21
26
27
29
29
29
30
34
CHAPTER 5 CONSOLIDATION OF THE MILK INDUSTRY: 1953-1967 35
5.1 Introduction 35
5.2 The Establishment of the New Zealand Milk Board 35
5.3 Prices, Allowances, Margins, Subsidies 36
5.4 Organisation in the Milk Industry Under the
Board's Administration 41
5.5 Quality Control and Modernisation 44
5.6 Sponsoring Consumption. Milk in Schools Scheme,
Publicity Campaigns 48
5.7 Conclusion 50
CHAPTER 6 1967 TO 1987 : THE PATH TO DEREGULATION 51
6.1 Introduction 51
6.2 The 1967 Legislation 51
6.3 Government Legislation, Committees of Inquiry and
Commissions Prior to the Repeal of the Milk Act 53
6.4 Prices, Allowances, Margins 56
6.4.1 Town Milk Producer Prices 56
6.4.2 Treatment and Distribution Allowances 59
6.4.3 Consumer Prices 60
6.5 Quality Control and Modernisation 61
6.5.1 Alternative Packaging 61
6.5.2 Alternative Products 62
6.5.3 Payment for Quality Schemes and Quality Testing 63
6.6 Consumption and Marketing 66
6.7 Conclusion 67
CHAPTER 7 CORPORATISM AND DEREGULATION IN THE NEW
ZEALAND MILK INDUSTRY 69
'"7.1 Introduction 69
7.2 The Rise and Decline of Corporatism in the Milk Industry 69
7.3 Deregulation and Corporatism 77
7.4 The Global Politico-Economic Context 80
7.5 The Value of Corporatism to the New Zealand Milk Industry 82
7.6 Conclusion: Corporatism and Statutory Board Systems 84
REFERENCES 86
APPENDIX 1
APPENDIX 2
OFFICE BEARERS AND MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL MILK
COUNCIL AND THE NEW ZEALAND MILK BOARD 1944-1988
LEGISLATION FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NEW
ZEALAND MILK INDUSTRY 1881-1988
PREFACE
The Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit has upheld a long involvement with the
Town Milk Industry, commencing when the AERU began the annual survey of town milk
producers in 1972. (An Economic Survey of NZ Town Milk Producers. AERU Research
Reports.) This Research Report presents the history of the New Zealand Milk Board as a
case study of statutory board systems that were typically devised by governments to manage
the post-war agricultural economy.
Although the history of the Milk Board is documented in this Report from its conception as
the Central Milk Council in 1944 until its dissolution in 1988, there has been no attempt at
a definitive historical narrative. The primary concern of this Report has been to examine the
nature of the relationship between the government and the Town Milk Industry that has
structured the administration of the milk service. The theory of corporatism which has been
utilised in the study of interest groups' political interaction with the government, has been
of value in many case histories of milk industries. Thus corporatist theory has also informed
this examination of the political context of the regulatory Milk Board regime's path through
regulation and deregulation.
The history of the Town Milk Service is presented in this manner to increase understanding
of both the nature of regulatory board structures and of government involvement in
agricultural management. Further, it will be of value to administrators of emerging milk
industries who may be exploring different organisational options that best serve the
development of their liquid milk service.
The AERU has published other work on the Town Milk Industry that may be of interest to
the reader. "Milk Purchasing: a Consumer Survey in Auckland and Christchurch."
(Sheppard, Research Report No.195, July 1985) which emphasised consumer preferences in
milk purchasing, packaging and the distribution service, and "A Review of the Deregulation
of the NZ Town Milk Industry" (Moffitt and Sheppard, Discussion Paper 122, July 1988)
which"studied the initial impact of deregulation on the town milk supply sector.
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INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study is to provide a history of the New Zealand Milk Board from 1944
until its dissolution in 1988. The Central Milk Council was set up by government legislation
as the first regulatory organisation of the milk supply. The Council and the subsequent
Board of 1953 epitomised the strong alliance between government and key agricultural agents
that was a characteristic form of economic organisation in many agricultural exporting
nations over this period of history. Government sponsored protection of the domestic milk
industry was to persist until the supportive and regulatory intervention of state in many
national economies was discontinued in the eighties. The history of the Milk Board is thus
situated within the context of national economic policies and structures. of regulation and
deregulation that also reflect a global historical background.
The discussion of the Milk Board's history, its structural evolution, regulatory role, policy
agenda and the cause of the Board's eventual discontinuation, was facilitated by the
employment of the corporatist model of the relations between the state and interest groups.
The theoretical concept of corporatism has consistently informed the study of arrangements
between producers and the state in the agricultural sector and was effectively used in the
analysis of domestic milk industry' organisation found in. several Western agricultures.
Statutory regimes have been constantly employed to stnicture the milk industries, licensing
monopolistic representative associations to Tegulate producers behaviour and implement state
agricultural policy. In historical studies of the milk industries of Britain, the US, and Europe
many observers concur that the most appropriate response to the needs of the dairy and milk
industries' specific environment had been the pursuance of corporatist arrangements. This
political organisational model also facilitated a comparative understanding of the history of
the New Zealand Milk Board.
Corporatism identifies the actors, structures and political processes involved in the
establishment and maintenance of a regulatory economy. The agricultural corporatist
structures were state sponsored collaborative arrangements with authorized private
associations of producers and other key interests. Corporatism as a specific study of the
alliances between the state and representative agents of important national economic sectors,
locates statutory regulatory organisations such as the Milk Board in relationships that are of
mutual and exclusive benefiho both the government and the participating industrial agents.
The state extends exclusive public status and access to state resources to the corporatist
partner. In exchange, the leadership of the participating industry is committed to instituting
the government economic agenda through regulatory control over its associated members.
Industrial management was thereby achieved under the guidance of statutory regulations
through monopolistic producer associations which provided a mechanism for market
stabilisation, sector restructuring, and economic problem solving.
The consistent incorporation of milk industries' agents into the policy making process
suggests a unique set of conditions exist in the sector conducive to corporatist arrangements.
That early milk marketing bodies were invariably corporatist organisations was attributed to
the organisational demands of milk as a perishable product, the economic importance of milk
to many societies, and the symbolic nature of the commodity. However that a specific
political and economic climate was required for corporatist organisation also indicated the
potential insecurity of these government sponsored arrangements. The exclusive alliance
enjoyed by the corporatist partners was susceptible to changes in conditions external to its
(v)
relationship and to the instability contained within the structures. Deregulation which
heralded the collapse of the New Zealand government's alliance with producers emphasised
the dependence of the corporatist partner on a specific configuration of polito-economic
factors to sustain its privileged access to the state. In this context corporatist theory offers
a perspective from which to critically analyze state sponsored regulatory bodies. In
presenting corporatist arrangements as an interaction between the state and its partner within
a specific environment, it was possible to appreciate the political, ideological and economic
requirements for regulatory economies and recognise the vulnerabilities of these structured
relationships.
An interpretive history of the Milk Board is thus well served by the critical employment of
the theoretical parameters of corporatism. To provide both a theoretical analysis and a
comprehensive narrative history, this report distinguishes between the two purposes
throughout its structure~ The first two chapters provide the theoretical framework for the
analytical discussion at the conclusion of the report while chapters three to six inclusive form
the basis of the history of the Milk Board. Chapter one outlines the general corporatist
arrangements found in the studies of domestic milk industries of Britain, the United States,
Austria, Holland and Switzerland. Under discussion are the conditions conducive for
corporatism, the .motivation of the state and producer to enter regulatory economies, the
structure of the corporatist relations, how these relations serve as a mechanism for sector
restructuring, and the endurance of corporatism. The following chapter examines the
development of corporatism as a theoretical construct. Chapter two concludes with a review
of the issues derived from the corporatist model that will provide contextual understanding
of the history of the Board from the study of the interaction of key parties in the
establishment, maintenance and operation of state-licensed bodies.
The narrative sequence details the history of milk supply organisation in New Zealand from
the early efforts of local municipal administrations to regulate the service. Each chapter
explores the legislation that shaped the structure and activities of the milk administrations,
details the tension between the state and corporatist partner over the price regime, and
comments on the process of restructuring and development of the industry. Chapter three
is concerned with the crucial report of the Milk Commission of 1944 which examined the
state of the pre-regulation milk service and proposed a new organisational structure for the
national industry. Chapters f~ to six are chronologically divided by the major changes in
legislation: The Milk Act of 1944, the Milk Amendment of 1953 and the Milk Acts of 1967
and 1988. While chapter four is an overview of the early Central Milk Council
administration, chapter five narrates the consolidation period of the Milk Board regime of
1953-1967, and Chapter six details the changes faced by administration from the 1967
legislation until the deregulation of the industry in 1988.
In the final chapter the study returns to the theoretical concerns addressed in the earlier
sections. Corporatism is first applied to the structured relations of the regulated milk
industry. Then a brief survey of the political and structural changes in the post-regulation
industry provides a comparative basis for an understanding of the dynamics of corporatism
in the New Zealand setting. A critical review of both the structured and deregulated milk
economies allows an assessment of corporatism both as a model to analyze the Milk Board
and as a form of organisation employed in the.development of the industry. While the role
of board administration is acknowledged as appropriate for a specific political and economic
environment, the realignment of post-regulatory agents in the industry and the subsequent
(vi)
effects on the industry do suggest a more equitable solution lies in a settlement between the
two poles of regulation and deregulation. In the concluding section, corporatist structured
industries are understood in the context of broader global economic trends of restructuring,
institutional experimentation, and economic integration.
(vii)

CHAPTER 1
CORPORATISM AND THE MILK INDUSTRY
1.1 Introduction
The theoretical concept of corporatism has consistently informed the study of arrangements
between the producers and the state in the agricultural sector. While avoiding the extensive
debates within the corporatist literature many observers of the milk and dairy industry concur
that the most appropriate response to the needs of this specific environment has been the
pursuance of corporatist arrangements.
Studies of dairy industries in advanced capitalist economies have documented the frequency
which the milk sector has instituted corporatist systems of industrial self regulation to ensure
market stability and provide an efficient and legitimate means of government involvement in
the sector. Corporatism refers to a particular form of political organisation between the state
and important economic actors, such as the agricultural producers, which is characterised by
the state licensing monopoly producer associations to enable both the indirect government
regulation of the producers behaviour avd the implementation of the state's agricultural
policy. This chapter will review the general arrangements of regulatory corporatist
relationships found in analyses of the milk industry in the UK (Winter; Grant; Cox, Lowe,
Winter), Austria (Traxler), Switzerland (Farago), Holland (van Waarden), and the US
(Young). Through the comparison of these structured regulatory milk economies, this
chapter will summarize conditions conducive to corporatist alliances in the milk industry, and
outline the motivation of both the state and the producers to engage in regulatory economies,
the structure of the corporatist relationship, how sector restructuring is facilitated by the
corporatist alliance, and survey the endurance of such state licensed bodies. This discussion
will initiate a broader examination of the corporatist theory contained in chapter two and
thereby contribute to the development of a contextual framework from which to understand
the dynamics of the establishment and operation of the New Zealand Milk Board.
1.2 Milk Industry: Gonditions Favourable for Corporatism
The corporatization of the agricultural sector is oft~n a unique experience in national
economies that are characterized by other forms of relations between states and interest
groups. In societies critical of state intervention, government involvement in the regulation
of the agricultural economy, particularly milk production, is often acknowledged as a
necessary exception. For instance, the corporatism of the American dairy industry is atypical
of the more pluralist arrangements found in the US between the state and other organized
economic interests (Young 1990:72). The prevalent liberal ideology in the UK has not
encouraged private organizations to act as agents of public policy. With the exception of the
milk industry, corporatist arrangements within British agricultural markets have not been
successful (Grant 1985:186). Of great concern to producers, the state and the public alike
has been the inherent instabilities of agricultural markets and it is the dairy industry that has
been the most regulated sector in these national economies.
That milk marketing bodies are more consistently corporatist is recognised by most
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commentators as attributable to the organizational demands of a perishable product, the
economic importance of milk to many societies and the symbolic nature of the commodity.
The perishable nature of milk requires effective organization to transport, process and market
the product quickly. Individual producers are denied the market power to demand higher
prices for their product through the difficulties inherent in withholding the supply of a
perishable commodity. Moreover any form of concerted market action typically requires the
organization of a myriad of small producers who are widely dispersed and working under
diverse conditions. In an unprotected agricultural market without state backing unorganized
producers remain vulnerable in negotiations conducted with oligopolistic dairy companies
over the price of milk. By the 1920s in Britain severe price variations reflected these uneven
market relations. As the political controversy grew in milk price negotiations the parties
formed the Permanent Joint Milk Committee (1922). For many producers who still received
much less favourable prices, dependency on distributors' restraint remained an unsuccessful
arrangement. Further state protection was sought by producer associations (Cox, Lowe,
Winter 1990b:4-7).
The dairy industry's economic importance as exhibited by its increased contribution to the
national income has encouraged state institutions to seek improved market conditions. In the
UK the agricultural sector had been the focus of government programs in research, education
and rural development. The milk industry ip. particular received much attention as it was
perceived as an area with great growth potential that did not demand a long-term financial
commitment from the government. By 1923 milk consumption had doubled in forty years.
Consumption was to increase even during the economic slump of 1929-1931. Considered
an important agricultural commodity, milk was subjected to a statutory marketing scheme in
1931 prior to a relationship being forged between the state and producers (Cox, Lowe,
Winter 1990a:6-8). In Holland however, it was not its contribution to the national income
as the milk industry's significance to the agrarian economy that led to the establishment of
corporatist arrangements (van Waarden 1985:199).
Liquid milk is primarily produced for domestic consumption and bears a specific symbolic
value. Local public health authorities campaigned for the improvement of national nutritional
standards through the promotion of milk consumption and the quality of milk supplies.
Public health campaigners sou,ght statutory arrangements in the milk industry as a more
centralized means of regulating commodity production. Their public lobby led to the
politicization of the commodity. The activities of the National Milk Publicity Council (1920)
of Britain created milk as a potent symbol in British food politics encouraging such laudatory
statements to be made by politicians as "there is no finer investment for any community than
putting milk into babies." (Churchill cited in Cox, Lowe, Winter 1990a:8). In Britain the
fortunes of the milk industry came to symbolize the state of agricultural policy (Winter
1984:110). The health lobbyist's campaign for improved consumption levels and quality
standards in milk supplies and the subsequent inclusion of milk in the agenda of food politics
provided both a rationale for regulation of the industry and public support for state
intervention (Cox, Lowe, Winter 1990b:7).
1.3 Corporatism: the Motivation of the State and Producers
Corporatist structures are established through governmental legislative measures. The
specific requirements peculiar to the agricultural economy, particularly the milk industry,
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persuaded reluctant governments to intervene in the sector. State institutions concerned with
stabilizing the market, hygiene control and responding to the voting consumer's demand for
a regular good quality milk supply, were sufficiently motivated to set up corporate structures.
For example, in the US state intervention in the milk industry appeared necessary for the
establishment of a satisfactory marketing scheme. Initial US governmental intervention had
also sought to impose quality standards in order to safeguard a 'wholesome' product.
However the state lacked the infrastructure to regulate producers' behaviour (Young
1990:77). The study of interventionist policies employed in different milk industries suggests
that other governments were similarly concerned about market instability. The emergence
of agricultural corporatism in Britain was not at the behest of producer associations who
resisted government interventionist policies. Initiated by the state in 1933 the Milk
Marketing Board (MMB) was a state response both to the market difficulties that plagued the
voluntary Permanent Joint Milk Committee and to the high political profile of milk as a
symbol of the nation's health. Later corporatist arrangements of the post-war era in Britain
were part of a general bargain between the state and agriculture to meet the demand for
increased production at a time of food scarcity (Cox, Lowe, Winter 1990a:7-8,32).
The inclusion of the producer associations in the milk processing regulation system, as in the
Swiss example~ demonstrated the cost effectiveness of the industry's self-regulation (Farago
1985:178). Both the administrative expense and the political controversy of direct state
intervention are avoided by providing the producer associations with a greater degree of
organisational development. Moreover, structuring the corporatist relations through
legislation provides the state with considerable opportunities to exert influence on the
operation of the regulatory scheme including the use of the structure to implement changes
in the industry. When the EEC approved of the introduction of milk quotas in 1984 the
existing corporatist institutions in Britain enabled the state to implement drastic policy
change.
As corporatist arrangements arise from a climate of conflict, there is a tendency for
corporatist initiatives to internalise or marginalise future conflict (Young cited in Cox, Lowe,
Winter 1990b:20). The British Milk Marketing Board (MMB) was able to internalise
potentially damaging resistance to the restructuring of 1984. New levels of production under
the quota regime were accepted by the large producers and the prevailing corporatist
arrangements were not serio"tlsly challenged. Small producers, farm workers, manufacturing
workers and consumers who were severely affected by the economic adjustments found their
lack of incorporation in the policy process led to their interests to be marginalised (Cox,
Lowe, Winter 1990a:11-14). Corporatist management enabled farming and landowning
interests to preserve their privileged status within a closed agricultural policy community
while the costs and crisis was diverted to other sectors or classes of the rural economy. The
industry's self-regulatory mechanisms permitted state agricultural priorities to be instituted
without the political dislocation expected by such a crisis.
Monopolistic producer associations typically pursued statutory regulations to secure farmers'
incomes. The conflict between the producers and distributors in price negotiations that
characterized the dairy industry of the US was eventually resolved in the producer's favour
through a legislated relationship. In an effort to improve their market power American
farmers had formed the National Milk Producer Federation (NMPF) in 1916 and sought
exemption from the anti-trust act. They lobbied the state to legalize their monopolistic
representative body but were opposed by the milk dealers associations. Strike action by
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producers achieved higher milk prices for some but mobilized the protest of consumer
groups. The state then acknowledged the need for an administrative settlement between
parties. The Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 recognized the organisation of producers'
bargaining institutions and delegated some public authority to the Federation. As there was
no provision in the legislation for associations to secure members compliance to industrial
agreements, insecurity and chaos continued. After extensive lobbying efforts by the
producers a more effective statutory arrangement was developed in the 1930s which involved
control of participants in marketing agreements and stabilization purchases of surplus produce
by the state.
"The delegation of state power to cooperatives meant that the industry had the
necessary enforcement mechanism to maintain orderly milk marketing
conditions and secure member compliance within the specifically designated
milk marketing orders." (Young 1990:76-79).
Corporatist management has provided protection for the dominant interests during
rationalisation and restructuring of tl}e domestic milk sector. Collective regulation through
the milk quota regime in Britain of the 1980s was recognized as more advantageous to the
individual large producer than the imposition of price cuts. The corporatist structures
developed by the sector in the earlier expan~ionist agricultural context had provided both
economic security and autonomy for the producer. In order to retain the power enjoyed by
the dominant producer group, the new agricultural agenda of limited production output
required the imposition of self-regulated restructuring and thereby "preserve the integrity of
its own policy community. "The MMB achieved this through adjustments in fann
management techniques and the implementation of a market mechanism for quota transfers
that granted established large milk producers a distinct advantage over less privileged
producers, even allowing some farmers to expand production. The Board's involvement in
implementing the quota system reflected the inherent bias towards a class group in the
administration of the milk sector (Cox, Lowe, Winter 1990a:27-33).
1.4 Corporatist Relations in the Milk Sector
The agricultural corporatist stru~ture is a state sponsored collaborative arrangement between
the authorized private associations of the producers and other key interests, primarily dairy
business firms and distributors or occasionally workers' unions. The development of this
arrangement is evident in the example of the history of the American milk industry. Through
the establishment of the National Milk Producer Federation (NMPF) in 1916 the US dairy
producers had established an organisation that monopolistically represented their interests.
With the distributors similarly organized, the dairy sector was arranged around associational
structures representing the conflict in the industry. The agreement reached between US
producers and dealers with the state in the 1930s resolved the industry's conflict through
delegating the regulatory authority to these powerful private associations while excluding
other interests from the policy making process.
The state delegated public authority to the associations when their organizational development
ensured a more efficient ability to regulate than state intervention. The Swiss Central
Association of Milk Producers was involved in the task of industry regulation due to its high
degree of organisational development. It was:
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"characterized by a comprehensive domain, high density ratios, differentiated
organizational structures and considerable financial and personal resources."
(Farago 1985: 178) .
Stability within the Swiss milk sector and the producer association's capacity to execute
regulations were both derived from the association's high level of professionalism (Farago
1985:179-181). By providing the necessary enforcement mechanism, member compliance
could be assured through restricting access to collective goods and thereby providing order
to milk market conditions (Young 1990:78-9). While the Swiss milk producers exhibited a
'highly developed associational system' and were prominent in the regulatory structure, the
milk processors, wholesalers and retailers all lacked a uniform representational system and
were thus prevented from developing a regulatory corporatist structure.
The highly corporatized Austrian milk industry provides evidence that effective associations
following state-responsive policies increase their organizational power through co-operation
with other parties and a 'reciprocal transfer of resources' with the state (Traxler 1985: 160-1).
State power is transferred to the private interest government in the form of organisational
resources, legal recognition of their regulatory capacity and guarantees of organisational
security. The Austrian system of regulation is framed in law (MOG) in which the aims and
means for regulation, the composition of the administrative Board (MWF) and the parameters
of its concerns are specified. The effectiveness of regulatory control over the four
participating interest associations was assured through legal endorsement of their compulsory
membership (Traxler 1985:162). The Board can call on the organisational bases of the
associations to regulate the system but it is also provided with the assistance of legally backed
sanctions. Organisational security is provided through the exclusive right to participate in
the policy making process by the four interest groups. While licensed by the state, the
associations retain considerable autonomy in the development of regulatory policy (Traxler
1985:152-162).
The relationship between the aSSOCIatIon and its members is shaped by the regulatory
attributes conferred on the association by the state's delegation of public authority. A crisis
of legitimacy can arise in the tension between the association's roles of representation and
regulation. The British MMB's successful history as a corporatist institution can be
attributed to, in part, the 'emphasis placed on democratic procedures for the Board's
administration. The Board is acknowledged as 'scrupulous' in its election arrangements;
producers are able to vote for the majority of the Board members and hold the ultimate right
to dissolve the Board. Producers have recognized that the MMB gave their members power
they never had prior to its inception in 1933 and thus appreciate the Board's need to consider
broader issues of state and market that may conflict with their interests. It is significant too
that the assumption of public authority by associations has not been projected as the
development of a quasi-political or quango institution. The MMB was able to avoid political
controversy in its purchase of 16 privately owned creameries in 1979 as
"it is able to project itself simultaneously as one of the largest agricultural co-
operatives in the world, and as a huge manufacturing organisation operating
successfully in a highly competitive market." (Grant 1985:187-190).
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1.5 Corporatism as a Mechanism for Market Stability, Sector
Restructuring or Economic Problem Solving
The literature has suggested that
"corporatism may have a specific stabilizing effect on Western societies by
ensuring a co-operative form of interest mediation and by integrating interest
associations into the process of policy formation." (Traxler 1985: 150).
Particular interests of the dairy industry have successfully sought protection through the
stability of insulated corporatist arrangements. Through the adoption of public authority,
associations were able to acquire legitimacy from the state that they were unable to generate
themselves. Both the British National Farmers Union and the American National Milk
Producer Federation had earlier attempted to control individual producer behaviour in a
climate of instability and opportunism. The dairy industry was characterized by antagonistic
relations between the farmers and the dealers or processors resulting in a market fraught with
uncertainty and little producer power. The unions were unable to secure compliance of all
producers to price agreements and thus continued to experience unfavourable market
conditions which threatened farmers' incomes. In the Dutch industry, as elsewhere, it was
found that most regulations were effective oRly under corporatist conditions of compulsion
and monopoly (van Waarden 1985:218).
Dairy market stability is often an essential goal of state policy. Even when state ideology
opposes state intervention, as was the case in Britain and the US, the special needs of this
industry have encouraged statutory arrangements to be developed. Opposition to any direct
state role also fostered support for private regulation. Once provided with enforcement
mechanisms the associations have been able to secure orderly milk markets for decades, even
in the face of consumer or retailer opposition to market price manipulation. The governance
of the milk market by the dominant interests in the sector has guaranteed the protection of
the domestic dairy industry, ~1abilized prices, farmers incomes and the quality and supply of
milk. In Holland,
"corporatist self-regulation in the dairy industry has generally been successful.
Quality control, market regulation and reduction of competition for raw
materials all seem to have improved the industry's economic position... in
relation to its competitors in other countries, due to its efficiency, large scale
of production, high quality, tight organization and effective private market
agreements." (van Waarden 1985:218).
When criticism to state intervention and market control becomes a significant feature in the
political culture, these stabilizing arrangements may be reappraised but not necessarily
cancelled. How the British quota case was managed through the corporatist structures in a
climate of opposition to protectionism attests to the strength of this stabilizing mechanism.
The recent sector restructuring was possible within the British milk market as the government
was able to recruit the Board administration to rationalise and implement the quota system
while insulating the state from any effective industrial resistance which could threaten market
security. The required change in production behaviour was far more readily instituted by the
intermediary organisation through the strength of its claim to legitimacy and its intimate
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knowledge of memberso
All dairy industries were initially faced with the task of implementing quality control of the
product in response to the demands of the consumer and public health organisations0
Corporatist statutory arrangements in the milk industry were found to be a more centralized
means of regulating commodity production0 Quality regulation is more efficient and
economical when pursued by agents of the industry0 The state in corporatized agricultural
economies also expected the statutory bodies they have empowered to act as modernising
agents in agriculture by promoting both the improvement of standards and the efficiency of
production0 In Britain the MMB
"has acted as a major promoter of new techniques - machine milking, artificial
insemination, bulk collection, improved breeding, milk recording 000 (and) the
conversion from churn to bulk collection of milk 000 provides one of the most
significant examples of the "modernising" role of the MMR" (Winter
184:114)0
Private self government has been credited with a positive problem solving capacityo Conflict
management of the crisis between the producers and the dairy processors and dealers is a
salient example of how the corporatist system is effective in resolving a key conflict facing
the industry0 All the statutory structures that govern the various milk industries generate a
political consensus both within the industry and between the industry, the state and publico
The potential for conflict over price fixing, industrial restructuring or quality control has
been generally avertedo Although individual union branches, such as the Fanner's Union of
Wales may attempt to influence policy through political action, once they have been
incorporated into the policy process even significant issues like the rapid imposition of the
British quota system do not cause much internal dissent (Cox, Lowe, Winter 1990b:18-19).
To concur with theorists who perceive corporatism as a means of controlling the working
class, labour relations have been characterized by a significant absence of conflict0 In
Austria an "all-embracing and co-ordinated wage and price-policy" that has been negotiated
within the corporatist system has met with labour compliance (Traxler 1985:163).
In the process of market stabilization, sector reconstruction, industry rationalization or
modernization, the state reli-ed on the delegated intennediary association to execute policyo
As each milk industry implemented self regulatory measures they were successfully involved
in problem solving tasks confinning the role of corporatism in achieving the economic
agenda of the state0
"The MMB seems to be a classic case of an organization which is more
flexible than state agencies, closer to the problems it attempts to resolve, and
better able to win the co-operation and support of those directly affected0"
(Grant 1985: 194).
Traxler notes that the capacity of private interest governments for problem solving varies
according to the condition of the national economy and the nature of the association. In
essence it is
"not the violation of member interests, but the violation of organizational
interests which sets the limits to the problem-solving capacity of associations
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involved in systems of private governance." (Traxler 1985:167).
From a review of the corporate structures in Austrian milk industry Traxler concludes that
associations with 'comprehensive domains' can assist the process of modernization during
times of economic expansion but during long term economic crises the association must
expect to lose members and employment. While negotiations over wage and price policy
require members to defer their interests for the maintenance of corporate interests, the more
extensive demands of modernization threaten the organization's own interests (Traxler
1985:166-7). The system's problem solving capacity appears to subordinate members'
interests and even the incorporated association's interests to the functional demands of the
state economy. In times of acute crisis this invariably creates a difficult political dilemma
for the private interest government.
1.6 The Continuance of Corporatist Arrangements
Studies of the milk industry's incorporation in the policy making process have suggested that
a unique set of conditions exist in the sector which have permitted this mode of self
regulatory governance by the private associations. That corporatism requires a specific
environment to flourish questions the durability of such relations. Several aspects of the
scheme suggest a vast potential for instability contained within the corporatist form of
organization. External conditions may alter Jhe fortunes of the corporatist milk sector, a
threat evident in the European industries' experience during the wake of the EEC milk
regime of 1984. Moreover the corporatist arrangements which had characterized the earlier
American milk industry were undermined when this closed policy community became
dominated by regional super-cooperatives in the 1960s (Young 1990:80-2).
Other causes of instability originate in the corporatist structures. The Austrian example
suggests that associatioll.<; \vho adopt a public mantle risk both destabilization and member
defection (Olson 1965 cited in Traxler 1985:163). Thus the milk boards who seek to
maintain their supply of resources and authority from the state need to maintain their
distinction from state bodies or quango institutions to retain their internal legitimacy. In the
regulation of the dairy sector a balance must be established between pursuance of the sector's
concerns and consideration of the needs of the whole economy. The conflict between
producers and processors also remains an underlying tension in the structured relationship
which must be attended to.
In some societies corporatism is a prevalent form of policy making and is not questioned on
ideological grounds. In Britain the corporatization of the milk sector is peculiar in a
predominantly market based economy. While there is agreement that indirect state
intervention is beneficial to the industry and the consumer, corporatist arrangements may
persist. A change in the ideological climate will severely test the flexibility of the private
interest government. Grant suspects that both the growing political concern of the
acceptability of corporatist forms of regulation and changes in the economic conditions of the
sector do not guarantee the continuance of the British milk marketing system (Grant
1985:191-5).
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1.7 Conclusion
The unique properties of the liquid milk industry played a key role in the establishment of
state licensed milk authorities in many national economies. As a perishable commodity of
economic importance and symbolic significance, milk possessed particular organisational
needs in its market. The industry remained acutely vulnerable outside government protection
which hampered the delivery of a regular milk supply to the concerned public. While the
producers sought a more secure income through the assurance of a government sponsored
regulated milk industry, the state was motivated by economic concerns and consideration for
the consumers' expectation for a better service through government intervention. In many
of the case studies outlined, a collaborative arrangement was agreed upon between the state
and the producer association to share in the management of the industry. In exchange for
the supply of government assets and industrial protection, the producers were to regulate
their milk industry in accordance with state agricultural policy. Thus corporatist
arrangements became a vehicle for the advancement of market stability, sector restructuring
and economic problem solving in the milk sector. Several aspects of the corporatist structure
were also found to hint at an instability within these arrangements. The ideological climate,
the tensions inherent in pursuing government policy, and changing economic conditions
external to the corporatist structure may. all serve to undermine the alliance enjoyed by the
producer with the state. It .is the purpose of the following chapter to expand upon the
theoretical constructs of corporatism briefly encountered in the preceding discussion, with
the objective of broadening the basis of understanding of this study of the interaction of key
parties in statutory regulated economies.
9

CHAPTER 2
THE THEORY OF CORPORATISM
2.1 Introduction
Corporatism is an approach to the investigation of the power relations between organized
interest groups and the state. Critical of the conventional or pluralist ethos of political
arrangements in capitalist liberal democracies, corporatist writers have developed an
alternative interpretation of the interaction between functional interest groups and public
authorities. The negotiated relationship is presented by corporatists as exclusive,
monopolistic, as a mechanism of social control or, for some, as a means of suppressing class
conflict.
The first theoretical reference point of contemporary discussions on corporatism is
Schmitter's definition of 1974. Earlier theorists had referred to the post war entrenchment
of trade associations in the administration as a distinctive form of policy making (Beer 1956).
Corporatism was the intimate involvement of ·the public bureaucracy and organised private
interests in the formulation of economic policy. Schmitter's definition transforms
corporatism from a process of policy making to a political form of the state. His departure
was in identifying corporatism as an institutionally structured system that was neither
competitive nor open, but was a "system of state-licensed monopoly" (Williamson 1989:11).
"Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest
representation in which the constituent units are organised into
a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive,
hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories,
recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted
a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective
categories in exchange for observing certain control on their
selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. "
(Schmitter 1974: 13) .
This initial conceptual statement was designed to overcome the wide variety of interpretations
that theorists brought to the discussion of corporatism, located in their differing concerns
within the wider political, socio-economic and organisational context (Singleton 1990:169).
An ambitious agenda was set by the corporatists and drew criticism to the theory as being
vague and ill-defined. Since Schmitter's reconstruction of corporatism, the focus of enquiry
has altered and the definition expanded and contracted through several theoretical crises. In
more recent work a broad consensus exists that corporatism is a shared approach to the
analysis of organised interests and their relations with the state. Corporatism offers an
alternative menu for investigation but does not aim to be a complete answer to theoretical
issues.
In this chapter plotting the progress of corporatism as a theoretical construct from a historical
ideology, a process of state policy making, a political form of the state, to an explanation of
a particular form of state relations with interest groups lays the foundation for the following
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discussion on the corporatist theoretical model. The key features of corporatist relationship
between the state and participating producer associations are examined with reference to the
earlier conception of corporatism derived from the study of the tripartite relationship between
the state, the labour unions and capital, and the later theoretical formulations of meso
corporatism and private interest governments. Some of the main criticisms of the theory of
corporatism are then touched upon. Corporatist theory is finally assessed in its value to the
study of the New Zealand milk industry and a set of discussion points are presented as a
theoretical agenda through which a greater understanding of the New Zealand Milk Board
history may be achieved.
2.2 Corporatist Ideology
Corporatism as the recent study of particular structured relations in organised interest group
politics is derived from the corporatist ideology that arose in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. Framed in a hierarchical and organic structured society, corporatism was
an idealised vision of how relations between the state and the society might be ordered. In
response to the changing social and economic order of the newly emergent industrial society,
corporatist ideology provided the state with the role of moral guardian and charged it with
the duty to intervene in economic and social affairs to ensure order, stability and self
reliance. The functional interests of labour and capital were to be organised into co-operative
regulatory bodies to oversee economic behaviour and maintain labour's subordinate position.
These state licensed intermediary bodies, corporations, were the mechanisms for state
intervention. Such arrangements encouraged the self regulation of producer's behaviour and
a disciplined workforce that accepted the regulated relationship in exchange for the security
and welfare provided by the corporation. Antagonistic class loyalties were replaced with
functional or sectoral solidarity in the structured relations of the corporation. Restraints on
representative democratic government were expected in obeyance to the higher moral concern
of national interest, justice and the natural hierarchical social order (Williamson 1989:21-34).
Corporatist ideology served to structure and legitimise political and economic arrangements
of certain authoritarian regimes. A system of monopolistic producers' associations and
labour syndicates was established in fascist Italy which allowed capitalist enterprises to
emerge protected by state control of representative interests, the eradication of the producer's
competition and regulated acceSS to political decision making. Thus state licensing of private
interest associations and appeals to the concept of functional representation has historically
provided a means of state influence in production without recourse to direct state intervention
(Williamson 1989:34-44) . In non-authoritarian societies, corporatist structures which bring
labour and capital together under state influence cannot rely on the support of repressive state
mechanisms. However, in highlighting the historical corporatism, Schmitter surmised that
these trends may relate to an undermining of liberal democratic and pluralist forms of
political representation in advanced industrial societies (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979:28-
30).
2.3 Corporatism and Theories of the State
Contemporary discussions about corporatism are derived from a critique of the conventional
description of interest group politics. The pluralist ethos describes the decision making arena
as a competitive market of pressure group interaction. The state institutions are said to
provide a neutral context within which a plurality of elites from representative associations
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of organised interests can influence policy. As a rejection of the pluralist form of the state,
early corporatists set themselves an elaborate task of providing evidence that the forms of
political representation in liberal democracies were changing wherein the state would be soon
characterised by closed policy networks. Schmitter was predicting the development of a new
political form to replace pluralist politics (Cox 1988:296). While this corporatist approach
was found to lack predictive utility at the macro level of the state, theorists have continued
to respond critically to the undifferentiated pluralist description of advanced industrial
societies (Cox 1988:303). Radical materialist, elite and managerial literature have also
informed the debate on state theory. Corporatists have been influenced by these concerns
and have explored both the socio-economic and organisational level of analysis in the study
of group-state interaction.
Corporatist structures are located in the production sphere (Williamson 1989:91-2). Thus
many political theorists have used materialist theoretical constructs to explain corporatism
(e.g., Jessop, Offe, Panitch, Westergaard) where it is defined in the context of advanced
capitalism as a political structure integrating socio-economic groups through mechanisms of
representation, elite co-operation and social control of the masses (Panitch 1980:3). These
arrangements control class politics through a structured compromise of labour with the state
and production agents of capital.
However, empirical evidence does not often support the Marxist presumption that the state
serves the interests of the dominant faction of capital as corporatism has developed in
differing historical and economic conditions (Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979:38; Cox
1988:305). Most corporatists agree that there is an unequal distribution of political power
based on social relations between capital and labour in the production process but they do not
presume the organisation and processes of collective action are exclusively class based. In
functional interest associations, sectoral or industrial interests shared between labour and
capital are often the basis for action against other sectoral interests (Cawson 1988:201).
Corporatist structures also divide those organised interests granted access to the state and
those excluded from such arrangements.
While reference to the socio-economic system may allow appreciation of the dynamics in
capital and labour organisation, it is not appropriate for the analyst to ignore other bases on
which interests are organis~d. Investigation into organisational processes provides one
alternative dimension in interest group study. Managerial literature furnishes the theorist
with further explanatory variables that describe the institutional context for group-state
interaction. Central to recent corporatist theory is the effect of organisational processes on
interest formation and articulation. Theorists have also referred to the state and its
institutional contingencies in explanatory models (Williamson 1989:131-2). Schmitter for
instance, discusses the state's involvement in corporatist arrangements as guided by
organisational contingencies (Schmitter 1985:41-3). It is these other bases on which interests
are organised that are important for the understanding of corporatism.
2.4 The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies
The historical development of corporatist structures in liberal democratic societies has been
variously attributed to the increase in state activity in the post war era (Cawson 1983), the
rise in national economic planning and incomes policy boards (Panitch 1988), or the state's
response to a growing economic crisis where the state, drawn into greater economic
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involvement, pursues corporatist arrangements as an alternative form of political economic
organisation (Winkler 1976). As the bureaucratic state has increased its sphere of activity
it seeks to delegate some of the burden to quasi-public associations. Although the state's
interest may be served by direct intervention, foregoing an extensive regulated intervention
allows the state to retain political legitimacy, avoid the costs involved and make use of the
association's local knowledge and resources (Streeck and Schmitter 1985:22-45).
Corporatist theorists have assumed a role for the state that is often not clear. In claiming that
to exercise control over economic actors the state establishes, enters into and maintains
corporatist arrangements, there was no agreement on what it is that the state seeks to control.
Theories of the state have referred to the general imperatives of the government sought in
corporatist arrangements but have not successfully explained the specific interests served by
this measure of influence the state gains over the behaviour of economic actors. Schmitter
suggests the state's concerns lie in the maintenance of state legitimacy. Cawson and
Saunders postulate that the chief interest is sustaining the hierarchical social order while Offe
argues that it is the need to reconcile contradictory institutional demands that the state seeks
through corporatist arrangements (Schmitter 1985:41-3; Offe 1981:153-5; Cawson &
Saunders 1983:26; Cawson 1986:56). Williamson suggests the state's involvement is
demanded by the need to maintain a social order while addressing· the tensions inherent
between the intervening state institutions and the production sector of the economy. By
exploring how corporatist structures resolve the existent conflict it is possible to appreciate
the state's effort to maintain "a social order against socio-economic pressures inimical to it"
and provide a crucial focus for corporatist analysis (Williamson 1989:138-140).
Production associations enter into corporatist arrangements with the state to prevent direct
state intervention, to retain some autonomy and to acquire a greater share of resources and
status. The public status offered to the association includes access to state resources and
authority, access to members it may represent and its involvement in policy planning and
implementation (Offe 1981:136-7). However it is a perceived threat of state intervention that
typically motives the association to conform. In a liberal democracy compliance would be
ensured through each association being individually vulnerable to the threat of the state acting
authoritatively (Williamson 1989:109).
The association's power structure is appropriately hierarchical in the leadership's control over
the members to ensure the implementation of policies formed through unrepresentative
bargains struck with the state. To maintain its sovereignty over members the association
must ensure they have no recourse to alternative representation and thus the association often
becomes a monopolistic supplier of personal or productive services for members as an
inducement for their collaboration (Olson 1965). Its authority is reinforced by some means
of compulsory membership sustained by the state and the industry. When the association
satisfactorily regulates behaviour it becomes redefined in the political arena as a state
dependent regulatory body.
At the centre of Schmitter's definition of corporatism "is the idea of the state licensing
organised interests, which affords some measure of influence over their behaviour, in return
for publicly sanctioned monopoly." (Williamson 1989:89). Schmitter's earlier system of
intermediation between the association and the state was extended by Cawson, and further
encapsulated in the theory of private interest government theory, to include the role of
enforcement of government policy (Cawson 1983:455). The state delegates a measure of its
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authority to the association to exercise on its own behalf providing the association with the
privilege of "the ability to rely on legitimate coercion." (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985:20). The
regulatory role of the association does not refer to the application of typical internal
regulations that members accept as necessary for the smooth functioning of the organisation
but the imposition of external regulations on behalf of the state (Crouch 1983:458; Grant
1985a:20-1).
A further role played by the regulatory leadership is the structuring and distortion of
members interests. Streeck and Schmitter describe an interactive relationship between social
and organisational structures which shapes and constrains collective identity formation
(Streeck & Schmitter 1985:19). Groups "no longer merely reflect or represent interests, but
are a part of the process of forming them." (Cawson 1986:12). This function frees the
leadership from accountability in its representative function. In a corporatist relationship,
members accept the legitimacy of the association in its role as a regulatory and enforcing
agency even when they do not support particular interventions (Streeck & Schmitter
1985:20).
Therefore for the association to act as a public regulator, certain organisational conditions
are required.' All producers that are the target for intervention must fall under the
association's jurisdiction. This may be achieved through the licensing of individual
producers or the imposition of a scheme -of standards to be met by the producers. As the
leadership needs to control and monitor the member-producers activities, and at times elicit
their collaboration, there is the demand for careful use of sanctions and inducements, and a
change in the form of the association to include its regulatory functions. While the full
implications of the contradictory mantle of both regulator and representative requires further
study, a potent area of tension exists within the corporatist structure. It is also evident that
as the association takes on a greater role in implementing public policy the form of
corporatist relations becomes more developed and the containment of this conflict becomes
more crucial to the corporatist agent's future (Williamson 1989:110-112).
2.5 Meso Corporatism
Corporatism was initially defined in the literature as a tripartite relationship between the peak
associations of state, capital~and labour at the national level (Singleton 1990:165). Attention
was primarily focused on national incomes policy agreements where the integration of
organised interests into government decision making was most apparent. However,
corporatism has not been a useful explanatory concept of entire political systems and many
writers have realigned their inquiry to examine corporatism below the national or macro-level
(Schmitter & Lehmbruch 1982:1-28; Grant 1985; Cawson 1985; Crouch 1983). With their
primary focus as the specialised interest associations at the sectoral level, meso corporatism
marks an explicit shift in analysis from the macro-focus describing a particular form of state
to a concept concerned once again with the process of policy making.
Meso corporatist interest intermediation also suffers problems of definition. While
Wassenberg attempts to distinguish meso from macro corporatism in terms of the institutional
level of both the state and private actors involved (Wassenberg 1982:85), Lehmbruch's
definition focuses on the relationship between the state and a single sector or branch of
industry (in Young 1990:74). To avoid the rigidity contained in such definitions, Cawson
preferred to focus on both the structural level of the interest association and the characteristic
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issues each level is interested in (Cawson 1985:11-12). However, examples of cross-level
corporatism persist to confuse even this distinction. Williamson suggests the solution lies in
referring to the scope of issue as a base for separating the levels, pointing to the recognizable
"distinction between broad national economic problems of intervention and more restricted
problems of intervention into specific sectors." (Williamson 1989:159).
Rather than the tripartite relations familiar in macro corporatism, meso corporatism may
often concern a bilateral arrangement between, for instance, the state and capital. The class
dimension that is prominent at the macro level is undermined or absent in sectoral relations
where capital and labour may share a common interest in seeking state assistance.
Moreover, while in studies of corporatism involving peak associations at the national level
political, organisational and social characteristics are crucial conditions for its establishment,
it is the structure of the sectoral economy that is the predominant factor of meso corporatist
arrangements. Certain products and industries seem more appropriate targets for meso
corporatism. Some writers contend that the development of corporatist arrangements can be
attributed to the needs of a specific environment, the agricultural sector is frequently cited
as a prime example. The corporatization of the dairy industry in particular has been
consistently referred to as evidence of the existence of certain policy areas that are best
served through institutions of group self regulation (Keeler 1987; Metcalfe & McQuillan
1979).
2.6 Private Interest Government
Maintaining the focus on bipartite relations, Streeck and Schmitter describe a further
theoretical refinement: the private interest government (PIG). By PIG they refer to
"arrangements under which an attempt is made to make
associative, self-interested collective action contribute to the
achievement of public policy objectives ... At its core is a
distinctive principle of interaction and allocation among a
privileged set of actors. The key actors are organisations
defined by their common purpose of defending and promoting
functionally-defined interest, i.e. class, sectoral and
professional assl9ciations. The central principle is that of
concertation, or negotiation within and among a limited and
fixed set of interest organisations that mutually recognise each
other's status and entitlements and are capable of reaching and
implementing relatively stable compromises (pacts) in the
pursuit of their interests." (Streeck & Schmitter 1985:10,17) .
Pluralist pressure groups develop into PIG's through a typical political process which begins
with disputes between state agencies and the interest association concerning the nature of
authoritative state intervention into the association's members' behaviour. Incorporation and
the acquisition of public authority by the association follow with association avoiding direct
state control and the state solving efficiency, legitimacy and cost problems inherent in an
exercise of direct intervention. The feature that distinguishes private interest government
from other forms of intermediation is the extent of the delegation of public powers to the
interest association by which it can regulate its members. As an intermediary between the
state and individual members, the association assumes public powers, is involved in public
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policy making and is extended public regulatory functions by the state. The granting of
political status to the interest group is expressed by means of a special relationship with the
state wherein the association participates in the processes of decision making and
enforcement, sharing the state's authority (Streeck & Schmitter 1985:10-20).
2.7 Conclusion: The Validity of Corporatism in the Study of the Milk
Industry
Criticism of corporatism was fielded from several fronts: Marxists decrying the lack of class
analysis in the concept (e.g. Panitch 1980); empiricists criticising the validity of corporatism
to describe contemporary state forms (e.g. Therborn 1987); and the pluralists who believe
corporatism is contained within the pluralist model. The corporatists' response was to
modify and redefine the concept. The current reorientation in corporatist studies to meso
corporatism and private interest government may have provided the theorists with a useful
analytical tool. Some have reiterated the criticism of the pluralist that such behaviour is still
incorporated within current theoretical constructs and that "corporatism" is a superfluous
theoretical statement. However what distinguishes the corporatist model from pluralism is
the absence of voluntary associative behaviour. Associations under pluralism still remain
dependent on members' support for any policing activities of the regulatory body. In the
corporatist model the regulations must be accepted and complied with. Only the jurisdiction
of the association is possibly subject to review not the legitimacy of a particular agreement
(see Williamson 1989:Chapter 9).
Corporatism is a distinctive form of interest intermediation which permits indirect state
intervention through the allocation of public status to regulatory producer associations.
Several defining characteristics of corporatism have persisted throughout the permutations
of theoretical development including the most advanced form presented by theorists, the
private· interest government. The state-licensed association ensures compliance with
negotiated arrangements and, in the more developed form, acts as an enforcing agency by
implementing imposed regulations on behalf of the state. As an explanatory concept the
meso corporatist analysis of specialised interest associations at the sectoral level has offered
a more valuable framework for empirical studies and is instructive in the study of the dairy
industry.
In the preceding review of European and American milk industries, the needs of this specific
sector appeared conducive to the development of corporatist arrangements between the sector
and the state. Statutory regimes consistently structured the milk industries, licensing
monopolistic representative associations to regulate producer behaviour and implement state
agricultural policy. Through the delegation of public authority to the self regulatory private
government, the state was able to secure market stability, contain industrial conflict and
institute programs of restructuring and rationalization of the milk economy.
Several questions arise from this review that will serve to inform this current historical study
of the New Zealand Milk Board. Initially it is important to ask that given the validity of
corporatism as an explanatory model for the structuring of many milk industries in liberal
democracies, does it apply to the organization of the milk marketing system of New Zealand
and in what way does the New Zealand practice of corporatism differ from other documented
cases? How does private interest governance affect the industry's capacity to perform? Are
corporatist arrangements the most efficient means of organizing the sector? Does this system
17
protect the industry while safeguarding the needs of the producerS (income security), of the
consumers (supply and quality control), of the dairy companies (supply and price stability)
and the state (implementation of policy and avoidance of both market conflict and political
controversy)? Are certain economic actors of the sector marginalized by corporatist policies?
As an analytical tool, the meso corporatist model of private government offers much to the
inquiry into the relations between the state and the interest groups. The literature review
suggests further considerations of significance. Do corporatist structures allow stabilization
of the market in the face of conflicting parties' demands in the sector? Is corporatism a
means of conflict management for the milk industry? Does it constitute an appropriate
mechanism by which the state can implement institutional changes demanded by the needs
of the broader economic agenda such as restructuring, rationalization or modernization? Is
the corporatization of the milk industry a means of providing the sector and the state with
a genuinely positive problem solving capacity? Is this affected by external structural or
economic conditions? Finally, how durable are corporate structures? Given the specific
environment that is required for corporate structures to prevail, would specific changes to,
for example the political climate, threaten the continuance of these structural arrangements?
In the exploration of these concerns in the history of the New Zealand Milk Board it is hoped
to offer a greater understanding ofJhe interaction between key parties in the establishment,
maintenance and operation of state licensed· bodies.
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CHAPTER 3
HISTORY OF THE NEW ZEALAND MILK BOARD
3.1 Introduction
Growing concern in the community over the inadequate milk service had been the catalyst
for the reorganisation of the national milk supply. The poor response of the milk sector to
early local initiatives served as a catalyst for a national inquiry into the liquid milk industry.
The Milk Commission of 1944 was then set up by the government to report on the obstacles
to a better milk service. This chapter explores the link established between the organisation
of the milk industry and its ability to provide a quality service within the context of the Milk
Commission's report. It outlines those early efforts to secure a constant high quality milk
supply through structuring the industry, examines the problems of organisation and poor
conditions of many local milk supplies featured in the report, and discusses the Commission's
recommendations for industrial reorganisation that was to serve as the basis for the regulated
milk industry. This chapter is largely derived from the Report of the Milk Commission
(1944).
3.2 Early Organization of the Milk Industry
Regular practices had been established in all sectors of the industry prior to the first Milk Act
of 1944. However the manner in which industrial organization of liquid milk processing had
developed in many regions did not assure market stability nor a regular supply of quality
milk for the consumer. Each area evolved a distinctive system in response to particular
circumstances which was often determined by economic conditions or pressure from
interested parties. Wellington and Auckland alone had effectively sought a directed
organization of liquid milk supplies.
The earliest regulations concerning milk production enabled local health boards in 1881 to
licence and inspect local dairy farms as a precaution against outbreaks of milk related
diseases. Quality standards were formalized in legislation of 1883, superseded by the Food
and Drugs Act 1908. Milk alad Dairies Regulations of 1895 authorized some local authorities
to control retail milk sales. In 1898 these regulations were replaced with the Dairy Industry
Act administered by the Department of Agriculture.
The Wellington municipal authority had a virtual monopoly of the milk supplied in the city,
controlling the industry since 1918 with the inception of the powerful producers' group the
Wellington Dairy Farmers' Association and the City Council's Municipal Milk Department.
The Council had received its authority through the local Milk Supply Act of 1910. As the
quality of milk and conditions of its supply continued to decline, the complete reorganization
of the milk supply in Wellington had become imperative. The collaboration of the producers
and the Milk Department provided the city with an economical quality treatment and
distribution service which guaranteed the producers a secure income. Their relationship with
the Department ensured a higher price for the supplier and better quality milk for the
consumer than could be found elsewhere in New Zealand. The pressure to secure the supply
of high quality milk led to the Council's adoption of a system that controlled both supply
levels and the standard butterfat content of milk. The scope of the Wellington organization,
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its volume of business and standard of production make it conspicuous among other less
successful ventures.
Auckland's metropolitan Milk Council arose from a severe price war between companies in
the 1930s which was reducing returns to the milk supplier sufficiently to threaten their
livelihood and the future city supply. The Council was created by 1933 Milk Council Statute
to organize and protect the supply. It achieved control of the industry through the issue of
licenses to milk producers, the adoption of a zoning scheme (1940) to rationalize the
distribution of milk, the initiation of a system of quality testing and by placing selling
agencies under the Council's jurisdiction. In response to the deleterious condition brought
on by unrestricted competition, the Auckland authorities developed a unique system of "tight
pools". Each tight pool consisted of groups of producers associated with a particular treating
house who were licensed to supply that house rather than the city directly. Thus the Council
was able to control the output of milk to some extent.
The irregularity and poor quality of the Dunedin liquid milk service had also led to the
eventual organization of a producers' body. Prior to the formation of the Dairy Farmers'
Co-operative Milk Supply Co Ltd, the industry was controlled by the vendors and producer-
vendors under the Dunedin Milk Vendors' Association and reflected their commercial
interests. The incorporation of the Milk Supply Co in 1942 led to the negotiation of
industrial contracts between the two key actor~ and allowed producers to regain some control
over their business. The Milk Commission (1944) suggested this reorganization would
eventually allow the development of the milk supply to a more favourable condition.
Controlled by a local Milk Supply Act 1914, the Christchurch milk industry remained in a
state of disorganization. Although not suffering from the substandard supply of other
regions, it was characterized by strong hostility between sectors of the industry. The
producers were organized according to their affiliation with the raw milk or pasteurized milk
vendors, the parties to the conflict. Thus it was the vendors who dominated the industry and
determined prices, contracted terms, supplies to be used and the method of seasonal
adjustment. As conditions of supply in Christchurch had not provoked either the
establishment of successful producer associations or better industrial organization there was
no recourse to agreed policies for quality control or guaranteed supply.
"In each centre the vendors' associations controlled the direction of the industry and their
commercial considerations shaped the organization of productive activities. The demand for
milk was made through the vendors and they determined all aspects of the supply: the
quantity, the time, the conditions and the price. In the most pronounced case of commercial
monopoly, Christchurch vendors controlled the level and standard of production through their
commercial activities. They naturally sought to purchase milk produced at the lowest price
which was to determine the quality and consistency of the milk supply.
Characteristic of the vendors' domination was the lack of standardized control over the whole
process of milk production. Quality control had not been achieved through the commercial
led organization of the industry. While natural conditions permitted the maintenance of a
better supply than elsewhere, the weakened position of the Christchurch producers still
threatened the security of the milk supplied for consumption in terms of quality and quantity.
When supplies were inadequate to meet the winter demand all regions relied on suppliers
from outside the regulated stock through the issue of temporary contracts, undermining the
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efforts at improving the quality of milk offered. Responsibility for the condition of
processing was divided between the Health Department, the Department of Agriculture and
the City Council who were all guided by different regulations and administered through
licensing. A multiplicity of licenses existed which did not ensure efficiency in their
inspection system. It was also found that when farmers could not adequately secure a viable
income through the production of liquid milk they sought the security of the guaranteed price
programme in supplying the factory milk industry. Thus both the maintenance of the volume
of milk output and higher hygiene standards demanded by the consumer remained in doubt
with the uncertain economies of the industry.
The initiation of organization in liquid milk production was often prompted by the severe
conflicts between producer and vendor interests which had prevented the industry from
meeting the demand for high quality milk. The chaotic conditions of rationing, failed supply
and poor quality milk, encouraged the members of the City Councils in Auckland and
Wellington to organize and strengthen the producers in an effort to control commercial
interests. While policy was determined by the vendors in Dunedin and Christchurch, even
the organized systems instituted in Auckland and Wellington remained influenced by the
dictates of commercial enterprise.
"...even in Wellington the Milk Department avows a policy of freedom to
control the supplies and to shape "its policy so as to receive profit from its
undertakings as well as protect its capital rather than to ensure adequate
supplies of milk of high standard." (Milk Commission Report 1944:7).
While producer organisation promised the cooperation of all suppliers, control of the output,
and protection of producers' interests, a centralized authority was still required to overcome
the persistent problems faced in the supply of milk for consumption.
3.3 Conditions of the Early Milk Industry
The attempts at restructuring had not overcome the many problems endemic to the industry.
Each region was unable to meet the demand for a regular supply of high quality milk.
Predicting the quantity of milk required by the consumer was complicated by fluctuations in
'"demand and seasonal variation in production capacity. While a constant-supply was required
throughout the whole year, normal dairy farming practice was seasonal, falling off during
winter months. Most vendor arrangements recognized the difficulty in procuring winter
supplies and they had sought to overcome this problem through higher price rates offered in
winter contracts. Prior to the regulation of the industry, the Second World War had also
created a shortage of farm labour and fertilizer and a heavy and irregular demand for milk
was generated by the American armed forces. A milk in schools scheme was inaugurated
in March 1937 which also required a regular but broken supply. The growth in population,
the increase in public purchasing power and the Health Department's campaign to increase
milk consumption all served to augment the demand for milk beyond the industry's capacity.
Thus the earlier supply of milk was characterized by periods of rationing, outside factory
stocks, inadequate supplies and many schools did not receive milk throughout the winter
months.
As records of consumption were not adequate, estimates of consumer demand remained
unknown. The Commission of 1944 (p 5) estimated the total daily quantities of milk
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consumed as :
City
Auckland
Wellington and Hutt Valley
Christchurch
Dunedin
Total
Population
(1941)
223,700
160,500
135,500
82,200
601,900
Sales
(gallons)
28,000
20,000
13,000
8,800
69,800
Average consumption: 0.12 gallons or 0.96 pints per person
The average stated in the New Zealand Official Year Book (1941) is 0.62 pints, the
difference perhaps attributable to armed forces consumption. The desired level of
consumption suggested by the health authorities was 1.75 pints per person. Even a modest
consumption of 1.00 pint per day, in a growing population demanded a substantial increase
in supply.
Population increases had not been met by growth in herd numbers; in most cases a decrease
in both the dairies licensed for town milk production and the herd numbers was registered.
Dunedin was the most affected with a steady decline of 2,063 cows on licensed dairies from
1938-1943. Tracts of former dairy land were being used for other more lucrative forms of
production. Mixed farming practices allowed this transition to be both simple and attractive.
Over ten years in Christchurch one sixth fewer farmers were supplying town milk.
In this climate all districts experienced shortages in their attempts to supply the needs of the
public. While in Christchurch there was a rationing of school supplies during the winter
months of 1938-1942, Aucklanders faced the suspension of the milk in schools scheme,
restricted supplies for the armed forces, milk shops and milk bars, and severe rationing of
household supplies by 1943. Moreover, the reduction in available producers had prevented
the adoption of stringent quality standards. While the amount of dairies that met the
standards for the issue of a license from the Department of Agriculture declined, temporary
licenses were often employed. Officially recognized in 1939 by the Department seeking
some control over this supply source, dairies issued with an emergency temporary license did
not meet the strict hygiene requirements that were expected for a permanent license. Thus
when the factory suppliers were employed in times of shortage, a further unsatisfactory
supply was incorporated. A manufactured milk supplier, the NZ Cooperative Dairy
Company, had provided 680,576 gallons of substandard milk in 1943 and yet there were still
shortages in milk supply.
Most districts possessed favourable natural conditions for dairy production in terms of fertile
land and capacity to produce winter feed (especially Christchurch and Auckland) which
suggested that the policy of production was the significant variable in supply shortages. A
continuous supply throughout the year, or "level supply", was the strategy sought by the
authorities. While summer supplies could be assured, the restructuring of the production
schedule and the demand for winter feed made winter production more demanding and
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expensive. Higher price rates, already a feature of contracts for winter milk supply, had not
prevented the severe shortages faced during the winter months. A more lucrative seasonal
variation in prices was necessary to secure the winter suppliers' income and thus a level
supply for the town milk needs. The Christchurch industry was the nearest approximation
to the level supply standard, due in part to favourable natural conditions but largely attributed
to the more advantageous terms of contracts between vendors and producers. However the
Christchurch system created a surplus of milk produced in summer. The incorporation of
this surplus into the dairy industry raised concern over the level supply of liquid milk.
Quality control was a primary feature of milk industry regulation and was already initiated
in several aspects of production: health of the herds, composition of the milk, hygiene
conditions in the milking stations and processing plants, methods of treatment and distribution
and freshness of the milk sold. These regulations were contained in the Dairy Industry Act
1908, the Health Act 1920, the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1908 and several local bylaws.
Thus several different agents were responsible for quality control of liquid milk. The
attendant poor standards demanded a better system of regulation.
The Health Department sampled the butterfat content of milk and found the average content
as Wellington 4.6%, Auckland 4.31%, Christchurch 4.12% and Dunedin 3.85%. Prices for
higher fat content in Wellington and in some of the supply pools in Auckland had encouraged
farmers to select cattle that produced richer milk. The minimum butterfat content in
Auckland had already been raised to 3.5%. The practice of payment by gallonage as applied
in Christchurch and Dunedin encouraged the production of quantity rather than quality
supplies. Many of the herds used in Christchurch and Dunedin were providing very poor
quality milk and their minimum butterfat content remained at 3.25%.
The laboratory testing systems did not adequately monitor for the contamination of milk. All
milk was checked for bacteria content in compliance with the provisions of the Food and
Drugs Act. However the regular testing of milk samples was not a satisfactory method of
control. Health Department checks found 13% of samples from the Auckland Milk Council
exceeded the prescribed plate count of 100,000 bacteria. When supplies from outside the
regulated area were analyzed their bacterial count was regularly excessive and condemned
by the Health officials. In Christchurch and Dunedin the conditions at plants promoted
poorer quality milk, often B'eing more contaminated after treatment. The exceptional high
standard achieved in Wellington was a consequence of the implementation of a very efficient
testing regime. Payment was determined by the quality of supplies offered. A good
laboratory service, extensive testing procedures and a financial incentive to produce high
quality milk fostered the best standards.
Conditions in milking station, treatment plants and collection depots were substandard. Many
facilities required rebuilding, re-equipping and modernizing. While the organization of the
Wellington industry ensured fastidious conditions of milk processing, production in the other
regions was characterized by defective quality control. The standard of cleanliness demanded
for the industry was absent in many dairy farms. The equipment was outmoded, little
improvement had been attempted and few farms contained refrigerators. The treatment
plants needed extensive alterations, re-equipping and improved procedural hygiene methods.
In these inadequate conditions, contamination of the milk is possible at every stage of the
process. The Commission summary mentioned that
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" a number of plants inspected by the Commission are out of date; little, if
any, attempt is made to ensure that only clean, fresh milk is treated; and the
conditions under which they are operated expose the milk to immediate
recontamination." (Milk Commission Report 1944:9).
Pasteurization was encouraged by the authorities for the health of the consuming public.
However the installation of the equipment was not sufficient to ensure the safety of milk.
While the re-equipment of treatment facilities was apriority, the whole process from milking
shed to household delivery required vigilance over hygiene standards for pasteurization to be
effective. The Commission stated that many procedures in the treatment plants suggested that
pasteurization was implemented only to "improve keeping-quality". The bottling of milk was
also considered another means by which the risk of contamination could be reduced. Many
efforts at treatment were undermined in delivery to households of milk by can and dipper
(loose), risking contamination through increased human contact. The extensive quality
control regime of the Wellington Milk Department did not permit the delivery of loose
pasteurized milk or raw milk for retail.
The Commission estimated the .following picture of milk supplies:
Pasteurized Bottled
Total* Retail Retail
Auckland 84% 70% 46%
Wellington 86% 77% All
Christchurch 37% 15% 21%
Dunedin 50% 31% 22%
* Includes retail milk, wholesale milk and milk sold under a special contract (Milk
Commission Report 1944:9).
Ineffective pasteurization methods encouraged suspicion over the laudatory claims for treated
milk. The supply of raw milk was still demanded by many consumers. However the risks
of a contaminated supply were..,high. Cattle were not initially subjected to extensive testing
for TE or other bovine diseases. Raw milk supplied to a military camp by the Wellington
Milk Department was expected to be drawn from TB tested herds. When first tested, a high
5.4% reaction was discovered which highlighted the need for all sources of raw milk to be
tested for TE. This health risk was compounded by unacceptable practices in the transport
and the distribution of milk. The time that elapsed before some milk stocks were collected
for processing allowed quantities to become stale prior to arrival at the treatment plant. Milk
produced the previous night was left out and picked up with the morning stock. During the
delivery of processed milk conditions of cartage threatened contamination. Milk left at open
depots, transported by uncovered vans and the practice of carrying loose milk were features
of the early milk distribution that gave authorities cause for concern.
Distribution was not only hygienically inadequate, the transport and the delivery of milk
suffered from wasteful, inefficient practices. Wartime Emergency Regulations issued in 1940
to control goods deliveries and conserve both petrol and tyres, had included milk delivery
zoning. While these regulations were lifted after the war, they were replaced by special Milk
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Delivery Regulations that retained the economic distribution encouraged in the zoning
scheme. However in a survey of vendors rounds of Christchurch (56 vendors of 153
furnished an account of their round) many inefficiencies in the distribution sector remained
apparent. The 2,442 gallons of milk these vendors carted daily could be transported in three
truck loads. Yet 56 vehicles were in operation for this amount at a substantially higher cost.
On average each driver carried 36.5 gallons daily, whereas the rationalized delivery system
in Wellington enabled each distributor to deliver 120 gallons per day. Vendor margins to
cover the costs of collection and distribution reflected the inefficiencies of most services.
While not perceived as too exorbitant, margins did not encourage efficient practices nor
improve conditions.
.Both successful quality control and level supply seemed based on a system of regulated
behaviour and financial inducements. The inadequate state of the town milk supply could
be attributed to the failure to reflect the needs of the industry through a supportive price
structure and regulatory system. Prices to producers did not generally indicate the need for
a winter supply, the importance of quality control and butterfat content. Most regions were
unable to meet the demand in winter months. While contractual agreements had supported
a seasonally adjusted price rate, the higher production costs were not met by the rates. It
was indicative of the lack of appeal of the income received by liquid milk production that
both herd numbers in production and permanent licenses issued had been in steady decline.
In Dunedin the prices paid to the producer were so low that they were regarded as decisive
in the serious deterioration of milk supplies.
In Christchurch the shortages were not as pronounced. This was in part attributable to the
terms of contracts vendors undertook with the supplying farmers, two different methods
being used: the winter quota and the declared quantity. The producer under the winter quota
system received the town milk supply price throughout the year for quantities equivalent to
the amount produced in the winter and factory prices for the surplus. The declared quantity
scheme bound the farmer to provide the pledged amount for which the town milk supply
price was paid and the balance received the factory price. Both methods tended to "stimulate
winter production and to induce an all-the-year-round level supply" (Milk Commission
Report 1944:28). Moreover to ensure supply account had to be made of the guaranteed price
for dairy factory supplies.
The system of payment on the basis of gallonage which was practised in the Christchurch and
the Dunedin milk industries did not increase the butterfat content or the quality level of
supplies. There was no incentive for the farmer to be responsible for the improvement of
facilities or the adoption of non-contamination practices. The highest butterfat average was
attained in Wellington where the farmer was penalized for low quality supplies. Offering
second grade milk cost the producer 1 pence below the rate allowed. Lower quality milk
was not paid for and the supplier was charged for cartage to the depot. Butterfat rates were
calculated at 17.25 pence per pound of butterfat and in the winter months a further 85% was
added. The Commission reported that "this system of testing, grading and payment has an
immediate and direct affect on the quality of the supply" (Milk Commission Report 1944:25).
While the service remained inadequate it was perceived as harmful to the future growth in
consumption. Greater efficiency was necessary in all aspects of production to prevent
excessive costs becoming prohibitive of milk consumption. Consumers were offered milk
at greatly varying prices in the four districts which were in no way responsive to the different
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costs in production. Without standardized consumer prices, cheaper low quality milk
remained competitive.
3.4 The Milk Commission's Recommendations
After extensive documentation of the condition of the milk industry, the Milk Commission
of 1944 reported on the reorganization required to facilitate adequate supplies of high quality
milk. The difficulties were recognized as problems of organization and price. The producer
co-operative basis of the dairy industry organization was considered an appropriate model for
the milk industry to emulate. To engage a form of organization already successfully
operating in the New Zealand dairy sector suggested that it was the most relevant for the
New Zealand context and provided justification for the Commission to prevent other interests
taking precedent over co-operative control of producers.
The system proposed by the Commission would be controlled by a Central Authority which
would act as an intermediary between the industry and the government. While acting as
administrative authority of government policy and representing the industry to the
government, it was the expressed concern of the Commission that the Central Authority
remained independent particularly in terms of its responsibility to fix prices for the industry.
Local authorities were to be set up and administer control over milk treatment and
distribution as had been successfully applied in the Wellington borough. The Metropolitan
Milk Councils were to improve standards and economy in all sectors of the industry. Strong
producer associations were noted for their success in facilitating stability and organization
of production. Hence the Commission recommended that Dairy Farmers' Co-operative Milk
Supply Associations be supported. Supply "Associations were to protect the interests of the
producer, safeguard the vendor-producer relationship, and thus enable long term planning.
In calculating the price for producers, the Commission stated the need for reference to both
the guaranteed price for butter and cheese and the relationship between economy, quality and
price, and stability in the price regime. The uniform price was to be based on the guaranteed
price with allowances for extra costs. In pursuance of the same principles, vendor margins
were to encourage efficiency and public health in the distribution sector. They were to pay
the full annual quota producer price to the Supply Association with the addition of collection
costs and a Milk Council levy.\" Margins for processing and distribution were to be set by
the Central Authority. Consumer prices were to be protected through the adoption of
economic measures in the industry. All milk was to retail at one price.
There were several features of a new milk industry that the Commission wished to have
introduced. The problem of securing an adequate level supply was met with the suggestion
for Supply Associations to produce a surplus of 10% of expected demand at all times. With
careful use of surpluses, producer interests could be safeguarded while the supply of milk
was assured for the consumer. To improve the collection and distribution services, zoning
was to be implemented. The distribution of raw milk and loose milk was condemned by the
Commission who sought the eradication of these practices. The Central Authority was to
institute stringent standards for the treatment and processing of milk. This would entail
extensive reorganization and the provision of testing facilities by the Supply Association or
the Milk Council in collaboration with the treatment plant.
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3.5 Conclusion
The dissatisfactory conditions of the procuring and supplying of liquid milk to the domestic
market was highlighted in the Milk Commission's report of 1944 and served as a strong
argument for the restructuring of the milk sector. In the next chapter the Commission's
pressure on the government is observed to shape a successful political lobby for the
establishment of a highly regulated national milk scheme under the Milk Act of 1944.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ORIGINS OF THE MILK BOARD
4.1 Introduction
The following chapter describes the new milk scheme that was established under the
legislation of 1944. It outlines the new organisational structures introduced to the industry
and the implementation of new practices in the production, processing, and distribution of
town milk. A brief history of the development of regulatory agricultural economies in New
Zealand is initially provided as a historical backdrop to the realisation of a regulatory system
that was to shape the milk industry for four decades.
4.2 Marketing Boards in the New Zealand Context
In many countries marketing boards have been a statutory means of organizing a market to
serve the interests of particular groups. They are readily associated with the stabilization of
markets and prices, increased industrial efficiency and reduced market conflict. Marketing
boards often command control over prices., quantities, entry to markets, and the distribution
of costs and benefits. Sadan suggests that the primary objective of a board is to secure the
bargaining position of the producer in a central organization sanctioned by the government
authorities to manipulate the market in favour of these privileged participants (Sadan
1979:210,233).
Prior to the first world war, opposition to government interference in New Zealand markets
prevailed. The government's need for various export commodities during the war led to the
stabilization of prices under state control. When the lifting of controls in 1921 coincided
with a slump in prices the producers demanded the reinstatement of control measures to
check the market power of overseas processing firms, transport companies and importers.
In this period statutory boards were created to regulate a range of activities ranging from
town planning to export marketing (Condliffe 1959:12 cited in Veeman 1979:102). The first
producer boards established~in New Zealand in the 1920s were export marketing boards of
meat (1922) and dairy products (1923).
The role of the early boards was confined to promotional activities, reduction of seasonal
fluctuations in export produce and securing better freight and insurance charges. The boards
were viewed with scepticism by the business community as a mechanism to protect vested
interests at its expense. The Chamber of Commerce frequently voiced concern at the
"encroachment of public control in business" (Stephens 1936: 783). The establishment of
the Dairy Control Board had been opposed by proprietary factories and selling agents. An
initial attempt by the Dairy Board to exercise absolute control over prices and sales in 1926-7
was unsuccessful but its policy of absolute control was seen as an attempt by the New
Zealand Co-Operative Dairy Company, of Auckland, to dominate the industry. The Dairy
Board's display of marketing inexperience enhanced the mercantile's case against the exercise
of such widespread power. The composition of the Board after the next election reflected
the discontent at the extension of such controls (Stephens 1936:770-9).
29
The new Labour government of 1935 abolished many of these early boards and took direct
control of the activities of others. The Primary Products Marketing Act (1936) established
a department that provided for direct government involvement in agricultural trade. To
insulate producers from uncertain markets, produce was purchased at guaranteed price levels
while the risks and the profits were absorbed by the Primary Produce Marketing Department.
Dairy producers accepted this institutional control, whereas producers of meat and wool who
opposed the new marketing regime remained outside the regulatory system of the government
until the second world war (Veeman 1979:102).
After the war, producers lobbied for a return to greater participation in the market which led
to the reinstatement of marketing boards by the time of the National government of 1949.
The fonner marketing department was abolished in 1953. New boards were formed in the
1940s as government-producer agencies which were responsible for the pricing and export
activities of the industry. National economic stabilization had become a priority to the
government and was sought through the manipulation of the market, primarily by means of
a central agency that regulated prices. A centralized marketing regime was often used as a
means of stabilizing market conditions for producers, processors and consumers alike (Sadan
1979:233). Government policies of stability were frequently pursued in agrarian economies
and indicated the ability for other nations to afford this degree of stabilization (Weststrate
1959:178). Both the export trading provisions and governmental concern for a stable
economy during the war provided the primary produce industries in NZ with stabilization
reserve funds from withheld sale proceeds. These funds were to become the financial basis
of the new boards' price stabilization programs (Veeman 1979:103). The liquid milk sector,
with pressure to improve its supply, was an early subject of governmental stabilization
policy. On the recommendation of the Milk Commission of 1944 (Milk Commission Report
1944: Part II) a regulatory regime for the milk industry was to be organized.
4.3 The Milk Act 1944
A Central Milk Council was established under the Act of 1944 to direct and regulate the
industry. It met in Wellington under the Chair of the Minister of Health and consisted of
one person from the NZ Municipal Association, two representatives of the milk producers,
one from each island, and two people recommended by the Minister of Health, one being a
woman representative for w0II\.en and children's interests. It set up a Milk Marketing
Division in the Primary Products Marketing Department to arrange the pricing system. The
Director of Milk Marketing also sat on the Council. The general objectives that determined
the role of the Council were:
"(a) The provision of an adequate supply of milk of good quality for human
consumption:
(b) The organization of the production, treatment, and distribution of milk
on an economic basis having regard to the need for an adequate supply
of milk as foresaid." (Milk Act 1944 Part 8:100).
The Council was primarily an advisory agency with few regulatory powers at its disposal.
Its principal functions included research and promotion of methods in the production,
treatment, collection, distribution, preservation and storage of milk. The powers the Council
did hold included the right to direct a local Milk Authority to procure a pasteurization plant,
to fix the maximum payable for the goodwill of a milk vendor's business, and to arbitrate
30
in disputes between Milk Authorities, supply or vendor associations.
The Act encouraged the reorganization of the industry at all levels. Every milk district was
to be administered by a Milk Authority, possibly a board or a borough council, designed to
control the supply and distribution of milk within their area. The members of local Milk
Authorities were elected by the local councilor borough from among their own constituents.
Subject to the fluctuations of political changes, the continuity of the Milk Authority's
supervision of the industry was dependent on its administrative staff, marketing officials and
government representatives (Bell 1954:3). Each Milk Authority's administrative expenses
were covered by a levy imposed on milk sold in the district, limited to 0.125 pence a gallon
(Milk Act 1944:37).
The duties expected of the Milk Authority were wide ranging and included the power to
conduct the business of the milk industry, devise and promote improvements in production,
processing and distribution, to license and administer the sale, treatment and delivery of
milk, and to inspect facilities. However the indifference of the industry in many regions did
not initially encourage the widespread formation of milk authorities. Boards that were
established were concerned primarily with the licensing and zoning of vendors and were not
involved with the production or treatment sectors (Henderson 1978:3,8).
Milk producer organizations were also f9stered and when approved were authorized to
license and supply the milk required in the region. The Milk Marketing Division entered
into contracts with the Supply Associations wherein the Association guaranteed the milk
supply and the Division ensured the price to the producer. Under contract with the Division,
the Supply Associations were to fulfil the quota estimated (nominated quantities) by producers
and outside supplies were to be brought in by the Milk Authority to meet any further
requirements for a sufficient supply of milk. Producers and their associations who failed to
supply their nominated quantity were subject to a penalty. The price of certain quantities of
surplus production, above the nominated quantity, was assured by the government under the
surplus milk scheme. An agreement was forged with the government to pay the Supply
Associations the producer price for both the nominated quantity and a seasonal percentage
of production over the nominated quantity, calculated at 17% from September to January and
10% in autumn and winter. While milk surplus to town and school requirements was
distributed to the manufactu$lg sector, the government was not responsible for the disposal
and payment of quantities beyond the nominated quantity plus seasonal percentage (Veeman
1972:228-9). Both the guaranteed prices and the surplus milk scheme encouraged the
producers to participate and was to influence the development of supplier organization. Most
town milk markets had Supply Associations within a year of the Act's adoption and the
system soon eliminated the threat of supply shortage (Henderson 1978:2-4).
Financial organization through the Milk Marketing Division dominated the early milk
regulatory system, possibly not envisaged by the legislators, and key decisions were made
by the Economic Stabilization Commission which decided on subsidy policy. The Division
was incorporated into the government's Marketing Department and functioned as the advisory
and secretarial service for the Central Milk Council. It also pursued the promotion of the
new organization and implementation of Council and government policy. While the Minister
of Health chaired the Council, the Division, an important decision making body, was
accountable to the Minister of Marketing, an awkward division of responsibility.
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Market security was sought in the milk sector through price controls and government
subsidy. In the manner typical of the government's national economic stabilization policy
the Minister of Agriculture fixed the price of milk for the producer, the level of additional
allowances, the margins for treatment and distribution, and the consumer price. A subsidy
provided the producer with the difference between the set price plus margins and the
consumer price (Veeman 1972:223).
"It is generally accepted that while the Government subsidizes the scheme it
should reserve this power (to fix prices)." (Veeman 1972:226).
Consequently, the New Zealand consumer received their supply of milk at a cost below that
of other countries including the US and Britain (Bell 1954:5).
While the producer price was linked to factory milk prices, the town milk producers received
a higher rate to correspond with the variation in cost of producing milk for the two sectors.
The seasonality of production for dairy factories could not cater for the demand by the liquid
milk market for a constant supply and so allowances served to compensate for the necessary
implementation of different management practices. In the milk season of 1944/5 the average
price for milk supplied to the dairy factories was 8.45 cents per imperial gallon while the
standard national town milk producer price was 11.87 cents per gallon (Veeman 1972:231-2).
Payment outside Wellington remained determined by gallonage, encouraging the disparity
between the quality provided by the two islands (Bell 1954:14). In the first year after the
legislation, quality milk was offered a higher price with a distinction between North and
South Island price rates that originally reflecting the lower fat content in the southern supplies
(Henderson 1978:4). However winter feed allowances were soon given to the South Island
farmers in acknowledgement of the greater hardship undergone to maintain a level supply.
Crucial in the agenda of the new administrative structures was the encouragement of
rationalization, technological advancement and improved quality control of the industry. The
Central Milk Council was charged with conceiving and promoting methods to improve the
efficiency and the hygienic conditions in all. sectors of the production of milk for
consumption. The duties of the Milk Authorities extended to the purchase or construction
of pasteurizing plants and ot~r facilities when appropriate; the inspection of premises,
vehicles and plant; and the issuing of local by-laws that may determine the method of
operation in the industry, standards to which milk must comply, and administrative
requirements under the new regime (Milk Act 1944:26,35,40).
A Sub-Committee on Quality Standards was set up in the Council. The Health Department
appointee for women and children Dr Muriel Bell chaired the committee. Its initial
recommendation was to designate an officer within the Dairy Division of the Department of
Agriculture, Tom Twomey, to supervise the renovation of the milk treatment stations (Bell
1954:4). Machinery was difficult to obtain while a post war backlog of orders persisted,
exacerbated by a stainless steel shortage that stockpiling had caused. On the advice of
Twomey the purchase of machinery, the layout of the plant and general improvements were
eventually implemented. The new plant that was installed, the High Temperature Short Time
plant, was cheaper to buy and operate, faster and more able to provide for recording and
safeguard requirements. The legalisation of the High Temperature Short Time pasteurising
method was effected through the 1946 Milk Pasteurising Plant Regulations (Be111954:8).
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Twomey proposed public ownership as the best means to control the refurbishing process.
Facilities were initially bought by the government and placed under the administration of the
Milk Marketing Division until the newly established Milk Treatment Corporation could take
over. The corporations were run by the local authority and producer cooperatives with the
government carrying the responsibility for capital investment and any losses. Assistance was
provided to the corporate owners through the State Advances Corporation and bank loan
accommodation. Changes in administration were slow and before the instalment of the
National government in 1949, Christchurch was the only centre with producer companies and
Milk Authorities sharing responsibility for the treatment corporations. Henderson of the
Milk Marketing Division recalls the means by with this policy was adopted:
"To those of us beyond the policy-making arena the movement towards public
treatment appeared to proceed by a peculiar mixture of coercion, persuasion
and carrot dangling, and in some instances by pressure from private owners
wanting to sell." (Henderson 1978:5).
Some did not submit to the government's overtures. The powerful NZ Coop Dairy Company
resisted government control. Three plants had been bought in the region yet the largest
plant, Amburys, owned by the Dairy· Company was not made available for government
purchase. Eventually an agreement Wa·s reached which allowed the company to retain half
of the processing trade in Auckland while the government formed Auckland Milk Treatment
Corporation was responsible for the other half of trade. This arrangement persisted
throughout the history of the regulated industry (Henderson 1978:6).
The government continued to purchase stations, the last bought being in 1949 at Rotorua.
The common procedure was to concentrate processing at a central plant, close older stations
and upgrade the target plant. While cost and expediency encouraged this approach, the
construction of new plants would have served the industry better (Henderson 1978:6).
Typical of the arrangements made was in the case of Hawkes Bay. The attempt to provide
for the region uncovered a strong intercity rivalry. Facilities were not available in Hastings
but a plant had been bought in Napier. Several "investigations, negotiations and committees
of enquiry later", an old abattoir site in Hastings was eventually designated the treatment
station for the two cities and the existing building was developed by 1949. Although still in
use in the 1970s, this initial refurbishing was to make further extensions impossible
(Henderson 1978:7).
The Milk Commission had raised concern over the procedures that threatened the hygiene
of liquid milk supplies. The national integration of the industry allowed the officers of the
Department of Agriculture and the Council greater access to all participants in liquid milk
production. This encouraged better education in the industry, more satisfactory testing of
milk supplies and the general improvement of the service. The Sub-Committee on Quality
Standards also promoted many key measures for the industry to adopt including
pasteurization, the correct use of new equipment, the reduction of human contact with milk,
to encourage cleanliness, TB and reductase testing, to prevent the effect on milk of light and
warm weather, to improve cartage and packaging (foil caps and bottles) and to adopt a
pricing system that would penalize producers offering poorer quality milk (Bell 1954:4-8,15).
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4.4 Conclusion
The organisation of the milk industry, the introduction of a new price regime and the
implementation of an agenda for rationalisation, technological advancement and improved
quality control were the key features of the duties invested in the new administration. When
the Central Milk Council was replaced by the New Zealand Milk Board in 1953, the industry
was preoccupied in its task of consolidating its early achievements. However, many of the
issues that arose in these formative years of the construction of the regulatory town milk
scheme were to shape the debates held within the industry and in public in the years to corne.
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CHAPTER 5
CONSOLIDATION OF THE MILK INDUSTRY: 1953 - 1967
5.1 Introduction
The major achievements of the Milk Board administration were initiated after the 1953
legislation reconstructed the industry's management in the form of a more responsible
statutory Milk Board. The following chapter details the developments in the crucial price
negotiations between the government and the industry, the reorganisation of the liquid milk
industry participants in structured relationships of exclusive monopoly, the extensive
developments in quality control and modernisation made throughout the milk sector, and the
Board's sponsorship of programs to increase milk consumption. Moreover, the
characteristics of the future post regulation milk industry were already evident in this early
phase of industrial reform and advancement.
5.2 The Establishment of the New Zealand Milk Board
The amendment to the Milk Act of 1951 laid the foundation for the establishment of a
statutory milk board. It began to reconstitute the Central Milk Council, now a body
corporate, and provide the advisory agency with further powers to direct and supervise the
industry. The government still staffed the Council with officers from the Public Service
Commission and controlled the key economic decisions of price, allowance and margin
fixing. The Marketing Division activities in the Department of Agriculture were now
transferred to all statutory boards. Under the Milk Amendment Act of 1953 the government
assigned new responsibilities to the New Zealand Milk Board (Henderson 1978:11-12).
The Board incorporated the Council and consisted of the Chair, W B Tennant, MP; three
members representing the producers, C J McFadden from the South Island and H D Lambie
and P T Jamieson for Auckland province and the rest of the North Island; one member
nominated by the vendors, L E August; a nominee from the Municipal Association, P
Dowse; a member represeNting the interests of women and children appointed by the
Ministry of Welfare, Dr ME Bell; and a representative of the government, the deputy chair
R B Tennant from the Department of AgriquJture. This represented a continuation of the
former Council's composition. Three associate members were permitted to attend from the
Departments of Agriculture, L G Purser and T P J Twomey, and Health, Dr F S Maclean.
The General Manager, D J Henderson, the Marketing Manager and the Board's
Administration Officer also attended meetings. The Milk Board was administered from its
Wellington head office, technical assistance was provided by government officers, with
regional officers stationed at its branches in Auckland, Palmerston North, Christchurch and
Dunedin. An additional office was opened in Hamilton to cover the Waikato and Bay of
Plenty areas in 1956 (NZMB Annual Report 1:5-9; 4:4).
The Board managed its own affairs, financed by a levy set initially at 0.35 pence per gallon,
and appointed its own staff. The National Milk Scheme was now under the jurisdiction of
the Board. The Board was responsible for guaranteeing the town milk supply, the producer
price and service margins. It entered into contracts, paying the necessary government
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subsidy, administered all government owned treatment stations, supervised surplus milk
disposal and the "milk in schools" scheme and assisted producer groups in obtaining
additional supplies when a shortage was experienced. While the Board was given the power
to operate the scheme, the government retained the right to set the producer price through
negotiations with the Town Milk Producers' Federation. The Board still made
recommendations to the government on margins and allowances after conducting its own cost
surveys and audits to ensure that subsidy claims were correct and prices and margins were
adequate (NZMB Annual Report 1:6-8; 4:4).
No further structural change was made over the period other than alterations required to
better facilitate the Board's new role. Milk Amendment Acts were enacted in 1955, 1956
and 1962 to serve this purpose, while other features were covered in Milk Marketing Orders
and Milk Regulations; sections of the Local Authorities Acts of 1954 (7), 1956 (134) and
1957; the Municipal Corporations Act (413) 1954 and the Co-operative Companies Act 1956
(12).
There was a regular demand for the consolidation of the Milk Act to improve certain aspects
of legislative administration. By 1959 the Board was circulating a draft of proposed revisions
to the Act which sought a change to the unsatisfactory condition of the Milk Authorities.
Several national bodies also submitted proposals for the governmental committee's appraisal
in 1961. By 1963 the Minister of Agriculture agreed to heip implement particular changes
asked by the industry. The resistance by· the Milk Authorities to the proposals was
eventually overcome in meetings between the Authorities, vendors and the Board who
submitted the outcome to the government in the following year. A Milk Bill was introduced
in the next parliamentary session which was designed to abolish the Milk Authorities and
transfer their functions to the Milk Board and the municipal local authorities. Submissions
were presented by the Board to the Lands and Agricultural Committee whose deliberations
were not completed before the Bill lapsed. However in 1967 the new Milk Act was passed
which incorporated the designs of the earlier proposed Bill (NZMB Annual Reports 1-14).
5.3 Prices, Allowances, Margins, Subsidies
The principal conflict between the producers' Board and the government lay in the
unremitting struggle over contr~ of producer price detennination. At the beginning of the
Board's first milk year, September 1953 to August 1954, the price agreement was reached
for the following three years based as before on the guaranteed price system for the suppliers
to the milk factories. Once the dairy produce price was fixed and the general wage order
of the Court of Arbitration included, the town milk producer price was finalized at 28.37
pence per gallon on 15 September 1953. Surplus milk when sold for dairy manufacture
received (in pence per gallon) 15.75 for cheese and 14.75 for butter throughout most of the
year. The producer price was paid out according to seasonal differentials. For instance in
the 1953-4 milk year the differentials were fixed as:
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Pence per Gallon
North Island:
September
October to January
February to April
May to August
South Island:
September
October to February
March and April
May to August
(NZMB Annual Report 1: 10)
23.648
24.25
29.00
33.8757
28.398
24.25
29.00
33.8757
The Milk Amendment Act of 1956 provided legal authority for the common procedure of
retrospective increases in producer prices. and margins (NZMB Annual Report 3:17-18).
The producer price structure was negotiated according to the terms of the Act between the
Town Milk Producers' Federation and the government. No specific guidance was sought
from the Board although general reports were requested by the government without obligation
to pursue their recommendations. The Board and the Federation undertook regular cost
surveys to report to the government on the adequacy of the producers returns. The
Producers Federation and the Board were dissatisfied at this arrangement and they regularly
petitioned the government for a change in the formula used to calculate the price since the
Milk Commission of 1944. The price structure was reassessed after changes were made in
the Dairy Products Marketing Commission's guaranteed price system in 1954-5. Variations
in the formula included an increase in the labour allowance to reflect the extra work of liquid
milk production, additional allowances in districts not adequately served by the allowance
system which were to be paid by consumer price increases, provision for a scheme of
payment for keeping quality of milk, and adjustment of the price for surplus milk (Henderson
1978:15-16; NZMB Annual Report 2:5).
However the periodic variation in the dairy guaranteed price continued and made it difficult
to secure a stable town milk producer price. A troublesome supply situation and the desire
of both the Board and the producers to have the price fixed prior to the commencement of
the new milk year led to further successful negotiations with the government over the price
setting formula. By 1956 the government abandoned its reliance on the earlier formula, and
matched adjustments to those made in the guaranteed price for milk in the manufacture of
the finest grade cheese. Future changes in the price were to be calculated according to the
ratio of 1 pence per pound butterfat to 0.6 pence per gallon of milk. Both quality payments
and special allowances were included in the new price regime (Henderson 1978:16; NZMB
Annual Report 3:4-5). .
The price structure still failed to include any reference to the changes in costs met by the
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liquid milk producers. Producers continued to petition the government for a price formula
that represented the internal costs of the industry rather than a response to the fluctuations
of overseas realisations. In the Board's report of 1958 information was presented on the
producers' costs and incomes from the first joint survey by the Board and the Federation to
convey to the government the importance of cost considerations in the producer price
structure. The 1957 survey found the average cost to the producers was (in pounds) £2668,
average revenue £4150 and thus the average labour return to the town milk farmer was
assessed at £1482. The Department of Statistics also published a survey of town producers
costs and incomes. However with its reliance on information from the Inland Revenue
Department the Department's survey was considered inadequate in its scope by the Board and
Federation. With the provision of data from the annual joint survey of the Board and
Federation in 1960, it was hoped that the Department's survey could accommodate the
additional information. The joint survey of 1961 was to be the last (NZMB Annual Report
4:5; 5:4,6,44-45; 8:8; 9:7).
The town milk producer price for the year 1958-59, a reduction of 2.4167 pence per gallon,
was rejected by the producers. Moreover, in spite of the procedure set out in the legislation,
the practice had arisen where the Federation proposed price submissions to the Board who
would then refer its considerations to the government. Under the direction of the Town Milk
Producers' Federation, producer associations refused to sign supply contracts, one centre
briefly withheld supplies and the Hawkes Bay Raw Milk Producers Co-operative Company
took a case against the government decision to the Supreme Court on behalf of the
Federation. The action taken by the Hawkes Bay Association to test the validity of the
government's price fixation was later successful in the Court of Appeal. Consequently, a
different procedure was required to be adopted formally. With the Board as mediator, the
immediate conflict was resolved through some modification in the government's price fixing
method whereby the procedure outlined under the Act was more closely adhered to.
However protracted negotiations with the government remained ineffective. While the
producer price for the following year had increased, based on an improving cheese marketing
position, the Federation expressed its continued reluctance to accept prices based on the
fluctuations of the overseas realisations for dairy produce. The government had begun to
acknowledged supply problems could occur from price instability and advised a committee
would be formed to report on the pragmatism of a new price setting formula. The Board's
recommendations to improve t~e' long .term fixation of the producer price was before the
government for some time. A inter-departmental review committee was established to assess
the organisation of the industry which would include amendment to the price fixing system
under the Milk Marketing Order of 1955. The government advised the Board in 1964 that
a Town Milk Price Authority was to be established to set the annual national milk price. The
Authority proposed was to comprise of two representatives from the government and two
from the Producers Federation with a fifth member as chair appointed by the Minister of
Agriculture with both parties approval. However negotiations with the Federation led the
government to shelve this proposed Price Authority (NZMB Annual Report 6:4-6; 7:4; 8:7;
11:7; 12:6).
The linking of quality control with graduated price structures was an important feature under
the new administration. The producer price in Wellington was the earliest inclusion of a
partial payment for the composition of the milk. The seasonal differentials over the year of
1953-4 for Wellington producers were calculated as follows :
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September
October to February,
August 16-31
February to April 15
April 16 to August 15
(NZMB Annual Report 1:10).
17.75d per lb butterfat +
14.933d per gallon
17.75d per lb. butterfat +
15.535 per gallon
17.75d per lb. butterfat +
21.0777d per gallon
32.83d per lb butterfat +
25.5509d per gallon
By the milk year 1955/6 the Board had established a national scheme of payment for quality
milk. The grading of milk and price differentials were based on the reductase test and
butterfat content. First grade milk indicated quantities that passed the 6 hour reductase test
and generally contained 4.3% to 3.5% butterfat. Standard grade referred to milk failing the
6 hour but passing the 4 hour reductase test and containing between 3.25% and 3.5%
butterfat. Second grade milk was that which failed both the 4 hour test and the minimum
requirement of 3.25% butterfat. For the year 1955/6 the national town milk price for first
grade milk was 29.2661 pence per gallon,. standard milk earned 28.7661 and second grade
received 24.7661. The gap between prices for first and standard grades was increased in
following years (NZMB Annual Report 3:6; 4:4).
Quality control was encouraged through other financial inducements. While the farm chilling
margins did not differentiate producers who supplied additional cool storage there was little
incentive for farmers to risk investment in new facilities. To encourage farm use of
refrigeration in 1958 the government increased margins and introduced an extra payment for
storage to provide security from the possible introduction of bulk collection by tanker in the
producer's district. The response was initially limited as farmers preferred to wait for the
impact of tanker pickups on their storage needs before they considered refrigeration. As the
changeover to tanker collection made transport less costly, a reduction in cartage allowance
was possible but the government chose to maintain the levels of allowance to assist farmers
through costs incurred in th~ transition. These incentives were soon adopted and by 1964,
80% of town milk was collected in bulk (NZMB Annual Report 5:8-9; 6:7; 8:9; 11:8).
Other special allowances were granted. Regular compensation of about 2 pence per gallon
was provided over the five winter months for special feed requirements especially in the
South Island. Local circumstances such as special cartage needs were covered by the Board's
allowances. To encourage the smaller outlying centres to provide bottled pasteurized milk
the Board gave special allowances for the establishment costs or extra expenditure for
transport. A fund to cover unforeseen and disastrous losses by producers was also sought
by the Board and the Federation. In 1958 the government agreed that the end of year
balance of the special production allowance be allocated for this purpose and a committee
was set up to administer this Trust Fund. Due to the difficulties in assessing the merits of
each claim, the Federation requested in 1961 that the funds be distributed to the Associations
to administer. The Board opposed this suggestion. After a review of the Trust's
administration in 1963, the circumstances for which the funds were available were clarified,
the Trust was reduced to one representative each from the Board and the Federation, and the
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Fund was limited to [pounds] £10,000, the surplus used for research by the Federation
(Henderson 1978:14,17; NZMB Annual Report 2:11; 5:5-6; 8:7; 11:15).
Some of the costs of these incentive schemes were met through a local consumer price
increase, often seasonal, rather than a rise in government subsidy. Thus consumer prices
reflected the variability in local costs, some determined on a gallonage basis and others on
a mileage basis which prompted the Board to seek a greater degree of uniformity in local
price changes. In 1955 the government had agreed to proposals that streamlined local
increases. However consumer prices remained determined by the Price Tribunal under the
Control of Prices Act. In 1962 the authority for consumer price fixing was transferred to
the jurisdiction of the Milk Act and thus the additional administrative step was eliminated.
The government then set all national prices with the Board fixing special prices when
required (NZMB Annual Report 1:12; 2:8; 9:8).
Allowance systems were also adopted as an inducement for industrial reform in other sectors
of the town milk service. Treatment station margins were allotted for stations according to
the volume treated each day. The demarcation and zoning of milk districts that restricted the
entry of new firms and competition between participating firms was the rationale for the
allocation of varia,ble margins (Veeman 1972:239). Stations pasteurising more than 10,000
gallons per day in 1954/5 received 3 pence per gallon and those treating up to 10,000
collected 3.125 pence. In the following year the difficulties incurred by the smaller stations
were recognized and an additional allowance of 0.5 pence per gallon was provided for
stations producing under 1000 gallons per day. Stations treating a smaller gallonage also
found it more difficult to absorb costs which larger plants could accommodate through
increased efficiency. However the rise in margins in 1960 for stations with a throughput of
less than 2500 gallons per day was criticized as penalty against efficiency measures. Stations
which chilled and treated the milk adequately without pasteurization received 1 pence per
gallon less than the above rates. Bottling treated milk earned the station a further 3.25 pence
per gallon. Adjustments to margins were based on recommendations of the Board arising
from their annual survey of station costs. Appeals for margin increases were often made in
response to changes in labour costs. A review of the capital input required for plant
expansion was also undertaken by the Board in 1963/4 in response to stations expressing
concern that their revenue was to be used for this purpose. It sought an assessment of the
provision of profit which sho~ld be allowed for when calculating treatment allowances
(NZMB Annual Report 1:11;2:7; 5:10; 7:7; 8:9; 11:9; 12:8).
The Dominion Federation of Milk Vendors based its applications for allowance reviews on
the occasional surveys by the Board of their situation. A survey conducted during 1964/5
milk year examined the validity of adopting a standard round that would allow assessment
of national delivery margin rates. Margins received by the vendor's Federation were often
queried and the Board suggested an extensive study of their case was required. In response
to the Board's reports, the government in 1955 had increased the fixed margins by 0.375
pence per gallon for normal household deliveries and a greater increase was allotted for
delivery to shops. In 1955 the Milk Marketing Order provided the legal basis for the
payment of the subsidy and margins by the Board (NZMB Annual Report 2:20). In 1959
the Board accompanied its survey with a circular to the vendors containing a more detailed
guidance of services for which margins were offered to clarify the points made in the Milk
Marketing Order of 1955. As the cost of milk varied according to the services performed
there was no uniform payment of subsidy.
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The Board was involved in the management of the vendor sector over other issues. Early
disputes between the treatment stations and the vendors arose in 1953/4 over the amount of
credit available to the vendor. The Board made a successful intercession in the conflict and
resolved their disagreements. In order to prevent vendors capitalizing on their allocation of
special vending allowances when assessing their goodwill in a sale, the Board made
allowances out to the applicant vendor. In 1963 it further required recipients to enter into
a deed which committed the vendor on sale of the round, to refund allowances obtained
(NZMB Annual Report 1:12,24; 2:7; 6:8; 10:9; 12:9).
5.4 Organization in the Milk Industry Under the Board's Administration
In the inaugural years of Board administration the relationship between the Board and
producer associations was of concern to both parties. The Board and the Town Milk
Producers Federation cooperated over the adminstration of several issues in the industry.
They persistently lobbied the government over the formula used to calculate the producer
price. This concern had led both parties to undertake joint surveys of producers costs and
incomes. The disaster relief fund had also been set up at the instigation of the Board and
Federation. The system of assessing and fixing quotas by producer companies came under
the scrutiny of the Board in 1963, resulting in the joint issue of a recommended code of
practice from the Board and the Federation (NZMB Annual Report 5:14; 11:6).
Their affiliation matured over the years with the Board's Production Officer travelling
extensively through the districts to provide the associations with information on the technical
facilities available to improve production methods. The Board's responsiveness to the
producers concerns was a common feature of their relationship. An instance of potential
conflict had arisen over the small producer associations in uneconomical locations whose
future was threatened by producers closer to the treatment stations and whose concern
prompted the Federation to ask for reassurance that the existing town milk producers would
be treated fairly. After discussions held in 1958, the Board advised the Federation that it
would protect producers interests while transferring quota rights to the more suitably located
association when a producer sold the farm or ceased town milk production.
The Board constantly regulated the affairs of the producers. It encouraged efforts towards
amalgamation of smaller prd'ducer associations particularly when more than one association
supplied a treatment station. Milk producer associations were directed to organise a
committee of supply under the Act in centres served by more than one association. The Milk
Regulations 1956 required that the rules of such committees be approved by the Board before
exercising their authority. Considerable success was achieved particularly in the difficult
case of Wellington where, after an extensive enquiry and much labour, all producers in the
Wellington and Hurt area united under the Wellington Dairy Farmers' Co-op Association.
However the fractured Christchurch industry prevented any cohesion developing between its
producer groups (NZMB Annual Report 3:17; 5:12-14; Henderson 1978:15).
The Board's contract with the producers' Supply Associations translated into quota rights
issued by the Associations to their members. For other producers to enter the liquid milk
market they required a quota which some felt they were at a disadvantage to obtain. An
appeal committee was established between the Board and the Federation consisting of the
Chair of the Board, the President of the Federation and an independent who heard producers'
discontent with decisions made over their application to supply town milk. However the
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limited opportunity to negotiate over the quota rights did enhance land prices for town supply
farms suggesting inequities existed between farming for the liquid milk and dairy produce
markets (Veeman 1979:106; NZMB 10:5).
An administration levy existed to cover costs incurred by the town milk producer
associations. Revision of the rates in 1955 continued to differentiate between the size of
associations' nominated quantities. When the guaranteed amount exceeds 7500 gallons of
milk per day, the association received 0.2 pence per gallon on all milk supplied. Smaller
quantities received 0.3 pence per gallon. Milk sold directly to the vendors by the association
secured an additional 0.2 pence levy (NZMB Annual Report 2:6).
The Board was involved in the adjudication of various sectoral disputes. Conflict had
surfaced over the terms of trade of the vendors with the treatment stations, the amount of
goodwill demanded when selling a vending round and the relationship between the Milk
Authorities and the vendors. The treatment stations disputes with vendors were successfully
mediated by the Board. What became a regular source of conflict with new entrants to the
vending sector was the manner in which the benefits of the quota rights system, administered
margins and restricted entry into the market were capitalized by the vendors in terms of
"goodwill" claimed in the sale of a business. However it was the relationship between the
vendors and the Authorities that disturbed the industry (Henderson 1978:18,20; Veeman
1979:106; NZMB Annual Report 3: 18-19; 1.2:14).
Milk Authorities were acknowledged as a crucial link between the industry and the consumer.
Members were chosen by municipal councils from among their own associates. While
susceptible to the changes in local politics, the involvement of the governmental bureaucracy
guaranteed some continuity in administration. To improve the Authorities' procedures
initially required a more uniform approach to the enactment of the Milk Act and greater
liaison with the Board. The suggestion of amalgamating some Authorities, 18 existent in the
inaugural year of the Board's administration, was first mooted by the Council in 1953 but
was opposed. An unofficial organization of Milk Authorities then approached the Board for
recognition as the Authorities' representative body. It was decided that subject to its
inclusion of at least 75% of Milk Authorities in districts selling an average of 500 or more
gallons per day, the New Zealand Milk Authorities' Association would receive official status.
It was approved by the Minist~r in 1958 enabling the Authorities' Association to receive
payments from individual Milk Authorities. Improved relations between the Board and Milk
Authorities was evident by 1962 as most Authorities had granted Board District Managers
the right to attend their meetings in an advisory capacity. However the Board retained
significant control over the Authorities. Before their projected levies were accepted, the
needs of Milk Authorities were first examined by the former Council and later the Board.
The Milk Regulations of 1956 broadened the scope of the Board's jurisdiction to include
areas without organized Milk Authorities. The regulations made the Board responsible for
licensing of producers and vendors and milk delivery zoning outside district Milk Authorities
(Bell 1954:3; NZMB Annual Report 1:27; 2:18; 3:17; 5:19; 9:15).
The Authorities were primarily concerned with the zoning and licensing of vendors. While
some performed their duties effectively, other Authorities were the subject of much criticism
from the vendors. With the operation of specified gallonage limitations provided for in the
Amendment Act 1951 milk rounds could be held at fixed gallonages with the benefits of
increased trade collected by the Milk Authority rather than the owner-vendor. Vendors
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claimed the adoption of this policy denied them the opportunity to expand. In 1956 the
Board issued a code of practice for the operation of the disputed section. Growth or loss of
trade due to vendor initiative was to accrue to the vendor whereas the change in goodwill
through housing development or destruction was to be amassed by the Milk Authorities.
However, Authorities who bought the ownership of their local milk trade often leased it to
the vendors at excessive rates. Still other Authorities took little interest in their
responsibilities. The growing concern in the industry of these issues provoked the Board to
review the powers granted to the Milk Authorities under the Act and to submit a proposal
for a more circumscribed role. The government's Bill of 1965 carried the proposal further
and abolished the Authorities. Even when the future of the Authorities was uncertain, prior
to the changes in the 1967 legislation, a productive liaison was maintained (Henderson
1978:18,20; Veeman 1979:106; NZMB Annual Report 3: 18-19; 12:14).
Another significant actor in the milk industry was created through the government's support
of the producer monopoly. After rebuilding or re-equipping milk treatment stations the
government returned many to local ownership through a combination of consumer and
producer association shareholders or the formation of producer companies, often with the
government as an initial shareholder. During this period more producer companies were
formed who purchased and operated stations. In many instances government finance was
involved through the State Advances Corporation and bank loan accommodation in the
producers companies' acquisition of milk stations. In Auckland and Hamilton the local milk
producers companies formed a subsidiary to administer the acquired milk station. In
Hamilton, Wellington, Christchurch and some of the secondary centres the milk producers
companies built new stations (Henderson 1978:13-14; NZMB:12).
The liquid milk industry was characterised by monopoly structures of producers, processors
and vendors. Supply Associations were established as monopolistic agencies for producers.
Quota allocation by Associations was not governed by the legislation and the code of conduct
designed by the Board and Producers' Federation to prevent undue discrimination against
new entrants remained recommendatory. Capitalization of quota benefits was attached to the
land, expressed in terms of higher land prices in a town supply farm sale. Moreover the
application for quota rights by an increasing number of producers who supply the dairy
produce market indicated significant
"
"elements of discriminatory pricing between those dairy farmers who produce
for the relatively small town market and those who produce for the much
larger export manufacturing market." (Veeman 1972:242-5).
The entrance of the new producer companies into the processing sector served to further
consolidate the producers' monopoly within the industry.
The benefits of the quota rights system, administered margins and restricted entry into the
market were also capitalized in terms of "goodwill" claimed in the sale of a vending
business. The burden of competition was eased for the established vendors by the limit of
milk distributors through zoning and by the payment of fixed margins based on costs. With
the demand that a vendor first offers a business for sale to the Board, in practice the Board's
attempt to fix the maximum price for goodwill merely established the level for the minimum
price for goodwill (Veeman 1972:243).
43
These organisations retained privileged access to the industry and to the assets provided by
the government in this restructured regulated economy.
5.5 Quality Control and Modernization
A principle reason for the regulation of the milk industry was the improvement in the quality
of the milk supply. This involved extensive development of facilities and behaviour of milk
handlers from production to distribution. The Board was charged with the overall
responsibility· to provide a high quality supply but the inspection services remained the
domain of the Departments of Health and Agriculture. While the Agricultural officers
conducted the control of conditions on farms, the Health Department supervised milk
sampling, its delivery and in conjunction with the Agricultural Department, conditions at the
milk treatment stations. The relationship between the producer associations, stations and the
farm dairy instructors in the pursuance of high quality milk was developed in this period
(NZMB Annual Report 1:17) .
Criticism had been levelled at the industry for poor quality supplies when the Board began
its management of the milk supply. In striving for quality regulation the payment on quality
scheme was advanced by many interested in the industry. Initially the Board was not a
strong advocate for the schemes proposed:
"In the sense of quality as meaning the cleanliness and general hygienic
standards of the milk, the standards are already high and it is doubtful if any
system which would be administratively feasible would result in any
appreciable improvement." (NZMB Annual Report 1:18).
Improvement in the composition of milk was another issue in the quality payment agenda.
Testing, grading and differential price systems were requested for both the butterfat and the
solids-not-fat (SNF) content in milk. The Board had also expressed reservations on the
establishment of a grading scheme citing both the practical difficulties of comprehensive and
reliable testing and the effect of such a scheme on the problematic supply of the early
industry. The reliability of milk standards was further complicated by the composition of
milk differing according to the breed of cattle. Bell offered the following analysis:
'"
Fat g/100g
SNF g/100g
Riboflavin mg/100g
Thiamin mg/100g
(Bell 1954:10)
Jersey
5.43
9.59
0.255
0.048
Shorthorn
3.91
8.94
Ayrshire
4.09
9.05
Friesian
3.63
8.48
0.194
0.0414
However criticism levelled at the seasonal problem of low SNF content in the South Island
supply encouraged the Board to pursue particularly troublesome producer companies. A
substandard milk second grading scheme was introduced by the Board in 1955 which required
certification of treatment station graders, testing procedures to be adopted and penalty rates
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for substandard supplies. Targeted by the new scheme were quantities with a butterfat
content below 3.25%, supplies testing less than 4 hours on a reductase test (keeping quality),
and milk with excessive sediment or added water. The payment lost by the producers was
retained by Supplier Associations for quality improvement. Lower grade milk was to be
rejected or diverted. Milk that did not pass through the treatment stations was assumed to
be first grade. As the allowances for high grade milk increased, the quality of the town milk
supply vastly improved (NZMB Annual Report 1:19; 2:12).
The smaller treatment stations performed some routine testing. In the larger stations
laboratories were attached that tested for keeping quality (reductase test), butterfat and SNF
content, efficient pasteurization (phosphotase tests), and tests of bacteria and sediment.
Procedural differences existed in each station's tests and some were not sufficiently reliable
for comparison as would be required in a comprehensive payment for quality system.
However the substandard milk second grade scheme was incorporated into a limited payment
on quality system the following year. While inadequate testing standards persisted the
emphasis remained on keeping quality and the payments for different graded milk was left
to the discretion of Supplier Associations.
In particular, no test for SNF was considered reliable enough to include the SNF content in
the grading scheme. While the increase in first grade milk indicated the general
improvement of milk quality, the SNF cORtent remained an issue particularly in the South.
The problem was compounded by the need to maintain an economic supply throughout all
seasons. A conference was called over the SNF question in 1960 with representatives of the
Health and Agricultural Departments, the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research,
the Dairy Research Institute and Massey and Lincoln Colleges. The presence of supplies
with a deficiency in SNF was not an easy obstacle to overcome. While feeding and breeding
programs that ensured an improvement in the SNF content would demand a disproportionate
increase in the cost of production, the addition of dry solids to deficient supplies was another
possibility. The addition of dry solids was permitted under an amendment to the Food and
Drugs Regulations in 1965. However this still implied the acceptance of milk from
producers that contained less than the legal minimum of 8.5% and would be at best an
interim measure. The Board sought the assistance of the Federation to encourage individual
producer companies to employ internal SNF improvement schemes from April 1965 prior
to the adoption of its more 'extensive payment for quality scheme in 1966. The schemes
introduced by the majority of companies included differential payments and companies
without an SNF improvement program became the target for the Board's inclusion of SNF
content in the new payment for quality scheme (NZMB Annual Report 1:17-18; 3:12-13;
7:11; 9:12; 11:12; 12:11-12).
Quality control was sought through financial inducement in other areas of milk production.
The extension of chilling allowances to all producers provided further incentive to upgrade
production conditions. The Board's concern over farm storage led to the establishment of
a farm chilling committee with the Dairy Division and Dairy Research Institute. The
committee also examined the problems associated with the conversion to bulk pick-up,
initiating a revision of the qualifications for chilling margins in 1958 and the adoption of the
UK Milk Marketing Boards standards of performance for tanks. In 1960 standards were
established by the Board for the different chilling schemes under operation to best maintain
the quality of milk and the Board issued a bulletin detailing the information on farm chilling.
The improvement in keeping quality was attributed to the widespread conversion to tanker
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bulk collection. Bylaws were also sought to demand the refrigeration of milk storage in shop
dairies (NZMB Annual Report 4:10; 5:9; 7:5-7,13; 10:11).
TB testing of cattle was perfonned under the Animal Industry Division of the Department
of Agriculture and was extended to most herds by 1953. The Board was satisfied to observe
the progress of the scheme. A committee of enquiry was fonned in 1954 by the government
to set up a system of compensation for slaughtered animals under the scheme. Raw milk
could also carry the disease brucellosis and the Board called for the vaccination of calves
against it. A pilot brucellosis eradication scheme using periodic ring testing of bulk milk and
whey tests on individual cow supplies was adopted on the initiative of the Christchurch
producers. With a bonus provided for milk of cleared herds and compensation for animals
destroyed, the program proved successful. The Board and government held discussions on
expanding the Christchurch voluntary test to other districts. However the elimination of TB
had to take precedence. Concern from an overseas experience of discovering penicillin
residual in the milk of animals treated for mastitis also highlighted the need for producers
to refrain from immediate use of supplies from treated cows. The disc assay test of the
American Public Health Association was initially adopted to detect the presence of penicillin
at the stations. The Brom-Cresol Purple test developed by the Dairy Research Institute was
also used by stations. Producers found with antibiotic residues in their supplies forfeited the
full producer price for their milk and had to demonstrate clear milk before re-entry into the
town supply. The producers' Federation suggested researching alternative methods to control
mastitis without the use of antibiotics (NZMB Annual Report 1:20; 7:12; 8:11; 9:11; 10:12;
Henderson 1978: 19) .
The Board adopted the fonner Council's policy of encouraging the pasteurization of the milk
supply by means of educating the industry and consumers. Bell recalled that
"in the days when Dunedin had a milk treatment plant that pennitted flies to
land on the pasteurized milk before it was bottled, there was no particular
point in doing away with the billy." (Bell 1954:7).
By the first year of the Board's administration, sales of pasteurized milk accounted for 85%
of all town sales. Treatment stations were also being discouraged by the Board from
supplying raw milk to avoid c0-!1tamination with the pasteurized product. In 1955 the Board
set out conditions under which the safety of raw milk could be more assured including
testing, bottling, supply isolation and appropriate labelling. The government supported these
proposals on the proviso that they would not affect the availability of raw milk when
demanded. In Christchurch agitation for the continued supply of raw milk had resulted in
a Supreme Court action. Although some changeover to pasteurized supplies occurred in
centers fonnerly supplied with raw milk, by 1956 further conversions were inhibited by the
distance of remaining raw milk supply districts from treatment stations.
Bottled milk for retail delivery had increased by 1954 to 81% of all town sales through the
National Milk Scheme. The 1956 Milk Regulations authorized the Minister of Agriculture
to specify districts where milk was to be distributed in sealed containers. While the policy
of the Board was to recommend this when the condition of a full bottled supply had been
achieved, to safeguard bottled supply the Minister did apply the regulation in 1958 to certain
districts. Bulk purchasers were also encouraged to receive milk in sealed containers (NZMB
Annual Report 1:20; 2:14; 3:15; 5:20; 6:13; Henderson 1978:19).
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Improving conditions in the distribution of milk was initially met with vendor resistance.
Covered vehicles were considered expensive and an impediment to rapid delivery.
Negotiations with the Board allowed uncovered deliveries to continue for early morning
dispatches but the Health Department enforced the regulation with other vendors. Expansion
in business led to some early conversion of transport fleets. Enclosed articulated vehicles
were employed in 1955 at Hamilton and Hastings with a capacity to carry in excess of 10
tons. By 1959 the Board was considering the incorporation of covered deliveries regulations
in the payment of margins. However in response to vendor concern over the effect on
delivery costs, the government remained unwilling to regulate vehicle covering in the Food
Hygiene Regulations of 1961. After joint recommendations from the vendors, milk
authorities and Board were accepted by the government in 1963 the standard for the type of
vehicle canopy was set under an amendment. The government did not permit compensation
for the instalment of new canopies but authorized an increase in the vending margin for
additional operating costs incurred from the general adoption of the standard canopy. A code
of practice was negotiated between the parties in conjunction with the amendment. The
condition of depots from which vendors pick up supplies also became subject to Board
scrutiny in 1961 with a set of standards being implemented concerning their construction and
operation. The local manufacture of plastic milk crates as used overseas was also mooted
in 1963 (NZMB Annual Report 1:21; 2:16; 6:13; 8:14; 10:14-15).
New technologies and products were gradually introduced into the industry. Milk treatment
stations owned by the government were passed to the Board's administration in 1953. Four
stations were then placed under the direct management of the Board while the progress of
four more which were the joint responsibility of the government and local milk treatment
corporations was supervised by the Board. Government owned stations operating on a deed
of management basis ceased to exist after the sale of the Invercargill plant in 1957. Sale of
government owned plants and the erection of new stations continued. The last plant operated
by the Board on behalf of the government, at Hastings, was sold in 1964. The steady
increase of milk consumption encouraged plant expansion. Where the construction of new
facilities was not feasible, the Board promoted the extensive alteration and re-equipping of
existing plants. The development of facilities owned by milk producer companies,
corporations and co-ops was also in progress. By 1957 the Board could report that "the
establishment stage of milk treatment facilities has been completed". The focus of the Board
then became the provision\Of treatment facilities for smaller centres particularly districts
where the incidence of TB remained high. The promotion of new plant included bottle filling
and aluminium capping machinery. At the 1956 Waikato Winter Show the display of a
decrater/recrater indicated the possible impact on the milk industry of the global trend
towards greater mechanization. Three stations installed the new plant in 1957. Forklift
trucks were also employed. In 1965 the first high capacity bottling plant was installed by
the Hutt Valley Milk Treatment Corporation. Other stations soon followed (NZMB Annual
Report 1:24-7; 2:16; 3:15; 4:12; 11:13; 12:13).
Standardized baby milk was a new product introduced in Auckland by the Board with the
Plunket Society, the Dairy Division and the Auckland Milk Treatment Corporation in 1953/4.
It was designed to limit the varying fat content in milk for infants. Homogenized milk was
also introduced in some districts to provide for the needs of babies and for the school milk
supply. Homogenisers were present in some stations, yet the Board wanted further studies
carried out on the effects of existing delivery conditions to homogenised milk before
promoting its production. A study was made in 1957 by the Board on consumer reaction to
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homogenised milk before its introduction in Palmerston North. The test proved favourable
and its consumption rose steadily, although still accounting for a negligible 2.5 % of all sales
in 1958 (NZMB Annual Report 1:28; 4:13; 5:18; 8:16).
Paper or cardboard packaging, a contentious issue for later administrations, was first
investigated in 1956 by the Board. While the Swedish Tetra-Pak cartons were considered
the most appropriate option for New Zealand conditions, the cost of importing the paper
would demand an unsupportable increase in consumer price. With later renewed interest in
cartoned milk the Board decided that to protect the existing market for bottled pasteurized
milk additional costs associated with the packaging be included in the price of cartoned milk.
The demand for carton milk fluctuated but was popular with holidaying consumers. Interest
was also shown at that time in polythene plastic bag containers as used in France. Flavoured
milk was offered to consumers in cartons, through the vending machines and Wright's
Metropolitan Milk Co of Christchurch supplied bottled flavoured milk through household
deliveries. Its popularity was pronounced at fairs, shows and sports events yet Christchurch
remained the only centre that seriously marketed flavoured milk. Manual operated milk
vending machines were trialed in 1959 and a bulk milk dispenser was in use in 1961. The
overseas development of high temperature pasteurization and aseptic filling into cartons as
a new means of reducing refrigeration costs was first discussed in 1965 (NZMB Annual
Report 3:16; 5:18; 6:15; 7:15; 8:16; 12:14).
The quality of reconstituted milk was also investigated by the Board in response to public
interest in its supply. The introduction of milk powders was suggested as an alternative to
the high costs of supplying milk quantities out of season. However as the regular supply of
high quality milk to the public was perceived by the Board as a hard won achievement of
twenty years, it did not favour the risks involved in supporting a cheaper product. Nor did
it feel that the consumer would generally accept reconstituted milk. Three committees were
setup by the Board for a full investigation into the matter (NZMB Annual Report 10:14;
11:14).
5.6 Sponsoring Consumption. Milk in Schools Scheme, Publicity, Trends
in Consumption
The school milk supply scheme. was initiated in 1937 under the Health Department. In
response to complaints against a high fat content school milk was the focus of an early
standardized milk scheme in 1953. As the key nutritional elements in milk were identified
as the protein and SNF content, butterfat was not to exceed 3.3% further reduced to 3% in
1957. While the Food and Drug Regulations demanded that milk sold should have no
additives or its content tampered with, school milk as a non-commercial distribution
permitted standardization and this policy was gradually implemented in all treatment plants.
In the effort to enhance the appeal of milk and thus its consumption by children, experiments
in homogenization of school supplies was initiated the following year at Auckland. Plants
gradually implemented standardizing and homogenizing procedures for the school milk
supply. By 1960 67.6% was standardized and 50.3% homogenized, the level that was
maintained until the conclusion of the scheme in 1967. The producers provided the whole
school supply with 75% of the school milk scheme budgeted for through nominated
quantities. The control of school milk quality and its appeal to students required care in
avoiding undue exposure to sunlight. Improved milk stands and covered delivery vehicles
were encouraged. The Board also sought improvement in the administration of the scheme
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through greater liaison with the schools. Four milk liaison officers were appointed in 1964
to assist the officer first employed in 1961. (Bell 1954:11; NZMB Annual Report 1:15;
2:11; 3:11; 7:13; 11:13).
The scheme became the subject of considerable criticism raised before the Commission of
Education in 1961. Opinions on the continuance of the milk in schools scheme were first
advanced at the Education Boards Conference of 1960. Milk distribution was seen to
interfere with the school day, the amount of milk wastage was criticized and the taxpayers
burden was also queried. School committees in Invercargill had not implemented the
scheme. After the conference the Hawkes Bay Education Board ceased all milk supplies to
schools in its district (Bell 1954:12). While the government assured the Milk Board of its
support for the scheme, the Board expressed its concern through submissions to the
Education Commission detailing the value of milk supplied to schools and on its intention to
encourage improved conditions, especially refrigeration. In particular the Board saw the
opposition as based on
"motives as whether it is desirable that milk should be supplied to school
children at public expense when parents should be in a position to provide for
all the requirements of their children... [However] it does not seem satisfactory
to the Board that when a supply of milk is made available for school children
at the cost of the general taxpayer an individual education board should be
free of its own initiative to deny the benefits of the scheme to children within
the area under its jurisdiction." (NZMB Annual Report 8:13).
The Board sought to improve industrial and public knowledge about the value and care of
liquid milk in many forms, the earliest being the publication of "Town Milk" which was a
quarterly journal distributed to producers, stations, vendors, authorities and other parties
from 1953. During 1956 the Board and Massey supported a course for treatment station
employees on milk testing procedures. Its success encouraged the course's continuance as
an annual fixture. The Market Milk Week, initiated as an annual meeting organized by
Massey College for retraining of station personnel, soon developed into a wider forum on
issues and developments in the industry. By 1963 the conference was attended by over 100
people. In its educational drive the Board sponsored market milk bursaries for the study of
the Diploma in Dairying at Massey College, initially at the rate of two to three per year and
proving more popular in later years. Overseas visits by Board members had also provided
the opportunity to observe new procedures and developments in the milk industry (NZMB
Annual Report 1:29; 2:19; 3:21).
The lack of awareness of the advancement made by the town milk suppliers motivated the
industry to set up a joint body in 1955, the Milk Publicity Council under the general
supervision of the Board. Although some interest in promoting milk sales provided the
Council with advertising work, it was mainly involved in public relations. The Producers'
Federation was keen on direct sales advertising to meet the competition from other products
and enhance milk consumption. Radio and a limited amount of magazine advertising was
used stressing the importance of milk in the diet.
The Board remained concerned with enhancing public confidence in the industry through
promotions and information on product care. The main focus of the Council's public
relations campaign was its publicity literature. Publications initially concentrated on
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informing school children of the value of milk consumption and included pamphlets, bulletins
and teaching aids. A film strip on the industry was made in conjunction with the Education
Department and a working model of a treatment station proved very popular in schools. A
colour documentary film entitled "Every Morning", completed in 1959, was shown on the
main film circuit and in schools to an "excellent reception" for several years. A new 16mm
film was in production in the early sixties for use in schools. Public tours of treatment
stations were encouraged and displays were set up at local Winter Shows. Later campaigns
and publications promoted the use of bottled milk and care of the product by consumers.
Slogans were often screen printed on the bottles. In 1966 the Council also participated in
a market research survey of consumers preferred drinks.
All such activities were financed by contributions from the Board, the Producers' Federation
and Treatment Stations' Federation. By 1958 the Board sought a greater financial
contribution from the industry for direct sales campaigns. As former Board manager
Henderson comments
"The Board did not feel that it was its responsibility to spend large sums of
semi-public funds on sales promotion, and the producers were at times
lukewarm when the natural increase in population tended to engender as much
increase in demand as they could provide." (Henderson 1978:18).
Two years later the cost and value of an extensive direct sales campaign was investigated by
the Council's advertising consultants. A milk advertising catalogue was first issued in 1963
which provided the industry with information on a variety of publicity material that it could
purchase. The following year the Council joined with other national advertisers in a screen
campaign prior to and during the Olympic games (NZMB Annual Report 2:19; 3:20; 4:13;
5:20; 6:17; 7:16; 8:17; 12:18).
5.7 Conclusion
The Board's agenda, prescribed by legislation, had defined much of the Board's activities in
this initial stage. Many successes in industrial reform, sector rationalisation, and overall
quality of the service were grounded in the efforts of this first administration. With the
advent of the 1967 Milk Act, the Board steadily increased its administrative responsibilities
and advanced the progress achieved at this juncture of the Board's history.
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CHAPTER 6
1967 TO 1987 : THE PATH TO DEREGULATION
6.1 Introduction
This final segment of the narrative history of the Milk Board traces the change in
administration of the 1967 legislation that afforded the Board greater powers to manage the
industry and pursue a constant high quality milk supply in a rationalised and modernised
liquid milk economy. During this period the Board also faced pressure to deregulate the
industry which was effected by the Milk Act of 1988. The chapter thus explores both the
material progress made by the industry and the concurrent movement towards the Board's
dissolution in the statutory relationship of legislation and government appointed committees,
in the price negotiations, through the institution of quality control, modernisation, and
promotional activities, and with reference to a change in domestic milk consumption patterns.
6.2 The 1967 Legislation
The consolidation of the milk legislation was finally realized through the Milk Act of 1967.
Crucial changes to the Board's administration occurred with the abolition of the local Milk
Authorities, greater local body representation and the establishment of a special Milk Prices
Authority. The Board was given further responsibility in zoning and distribution, more
involvement along with representatives from the industry in the price fixing regime, and
greater consumer input in its administration. In particular the Board was assigned wider
powers in the distribution sector.
The legislation defined the objectives of the Board as before:
"a) The provision of an adequate supply of milk of good quality for human
consumption; b) the organisation of the town milk industry on an economic
basis." (Milk Act 1967, Part 1:10).
"
The administration of the industry by the Board was to be guided by the demand for
efficiency, economy and quality. Its functions included the promotion of improved
technologies, encouragement of consumption, patronage of research, involvement in the price
fixing regime and coordination with government and other relevant public bodies. The
Board's powers to adjudicate in industrial disputes was also extended, including the
management of consumer complaints against individual vendors. The Board was funded by
a levy imposed on milk and cream sales of which its rate and collection practice were both
determined by the government. New members were added to the Board's structure from the
Municipal and the Counties Associations to represent the consumer. Under the 1967
legislation the Board consisted of ten members appointed on the recommendation of the
Minister of Agriculture. Along with three members of the Town Milk Producers'
Federation, one member from the Federation of Vendors, the member appointed for the
welfare of women and children and the government representative, there were four members
nominated by the Municipal and Counties Associations. Overall though, the structure of the
town milk scheme had remained unchanged since its inception in 1944 (Milk Act 1967, Part
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1:11,31; Veeman 1972:225).
In its submissions to the Lands and Agricultural Committee over the new Bill, the Board
cited several deficiencies related to the Milk Authorities' administration. Some milk
distributors experience with the Authorities' management of the vendor sector was restrictive
and expensive. The specific gallonage zoning scheme, the amount of trade held by
Authorities, inconsistencies and duplication of administration had all prevented both
expansion or improvement in the vendors business. The financial hold over vendors by the
Authorities could be quite extensive and deleterious to the vendor. Lease fees to finance the
Milk Authorities were at times excessive and charged only to some rounds, an accumulation
of funds by some Authorities was not channelled back into the industry and the Authorities
role in determining the maximum goodwill possible in the sale of business was also
criticized. The Board avoided proposals concerning its own membership or making any
statement "strongly in favour of or against the BilL .. [although] the Board supported the Bill
in principle". The Act came into operation on 1 September 1968 (NZMB Annual Report
14:18).
By 1967 separate ad hoc local authorities conducting independent policies had become
irrelevant to the industry and an impediment to effective administration. Provincial
authorities retained some local mspection and hygiene controls while other standards of local
control were placed under the Food and Drug Regulations or the Food Hygiene Regulations.
The responsibility for vendors' distribution zoning policy, vendors' registration, and milk
rounds formerly owned by the Authorities was transferred to the Board and the specified
gallonage system of zoning was phased out over the following three years. All milk rounds
for sale were to be offered first to the Board for purchase. The Board's power to buy and
resell the vendors' business was used as a means to control excessive goodwills, to allow the
"most suitable applicants" to obtain rounds or for the purpose of rezoning. This legislative
obligation to set the maximum permitted for the amount of goodwill in a vendor business sale
seemed to be an attempt to limit the operation of milk vending monopolies. However the
Act did not limit the formation or activity of the Milk Supply Associations. Approval of a
producer association as the Supply Association for a district validated that Association's
monopoly of the town milk supply service (NZMB Annual Report 15:13; 16:12; 17:15;
Veeman 1972:227-8).
"The reorganisation of the distribution sector preoccupied the Board over the next two years.
Conditions for milk vendors' approvals and temporary approvals had to be devised, plans
made to evaluate and purchase business owned by Milk Authorities, safeguards designed
against leasing, the specified gallonage system had to be replaced and the Board was also
concerned with developing its supervisory role over the vendor service. With the staff of the
former Milk Authorities offered employment by the Board and many existing zoning schemes
initially retained, the transition was easily implemented. The Board had six district offices
to administer its new task, local committees were appointed and delegated with the power
of approval of vendors. The surplus of funds accrued to the Board from its various financial
activities was placed in a General Distribution Reserve and used to meet the indebtness of
local Authorities after the transfer of trade. This process was to be completed by August
1973 under the legislation (NZMB Annual Report 15:14; 16:12; 19:14; 25:17).
The new Milk Prices Authority was a result of the long standing industrial agitation over the
mechanisms for price fixing. Treatment and distribution allowances under the 1967
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legislation were now determined by equal representation from the industry (stations or
vendors) and the government under an independent chair, the Board supplied administration
services and information and made recommendations to the Authority when necessary. The
first Chair was R C Bradshaw a public accountant. The producer price and allowances and
consumer price were still fixed by the government in accordance with recommendations from
the Board while the setting of special prices remained under the Board's jurisdiction (NZMB
Annual Report 15:13; Henderson 1978:21).
6.3 Government Legislation, Committees of Inquiry and Commissions
Prior to the Repeal of the Milk Act
Legislation was later brought down to correct omissions in the Milk Act of 1967. The
Amendment Act of 1971 strengthened control by the Board over contractual arrangements
with the vendors, increased the Board's levy, clarified the position of Supply Associations,
the leasing prohibition, treatment consents and temporary approvals, and the Board's
regulatory power over the milk token scheme. The replacement of the Milk Regulations of
1956 was also required by the changes in the industry and enacted in 1973. The Food and
Drug, Milk Production and Supply and Stabilisation of Prices Regulations were modified in
1973. All legislation was affected by the conversion to the metric system on 1 March 1974
(NZMB Annual Report 17:17; 18:17; 19:15; 20:15; 21:14).
Arising from the deliberations of a Government Caucus Committee on Town Milk in 1979
new legislation was introduced the following year that changed the administration of the
regulated milk industry. The Board's membership was altered to one that was more
reflective of the industry'S interests. The Chair was no longer appointed by the government
although government retained direct influence through the consumer representative from the
Social Welfare, a director of the NZ Dairy Board and the Director General of Agriculture
who also remained members. The three consumer representatives formerly appointed by
local authorities were reduced to one nomination from the Municipal and Counties
Associations. From within the industry, the producers retained a membership of three, the
vendors nominated two members and the NZ Federation of Milk Stations Inc held one seat
on the Board. Both the Chair and Deputy were elected by the Board from the six industry
representatives.
The Milk Prices Authority was also abolished in the Amendment with the exercise of its
functions transferred to the Department of Trade and Industry. Other administrative changes
adopted in the 1980 legislation included an increase in the Board's levy, a substantive rise
in the maximum penalty for an offence against the Milk Act, from $200 to $1,000 and the
appointment of the Board to control capital expenditure by milk stations. The Caucus
Committee had also conferred over the role of alternative forms of milk and packaging in the
industry. While it endorsed the industry'S preference for glass bottled milk over alternative
forms of packaging and found no support for reconstituted or recombined milk, the
Committee did acknowledged the important development in UHT products (NZMB Annual
Report 28:24; 29:21; 34:17; NZMB:13).
Another significant amendment arose from the difficult relationship between the Board and
the vendors. In 1972 the Board established a Vendor Review Committee for the adjudication
of cases previously under the jurisdiction of the local authorities which considered the
revocation of a vendor's approval. The Committee initially heard about 4,500 complaints
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but the volume of cases declined as consumers were encouraged to pass their concerns
directly to their vendor. Another Amendment Act was introduced in 1978 that established
a Milk Appeal Authority to hear complaints made against the Board. It was comprised of
three members, two chosen for their knowledge of the industry and a barrister as the Chair.
In effect the new Authority took over responsibilities formerly vested in the Magistrates
Court. The amendment provided the Board with the power to discipline members of the
industry who fail to fulfil their duty by reducing or withholding appropriate prices and
allowances. The Authority dealt with about six cases on average each year.
One significant dispute handled by the Vendor Review Committee in 1978 concerned the
action of ten Wellington vendors who had introduced an unauthorized six day delivery
service. The vendors had first requested a change in their service in 1972 which the Board
had responded with permission for the adoption of a trial period of a shorter delivery week
over certain rounds. In response to other disputes of vendors in Wellington and Dunedin,
Committees of Inquiry were set up in 1977 to examine the terms of trade between vendors
and stations. Their decisions were subject to continued debate and legal action and
eventually sent the adjudication process to the courts system. A Committee was set up in
1981 to examine the Auckland area in terms of its distribution structure. Another Committee
of Inquiry was also established to investigate milk vendor approval holders who were not
involved with the physical delivery on the round and thus contravened Board policy. In
accepting the Committee's report the Board \yas thus able to strengthen its concept of the
owner operator milk vendor and demanded their direct personal involvement in the round.
In the climate of uncertainty and higher costs prior to deregulation, more vendor businesses
were offered for sale forcing the Board to rezone more rounds than was practical. The
Board responded with improved procedures for selecting vendors that emphasized vendor's
selling skills, first under trial in Auckland in 1984, and the adoption of new marketing
techniques directed at the vendor service (NZMB Annual Report 19:14; 25:17; 26:20;
28:22; 30:20; 31:11).
The final Milk Board administrations were preoccupied with the discussion over deregulation
of the industry. Extensive negotiations were undertaken between the Board, the industry and
the government, and were mediated through the Industries Development Commission. In the
1984 Budget the government had begun the process of deregulating the industry through
terminating the consumer subsiqy on milk. The Board's Chair B Kimpton expressed the
hope that
lithe removal of the Government subsidy, while it has in the short-term
resulted in a price rise, should in the long term set the industry on a path of
self determination, self regulation and control. II (NZMB Annual Report 31:2).
The industry submitted a joint proposal to the government advocating a variable licensing
system of processors that was designed to serve as a vehicle for progressive deregulation.
Upon receipt of the industry's strategy for the reorganization of the service, the government
established an Industries Development Commission to review the milk industry. The
Commission was to investigate the efficiency and economy of the current structure in its use
of resources and was requested to advise on the relationship between the town milk and
manufacturing dairy sector in the domestic market, the pricing, marketing and regulation
mechanisms as well as assess the future role of the Board and any legislative changes
required. This review of the industry coincided with an ongoing investigation into alternative
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packaging for mille
From the 70 submissions the Commission received, a draft report was presented in May
1985. The Commission indicated that the public interest would be best served by a
deregulated milk industry and recommended several changes were required : the removal of
all price and margin controls; a reliance on market forces to dictate zoning systems and milk
distribution; the lifting of regulations that impede the introduction of alternative packaging;
a division of responsibility over the milk production process between the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries and the Health Department; and the establishment of a transitional
authority to supervise the industry's conversion. The milk home delivery service was to be
protected through a system of licensing milk processors and control of prices over the
transition period. The public hearing of the Commission was held in July 1985. Minor
amendments were made to its final report, with Commissioner Troot submitting a minority
report that opposed many of the measures proposed. The Minister of Trade and Industry
called for further submissions and a Caucus Committee and Officials Committee were
established to consider the recommendations of the Commission. Meanwhile the Chair of
the Milk Board expressed his disbelief that this prolonged process of institutional
restructuring was serving the public interest:
"...the constant changes of direction are eroding the service. "The wind goeth
towards the south and turneth abouLonto the north, it turneth about continually
in its course." This is not a commentary on wind conditions off Fremantle at
the time of the America's Cup races, but rather a cynical observation from the
Book of Ecclesiastes, which appears to fit the irresolution of the milk industry
at the present time." (NZMB Annual Report 33: 2) .
The government's plan announced on 30 May 1986 proposed the deregulation of production,
the introduction of cartoned milk, the licensing of stations by the Board and the application
of a maximum-minimum price scheme on milk. The Board and industry had acknowledged
the developments in both market distribution and consumer requirements and were prepared
to accept this government plan. In August further' changes were to be enacted which went
some way toward maintaining the Board's home delivery, in particular a fixed milk price
designed to prevent supermarket undercutting (NZMB Annual Report 32:13-14; 33:11-13).
~
The industry was less receptive to the restructured regime that was gradually revealed by the
government over the subsequent months. It was announced th,at by September 1987 both
contracts and prices would no longer be fixed, milk stations were to compete for contracts
and the setting of margins and allowances by government would cease. Changes to the
vendor service were also disclosed which included the loss of their exclusive rights in both
round ownership and in the service of wholesale or retail outlets. With the introduction of
cartoned milk and the authorization of supermarkets to operate as milk outlets, the vendors
position in the industry became more precarious. However the government did propose to
reconsider the vendor sector in consultation with the industry when the deregulation of
production and introduction of alternative packaging was implemented. Seeking protection
for a viable home delivery service, the Board and the three industry Federations again
offered their joint proposal. The government remained dissatisfied with the proposal's
projected degree of regulation. In February government announced that the deregulation of
the production sector was to proceed from September 1987 with a temporary subsidy to assist
vendors over the transition period. All sectors of the industry rejected this latest
55
communique as a threat to the future of the home delivery system. A revised joint plan for
the deregulation of the industry submitted by the Milk Board. and the Dairy Board was
eventually accepted by the government in March 1987. It proposed that the deregulated
regime would include provisions to licence milk processors, to provide supermarkets with
broader sales zones, to prevent predatory pricing and the fixation of maximum price
differentials between supermarket and home delivery, for the transfer of the control of
vendors and the rights to purchase of available vendor business to milk processors, and for
a three person licensing authority to administer the system. The government was to provide
an exit package for those vendors wishing to leave the industry during deregulation (NZMB
Annual Report 32:13-14; 33:11-13; 34:17).
While negotiations over details continued an effort was made to implement the new policy
within the existing legislative framework. Retail prices were recommended by the processors
and formally fixed by the Board and licences were issued in accordance with the new
requirements. However the negotiations over distribution contracts between the vendor
associations and the stations remained protracted and difficult. Stations with approved
contracts were soon granted vending responsibilities by the Board but in most regions conflict
over these contracts was to persist. Some vendors expressed their dissatisfaction of their loss
of livelihood and the inadequacy of compensation they were offered. While processors now
made their own arrangements for the supply of milk, most retained their link with their
regular producer associations (NZMB Annual Report 34:4,18).
The Board expressed concern that new legislation ought to be introduced which maintained
a viable home delivery service without authorizing either excessive regulation or unlimited
private monopoly. The new Milk Act was passed on 24 March 1988 and implemented on
1 April, although deregulation had effectively occurred prior to its introduction. A1lprevious
legislation and regulations were repealed. The New Zealand Milk Board was abolished and
replaced with a three member New Zealand Milk Authority to supervise the home delivery,
the retail price differential between shops and supermarkets, and the licensing of milk
processors. The new system grants sole rights to the licensed processor on condition of a
guaranteed home delivery service with a compensation package offered to vendors leaving
the scheme (NZMB Annual Report 34:3).
As the final Board executive s~pervised the transition to a deregulated administration, the
Chair B F Kimpton permitted himself a final quotation to express the end of an era in the
industry :
"Last season's fruit is eaten and the full fed beast shall kick the empty pail for
the last year's words belong to last year's language and next year's words
await another voice." T S Eliot (NZMB Annual Report 34:5).
6.4 Prices, Allowances, Margins : From 1967 to Deregulation
6.4.1 Town Milk Producer Prices
After the 1967 legislation, the town milk producer price was still calculated by the
government in consultation with the Board on the basis of the milk price for cheese
manufacture. The town milk producer price actually reflected the payment fluctuations over
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the spectrum of dairy factory supply.
"The estimated payout for cheese milk takes the form of an advance price
adjusted at the end of the manufacturing season to a price which should equate
with estimated payouts for butter plus casein and butter plus skim milk powder
manufacture." (NZMB Annual Report 15:5).
The town producer price was similarly paid out by means of a low advance price and a
further payout at the end of the season. Lower rates of payment were still a source of
concern to the producers who petitioned the government for an improvement. A differential
price regime remained to reflect seasonal, regional and quality schedules.
In 1970 the government expressed its interest in a price fixing authority that still
acknowledged the relationship between the producer price and the payment for cheese
manufacture. An Interdepartmental Committee was set up to examine the proposal in 1973.
The report released the following year recommended changes in the conversion factor used
in the calculation of the price, an increase in the consumer price to reduce the subsidy, and
replacing the "all-the-year-round" basis of the quota system. As these suggestions raised
some controversy, a Review Committee was appointed by the government to study the
recommendations. The Committee commissioned a working party to investigate alternative
systems of town milk contracts and pricing. The working party concluded that savings
arising from alternative systems did not warrant changes in the current town milk scheme
without threatening the regular milk supply. With the government's acceptance of the
Review Committee's report, the issue was closed. In view of the changes of the payment
to manufacturing suppliers, a reassessment of the producer price formula was asked for again
in 1979. The recommendation was made for town milk prices to be set in relation to the
farm gate values paid to the factory producers (NZMB Annual Report 14:6; 15:5; 17:7;
21:6; 22:6; 23:7).
Town milk prices were particularly susceptible to the effects of inflation. However the
government's strategy to contain inflation in the 1970s also disturbed the industry's returns.
The government began to limit payouts in the dairy and town milk industries in 1972.
Payments were restricted to 50 cents per pound of milk fat and the remaining funds were
frozen until government authorization was given, the effect being that the final payout was
delayed until the following year. The national price freeze of the 1970s also affected the
producers' returns and in 1976 the Federation was lobbying for a price increase to regain
relativity with the seasonal manufacturing suppliers. Increases in production costs were
usually covered by expanding output and boosting quotas. However with consumer price
increases reducing liquid milk sales and a freeze on nominated quantities, the producers no
longer received their former level of returns. It was keenly felt that profitability of town
supply farming had been severely affected by
"the gradual decline, during the last decade, in the proportion of total
production from each farm being sold at the town milk price." (NZMB
Annual Report 33:4).
(NZMB Annual Report 19:6; 24:6).
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The general Price and Wage Freeze Regulations limited the producer price for those
servicing the domestic market in the 1982/3 season to the price calculated for the previous
year and was carried over into the 1983/4 term. Town milk suppliers protested over the
exemption from the freeze of the manufacturing industry suppliers whose production was
partially destined for local use. The link of the producer price to the manufacturing sector
was restored after the price freeze was lifted in 1984. However the town milk producers
price was caught again under the post Budget price freeze during 1984. Prior to the
deregulation of the industry, the town milk producer price was further affected by the
substantial reduction in manufacturing prices. The traditional link between town milk prices
and manufacturing prices was then discontinued in anticipation of the restructured industry.
After deregulation the price and quantity requirements were to be determined by negotiations
with the local milk processing companies. The Minister of Agriculture set a minimum price
of 15.14 cents per litre for the 1987/8 milk year to facilitate the new pricing regime.
However as one commentator attests
"This was not as dramatic as it reads insofar as the great majority of milk
processing companies, certainly those in Auckland, had substantial producer
ownership. "(A.Brown Draft 29: 14)
(NZMB Annual Report 29:5; 30:5; 33:5; 34:11).
The quota system had also undergone a signi.ficant change. After provision for school milk
was phased out in 1971, the level of nominated quantities became solely determined by milk
sales. During the initial years contracted quantities for supply remained static but an increase
in sales during 1970 permitted a rise in some nominated quantities. In response to nominated
quantities being in excess to the needs of a declining market, attributed to regular consumer
price increases, the nominated quantities for 1976 were set at the same level offered in the
previous year. This stayed in effect until 1981. After negotiations between the government,
the producers Federation and the Board the frozen level of nominated quantities was reduced
by 4% in 1979 and a further 8% the next year and a new formula was introduced in 1981/2
that calculated the nominated quantities with reference to the average daily demand. As
deregulation of production approached with its attendant reduction in producer price, many
producers felt unable to meet quotas for 1987 (NZMB Annual Report 14:4; 17:5; 18:5;
26:5).
\-
Demands for the increase in special production allowances were also made in response to the
continuing high levels of inflation. Concern had been expressed at the inadequacy of current
rates to ensure stability of the South Island supply. In 1978 the application by the South
Island Town Milk Producer Organisations for an increase in their additional payment was
rejected and the Board was then questioned over its uncritical distinction in pricing between
the two islands. It was suggested that the special allowance system ought to be replaced by
allowances paid on a regional basis. One proposal recommended fixing the producer price
on a three tiered regional basis. (NZMB Annual Report 26:6.) Changes were made in the
farm cost survey conducted by Lincoln College to ascertain which districts faced higher costs
that would warrant allocation of special allowances. In 1980 the government merged the
South Island allowance with the general special production allowance fund. Although the
Board had suggested at least $2.1 million was required to offset the effect of inflation, the
fund was set at an annual $1 million for the next three years. In order to administer the
fund, the Board now made a detailed review of production costs and needs in all the South
Island areas formerly served by the blanket allowance. (An Economic Survey of NZ Town
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Milk Producers. AERU Research Reports.) Providing the Board with a greater degree of
flexibility, the new allowance regime was allocated on the basis that no area received an
allowance greater than the cost of transporting milk from an adjacent source of supply. At
the end of this period a grant was made by the Minister of Agriculture of a further $1 million
for the special production allowances of the final 1986/7 milk year (NZMB Annual Report
25:5-6; 26:6; 27:7; 33:6).
6.4.2 Treatment and Distribution Allowances
Most allowances governed by the 1967 legislation were regularly under review in response
to the loss of the milk in school scheme, award wage rate increases, and the escalation in
costs. Applications for a rise in allowances for pasteurisation, chilling, bottling,
standardisation, storage and homogenisation granted to the treatment stations were often
awarded on a regular basis. To encourage improved refrigeration and storage facilities in
the retail sector wholesale and dairy retailers were also eligible for certain grants. Aside
from the regular provision of margins for the vendors, the Board had adopted a national
schedule of cartage rates, approved by the Secretary of Transport, to compensate for the
substantial increases in vehicle operating costs. Wholesale and shop dairy handling
allowances were also available to the vendor.
The Dominion Federation of Milk Vendors made its first application for margin increases
after the 1967 legislation in a climate of vendor unease, particularly manifest in the
Wellington dispute between the Milk Corporation and contractors. While the Federation was
praised for its adoption of a "most restraining and responsible attitude" in the conflict, the
increases granted fell short of what the vendors had requested. In the Federation's regular
applications for margin increases, their claims were substantiated with the Board's reports
on the vendors cost structure. In 1969 the first vendor allowance increase from the Milk
Prices Authority was significant enough to require amendments in the consumer prices. The
following year the Federation applied for a rise in maximum goodwill rates, unchanged for
18 years (NZMB Annual Report 14:6-8; 16:6; 17:9,17).
In 1975 a milk treatment allowance was fixed to cover the combined services of
pasteurization and bottling. Special rates of allowances allocated by the Milk Price Authority
were fixed on an individual basis for smaller milk stations and for. vendors with difficult
rounds. While in the past rural rounds alone were the subject of special vending allowances,
other rounds were also recognised as disadvantaged and were under examination by the
Authority from 1976. Inflation had affected the capital costs involved in the improvement
of milk station facilities and so an additional allowance was provided in 1977 by the Board
under its obligation "to ensure the continued viability of the undertaking." A new allowance
was also granted that year for the supply of non-fat milk. Separate allowances existed for
returned and unissued service milk for 2% of the net issues. Extra finance was also allocated
for the operation of two central token banks (NZMB Annual Report 22:9; 23:10; 24:11;
25:10; 26:12).
The 1980 amendment to the Milk Act abolished the Milk Prices Authority and transferred
the responsibility of setting standard processing and vending allowances to the Secretary of
Trade and Industry. The difficulties that ensued prompted the Board to request greater
consultation between the Minister, the Department of Trade and Industry and the Board in
the fixation of prices. Moreover all allowances and margins were subject to criteria used in
59
the Price and Wage Freeze Regulations during 1982/4 seasons. Treatment stations
allowances were restructured in 1985 to replace flat rate increases with a more flexible
allowance system. This new regime was designed to promote efficiency, greater
responsibility for local town milk interests and a true evaluation of station costs. A new
system of milk station area prices came into effect after the government subsidy was cut,
reducing the number of pricing areas from 196 to 37. In May 1986 the Commerce
Commission replaced the Secretary of Trade and Industry in its obligation to fix the standard
treatment, vending and shop dairy handling allowances. In December 1987 the Commission
announced that under deregulation the standard rates relating to the treatment of milk would
be revoked. The allowance scheme provided by the Board for the disposal of milk returns
was discontinued due to excess cost by 1987. Discussions initiated'over a new allowance
scheme were marred by the uncertainty of the extent of deregulation including the possible
lifting of price controls (NZMB Annual Report 28:13-5; 29:12; 30:7; 31:8; 32:9; 33:7-8;
34:13).
6.4.3 Consumer Prices
Decimal currency introduced on 10 July 1967 led to the complete revision of price schedules
contained in the 1967 Price Orders. The small increase in consumer price was balanced
against the subsidy and little other effect was observed. The standard retail price for milk
was set at 4c per pint and cream cost 8c per qllarter pint. All margins and allowances were
also adjusted. Plans were made for the introduction of the metric system in the industry in
1972. With the new metric bottle containing more milk, price changes per unit of retail milk
were to be expected. Over the twenty month transition period allowed by the administration
the two types of bottles remained on the market at the same price. Financial adjustments to
the affected sectors were made by the government. The full change to the metric system was
completed by 1 March 1974 (NZMB Annual Report 14:12; 18:16; 20:14).
Increases in special allowances were met by higher consumer prices for that particular supply
area. In a review of the special price fixing procedure in 1976, the government continued
to recover excess costs through consumer charges but used altered rates. The earlier system
charged the consumer 0.5 cents per 600ml for each 0.83 cents per litre of excess costs. This
was modified to a charge of 1 cent per 600ml for each 1.66 cents per litre in excess. Many
areas faced an increase in COJ;lsumer price subsequent to the introduction of the new
procedure however the government had frozen all retail prices at that time which delayed the
imposition of the new rates. Proposals were offered in 1981 to simplify the consumer
pricing system still grouped in over 200 different price zones throughout the country with the
Board reiterating their preference for a uniform retail price. In recognition of the many bulk
users turning to alternative products to save costs, the Board also presented proposals to the
government that would reduce prices for bulk deliveries. However, discussions remained
at a stalemate for some time (NZMB Annual Report 23:12; 28:17).
The subsidy payout for the milk industry had reached $40 million by 1974 which provoked
a wave of government sponsored reviews of the National Milk Scheme. When the
government announced that the milk subsidy was to be removed from the November Budget
following the 1983/4 season, the Board increased the consumer price to cover the costs of
an unprotected industry. The final termination of the subsidy by the government took effect
on 31 March 1985. This led to a substantial increase in the consumer price and
acknowledgement that future rises in costs would be met directly by the consumer. The
Board borrowed finances to cover any shortfall during an interim period of six months while
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the price increase was implemented gradually. The government deferred approval of the
Board's application for a final price increase, prolonging the Board's dependence on bank
loans. Bulk users were also provided with a discounted rate. A further price increase was
made to allow for the introduction of the new goods and services tax in 1986. New price
arrangements were also required with the supply of cartons and plastic containers of milk to
the market. However as milk stations were now able to determine their own retail prices,
after deregulation the retail price of a 600ml bottle of milk ranged from 48 to 60 cents over
the country (NZMB Annual Report 29: 14; 30:9; 32:9; 33: 10).
6.5 Quality Control and Modernization
6.5.1 Alternative Packaging
In 1972 D J Henderson, General Manager of the Board, investigated the packaging and
distribution methods of the milk industries of Europe and America. The choice between
glass bottles and other containers was observed as conditional on the form of distribution.
While shop retail furnished milk in cartons, plastic sachets or plastic bottles, home delivery
systems bottled their milk. As the alternative containers were more expensive and New
Zealand maintained a home delivery system, Henderson reaffirmed the Board's commitment
to preserve the bottled milk home delivery service. The Board remained adamant. With a
perceived economic distribution sector, hi"gh reuse value of the glass container and limited
variety of milk supplied, the Board believed "that while these conditions obtain, the room
for other containers must be limited" (NZMB Annual Report 19:10).
Alternative packaging was to become the major issue for the milk industry, government and
consumer in the debate over national deregulation. With the removal of the milk subsidy in
1985 the industry had already entered "a period of considerable self examination" raising
matters like non-traditional packaging to the fore. The Board recognized the demand for
cartons and plastic containers could serve as an avenue of increasing sales which, if managed
carefully, would enhance the industry's business. The marketing committee established by
the Board in 1983 reported the following year that the market was not adequately served
under the current system, citing the unmet demand for takeaway sales from shops, schools
and supermarkets. A packaging seminar was organised for the industry and was addressed
by R M Kennedy sales dir~ctor of the Scottish Milk Marketing Board. Agreement was
reached to develop a marketing plan for the introduction of cartons. A Packaging Task
Group chaired by Professor Cullwick was established with three working groups
commissioned to report on the implications of carton introduction and both the legislative and
administrative changes required (NZMB Annual Report 31:2,10).
The Task Group report "Milk Marketing and the Role of Alternative Packaging" was
presented in November 1984. It identified the best means of maximizing milk sales as
providing optimal access to a variety of products supported by promotional activities. The
home delivery system had to become more effective and a reward scheme for high
performance was suggested. A transformation of the Board was also required to reflect a
greater market orientation. In sponsoring the imminent introduction of alternative packaging,
the report reaffirmed the need for the industry to retain control and suggested
"the need for an integrated programme of prices, margins, milk round
licensing and quality control of milk in distribution...a need to set proper
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relativities between the bottle and carton selling prices... a need to control
supennarkets as to selling price [and other sales perfonnance standards being
met]." (NZMB Annual Report 32: 12).
In acknowledging the importance of developing the liquid milk service, the Board considered
that it had "been constrained by the existing legislation from major innovative changes in
marketing milk." By 1985 the Board was concerned with the continuance of the home
delivery system, maintaining the level of public milk consumption and actual survival of the
industry. While the report of the Industries Development Commission remained
inconclusive, the Board expressed the industrial goal as
"that milk be made available to all consumers as cheaply as possible, in as
many places as possible and in the most convenient container." (NZMB
Annual Report 32:2).
The government approved the introduction of alternative packaging in October 1986 and sales
indicated a growing consumer demand for milk in both carton and plastic containers. The
Board saw the reversal of the milk sales trend as a "vindication" that had a greater freedom
of product choice been provided to consumers the industry would have improved. The Board
had also sought consensus over a national brand for milk and cream but as opposition to the
Board's involvement ran high, many large. processors developed their own house brand
(NZMB Annual Report 34:3-4).
6.5.2 Alternative Products
In 1966 C J McFadden and D J Henderson attending the 17th International Dairy Congress
in Munich infonned the Board on overseas trends in disease control programmes, UHT
pasteurisation, milk quality control and quality payment systems, processing station layout
and handling methods, competition from milk substitutes, developments in alternative
packaging and changes in delivery pattern. In light of the growing acceptance of UHT
pasteurisation and aseptic packaging in milk industries abroad, the Board announced that sale
of the UHT milk would be accepted within the nominated quantities scheme and provided
with the standard subsidy and payments providing no market was totally dominated by the
new milk. However the government declined initial applications by town milk companies
to import the equipment for UHT processing. "Town Milk" Longlife UHT milk was first
introduced in 1981 with an unrefrigerated shelf life of six months after treatment and
packaging. It was produced by a UHT plant at Amburys milk station in Takanini. The
market was primarily composed of the shipping industry and the motel/hotel/airline trade.
The consumer price, about two and a half times subsidized standard milk prices, reflected
the increased processing and packaging costs and was not seen to compete with the bottled
milk market. Handled by a national distributor, UHT milk was marketed outside the national
milk scheme, excluded from nonnal town sale disposal and subsidy grants while its prices
remained fixed by the Board (NZMB Annual Report 13:10; 14:11; 15:9; 30:9).
Reconstituted or recombined milk was investigated as a substitute for winter milk supplies
on several occasions. At the request of the Minister of Agriculture in 1968, the Board
investigated the proposal to use this fonn of milk as a replacement for costly winter milk.
It concluded that with the available technology, reconstituted milk did not resemble natural
whole milk adequately to serve as a marketable alternative (NZMB Annual Report 15:9).
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The Board first introduced a better tasting non-fat milk known as "Trim Milk" to the public
during 1986 in conjunction with stations already supplying the product. It contained less than
0.5% of milk fat and to improve the product's taste, additional non-fat milk solids were
included. Sales of Trim were significant in the milk market on its introduction, accounting
for 10% of total sales (NZMB Annual Report 33:11).
Plastic sachets to contain single servings of milk had been used extensively in Europe.
Although the New Zealand public's response to sachets of milk was unknown, the Board
sought to protect the consumer's right of choice by a commitment not to incorporate
additional costs into the product's price if it would prevent the milk's availability. Two town
milk companies unsuccessfully tried to obtain licences in 1968 to import the required
equipment and raw materials... The Waikato Milk Co. purchased the first plastic sachet
filling machine in 1970 and commenced marketing the new product the following year. Skim
milk was included to the sachet range in 1973. The level of sales was not significant. For
this special trial venture the Board provided some financial assistance (NZMB Annual Report
14:11; 15:9; 17:10; 18:10; 20:10).
Overseas experience indicated cream sales increased when marketed in a variety of
packaging. The packaging of cream in cartons was initially trialed in Auckland supermarkets
and dairies in 1969. A Cream Steering Committee established in 1982 to test the market was
denied permission by the government to test standard cream in cartons. The Committee then
restricted its research to consumer response to varieties of cream and was involved in a
promotional campaign for whipped cream in Palmerston North. Although sales targets were
met, it was found that once the promotion ended trade slowed down (NZMB Annual Report
16:9; 30:11; 31:6).
6.5.3 Payment for Quality Schemes and Quality Testing
Producer associations were encouraged to include differential payments for solids-not-fats
(SNF) in their internal payment schemes. By 1 September 1966 all had made adjustments,
usually in the form of deductions of 2d to 4d per gallon for milk testing below 8.4%.
However the poor weather conditions experienced in the previous season and the subsequent
deterioration in the SNF level demonstrated the difficulty faced in controlling this variable.
Farmers were also handicapp'ed by the lack of testing facilities on farms to identify individual
low SNF producers within the herd. Trials were underway with equipment from Lincoln
College that tested for total milk solids and protein content. An infra-red milk analyzer was
also available at the NZ Dairy Research Institute at Palmerston North. The Board was
cognisant of these difficulties and did not recommend harsh adoption of the SNF standard.
The Food and Drug Regulations were modified in 1973 to require a new minimum standard
of 11.75% total solids. This combined a minimum of 3.25% fat with the 8.5% SNF, thereby
allowing greater flexibility over quality standards in the winter months. Over the next few
years tests indicated an increase in supplies with a SNF content below 8.5%. Procedures
were also set out for the addition of non-fat milk solids to homogenised milk to maintain the
minimum level of SNF as regular fat content was an important factor to many consumers of
the product. The Food and Drug Regulations of 1983 permitted the addition of SNF in non-
fat milk. In 1979 a voluntary internal standard SNF improvement scheme was adopted by
the industry which imposed penalties as a result of unsatisfactory performance in the monthly
average of three tests. The scheme remained sensitive to hardship experienced by some
producers due to difficult climatic conditions. While not presumed to eliminate the problem
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of SNF content, the scheme was however discontinued two years later at the request of the
producers' Federation (NZMB Annual Report 13:13; 14:15; 20:12; 25:15; 26:17; 28:20;
30:17).
A revision of the grading system was undertaken by the industry in 1970. The methylene
blue reductase test no longer provided a satisfactory indication of the bacterial and keeping
quality of milk particularly when most stock was chilled. Two methods in use in the
manufacturing industry were placed under trial. Both the modified methylene test with its
longer and more uniform system of ageing the milk prior to testing and the nitrate reductase
test were more severe than previous tests. Results indicated a higher standard of hygiene
would be required on farms to achieve the finest grading. Other bacterial, senses and
freezing point depression tests were also administered regularly as an optional check on the
keeping quality and bacterial content. The Dairy Division made appropriate revisions in the
testing and grading procedures for the quality payment scheme (NZMB Annual Report 17:13;
18:12; 26:17).
Concern that inflation had reduced the financial disincentive of producing less than finest
grade milk, led to an industrial proposal for a revised payment scheme. However since the
inception of the National Milk Scheme, payment for the finest grade of milk has been made
on at least 90% of total supplies and in later years finest grade milk accounted for about 98%
of milk received. The new grading standards introduced on 1 September 1981 were seen as
enabling "stations to more effectively maintain internal quality control with suitable external •
monitoring" (NZMB Annual Report 27: 17). Under the new system several tests were now
mandatory.
Test
Senses
Sediment
Standard plate count
Inhibitory substances
Freezing point depression
Total milk solids "
Milk fat
Phosphatase activity
Acid and gas forming organisms
Thermoduric plate count
Solids-not-fats
Homogenisation
(NZMB Annual Report 28:21).
Raw
x
X
X
X
X
X
X
Processed
X (containers)
X
X (pasteurised)
X
X
X
X
X (and non-fat)
X
In 1983 the industry elected to adopt higher penalties for first and second grade milk in line
with the penalty scheme of the manufacturing sector. The Board's Milk Quality Committee
met regularly to review both the developments in milk quality assurance programmes and the
application of the milk quality standards. Based on a scheme of the English Milk Marketing
Board, the Committee proposed substantial penalties in 1985 for second grade milk in order
to eliminate this grade from the industry. Itwas implemented after Ministerial approval in
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September and in 1986 this grade accounted for less than 2% of total supplies. A voluntary
internal test was introduced in 1983 by the producers' Federation, the thermoduric plate
count penalty scheme. Included in the Board's quality standards by 1985 were the
Thermoduric Plate Count and Somatic Cell Count. Incentive payments for premium grade
milk was also introduced for raw milk where a supplementary payment of about 0.5% per
litre was available on a monthly basis for suppliers of finest grade milk with an additional
requirement of a lower Standard Plate Count test (25,000 colonies per ml or lower) (NZMB
Annual Report 31:10; 32:10; 33:10).
To regulate for quality control in the distribution sector the Board was provided with
Amendment No. 3 to the Food Hygiene Regulations which enforced the use of permanent
canopies on all milk delivery vehicles from 1 April 1967. Milk was now expected to be
protected from all conditions of daylight. While many districts had already introduced this
measure, resistance was found among the Auckland vendors whose local authorities had been
reluctant to enforce the measure. The Board had thus found it necessary to increase
surveillance over this matter. The standard of vendors vehicles was deemed satisfactory by
1976. With a greater number of afternoon deliveries, the Board placed more emphasis on
temperatures in cool room facilities and at the time of collection by the vendor. When an
industrial agreement had been reached over design, plastic crates were also expected to start
replacing wire crates from this time. In 1983 a vendor training programme was initiated to
encourage greater milk quality and improved customer service. The two day seminar and
accompanying vendor handbook was designed primarily for new entrants to the industry.
Shop dairies accounted for about 20% of all retail sales by 1970 and the Board had also
increased its liaison with proprietors to check conditions and milk's availability to the public
(NZ Annual Report 13:10-11; 14:12; 30:19).
With the purchase of the Milk Processing (Palmerston North) Ltd treatment station by the
Manawatu Co-op Milk Producers Ltd in 1966, the twenty year program of government
development of the processing sector was concluded. In the next period of the milk
industry's history, new treatment stations were constructed, plants continued to be re-
equipping and new depots were built for the delivery of milk to the vendor, often with the
assistance of the Rural Banking and Finance Corporation. A review conducted in 1966 of
treatment facilities required in the Auckland region highlighted the importance of the Board's
continued involvement in approving sites for new stations. Rationalisation of the industry
determined the Board's approach to the development of sites and the adoption of new
technology particularly in the amalgamation of uneconomic stations into the processing
sector. Rationalisation of processing and distribution was considered difficult by the Board
to achieve under the 1967 legislation. To counter the effect of falling sales and rising costs
the Board presented a program of national rationalisation for industrial comment in 1984.
However as any major expenditure proposal now subjected a station to a Board investigation
of its economic viability, fewer propositions were made by stations. Consequently the rate
of reconstruction and re-equipment declined. Uncertainty over the future packaging and
quality control measures provided more reason to defer costly station refurbishing.
"The final Government decision on the future of the town milk industry, in
particular the extent of deregulation that is decided on, will have a significant
effect on the progress of milk station rationalisation." (NZMB Annual Report
33:9).
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Even within an obsolete legislative framework the process of industrial change was in
progress by 1986. By 1987 the processing plant at Westport remained the only station that
did not offer alternative packaging. While some stations were closed down, other stations
in the face of direct competition had introduced alternative packaging without Board
consultation. The Board expressed concern that the absence of a coordinated approach would
encourage oversupply, financial problems and create the need for further rationalisation of
processing operations (NZMB Annual Report 13:9; 14:10-11; 16:7; 26:16; 29:13; 31:7;
33:3; 34:4,12).
6.6 Consumption and Marketing
In 1966 the per capita consumption of town milk at 30.81 gallons per year (140.06 l/year)
indicated a continued decline. The lower increase in sales coincided with a lower population
growth rate. The cancellation of the milk in schools scheme had also resulted in a loss of
trade of 3.5 million gallons. The industry's concern in declining consumption levels led to
a national survey commissioned from the NZ Data Ltd on the levels of consumption and use
of milk. Although a slight increase in the per capita consumption was evident from 1968 to
1972, the sales trend was reversed after the escalation in consumer prices from 1976,
arrested only with the price freeze of 1982-85. _By i 986 the per capita consumption of milk
had fallen to 106.5 litres (NZMB Annual Report 13:5; 14:19; 16:5; 20:5; 24:7).
The Milk Publicity Council had continued its public relations and educational activities on
a modest scale and the Milk Market "Week" Conferences remained an annual gathering of
the industry. Annual competitions between treatment stations manufacturing by-products
were introduced in the 1968 Week. The new 16mm educational film became available to the
public in 1969. In 1967/8 a comprehensive television and radio advertising campaign was
undertaken while the Council reduced some involvement in previous activities. An increase
in financial contributions from the industry allowed the Council to commence its new
scheme. With total expenditure at $32,000 the new promotional scheme accounting for 70%
of the budget. In the first year 144 telecasts were arranged and the radio coverage based on
the television campaign was broadcast through a commercial network of 22 stations. This
promotion was continued on a similar budget until an appeal to the industry for a need to
meet inflationary costs led to increased contributions from 1974. The Council was to
reevaluate its advertising activities through a market research programme commissioned in
1977. Based on the Council's revised marketing position, advertising agencies were
approached for a new promotional campaign launched the following year (NZMB Annual
Report 13:15; 14:19; 15:15; 21:15; 24:18).
In response to the significant decline in consumer sales after several price increases the Milk
Publicity Council was replaced in 1978 by an official and independent body, the NZ Milk
Promotion Council. While the constituent financial members remained key agents from the
industry, further admissions to membership were possible. The normal publications and
educational material were produced by the new body but it also sought in a more vigorous
campaign to stabilise sales, encourage consumption and promote better a service for the
consumer. In its first year the Council operated on a budget of $250,000 with the Board
contributing $50,000. Another promotional effort involved in prompting the International
Milk Day, 22 May 1979.
In 1982 the Council transferred its funds and functions to a committee of the NZ Milk Board.
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Its constituent members remained unchanged and the Board increased its contribution to
$200,000. New promotional activities included assisting with a trial distribution of recipe
leaflets by South Island vendors in concurrence with a television campaign, providing further
grants to local promotional groups and releasing a new educational kit entitled "What Shall
We Eat". In 1985 four new television commercials were produced. Market research and
product development were regularly undertaken by the Council. A new professional agency
was appointed for the Council's advertising campaign in 1984 and an attitudinal survey was
made into the consumer's perception of milk. Arising from an opinion audit of the industry's
image among government and media personnel involved in the agricultural sector, the
Council implemented a number of recommendations in its publicity campaign (NZMB Annual
Report 24:18; 25:18; 26:21; 29:21; 30:20; 31:11).
The Board also established a Marketing Committee in 1983 to advise on how to protect the
existing market and further expand milk sales. The Committee arranged for a marketing
audit of the industry and pursued issues in accordance with its findings. It reviewed the
institutional market, the opportunities for milk sales in schools, pubs and outside the home,
the vendor sector, alternative packaging and the future structure of the industry. New
schemes were trialed in selected areas including incentive programs and selection procedures
for vendors, the use of milk dispensers in hotels and food outlets, the introduction of new
milk products, Longlife Milk and Trim Milk, and involving the Board's distribution officers
in promotional activities. The opportunity to expand the market through adopting alternative
packaging was important to the Committee who were participants in the 1985 report "Milk
Marketing and the Role of Alternative Packaging". Late in 1985 the Milk Promotion
Council and the Marketing Committee were amalgamated so that the Board could coordinate
a strategic marketing policy within a body of industrial representatives and marketing experts.
New projects included the further popular television commercials, one to promote the sale
of Trim Milk, the "Milo Milkie" vendor promotion, production of nutritional booklets,
articles for medical magazines and newspaper columns and booklets designed for carers of
infants, "Where do I Start?" and young children, "Grandpa and the Baby" (NZMB Annual
Report 30:18; 31:10; 32:11).
Deregulation of the industry was to foster a reduction in the production and supply of the
Board's promotional material. The Board was also advised that it would lose financial
support for its advertising campaigns. The industry sought patronage for a Milk Industry
Council, a promotional body, but this proposal did not receive approval of many stations who
now promoted their own products under the new regime (NZMB Annual Report 33:14).
6.7 Conclusion
The Board's administration had been considerably successful in the implementation of the
early government's agenda for the restructuring and development of the town milk service.
Higher quality standards had been adopted in all spheres of the industry and the consumer
was assured a regular supply of a quality product. Advances had been made in the
implementation of new technologies particularly in the processing sector. However there
were significant elements of resistance in the traditionally structured industry that impeded
the introduction of more radical technology and product changes, and their associated new
economic agents. It will be the purpose of the final chapter of this report to outline the
development of these new power structures within the context of a collapsing corporatist
alliance, a comparison between the two systems would further an understanding of the
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dynamics of the regulatory domestic milk economy. Thus the theoretical constructs presented
at the outset of this report will serve to provide an interpretation of the narrative history of
the New Zealand Milk Board.
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CHAPTER 7
CORPORATISM AND DEREGULATION
IN THE NEW ZEALAND MILK INDUSTRY
7.1 Introduction
In this final chapter the narrative history of the New Zealand Milk Board will be reviewed
with reference to the corporatist theoretical model presented in earlier sections. The first
section details the relationships and structures of corporatism that were derived from the
alliance between the state and the milk producers and explores the effect of corporatist
governance on the performance of the industry. In particular the following section examines
how the state was able to secure market stability, contain industrial conflict and institute its
agenda of rationalisation and modernisation of the liquid milk service through the
mechanisms of a regulated economy. While the state's success in allocating responsibility
for the economic management of the industry is evident, the deregulation of the milk service
in the 1980s indicates the alliance became redundant to the adminstration of the milk
economy. The· breakdown of the corporatist relationship is examined and highlights the
hidden dynamics of power contained within the producers' relations with the state that
became apparent through the collapse of the alliance. Further understanding of the
corporatist relationships, both their value and their limitations, is provided by the contrast
of the emerging economic environment and agents that restructured the post-regulation
domestic milk sector. A brief survey of the deregulated milk industry is offered for
comparison to the earlier situation and this is followed by a commentary on the broader
politico-economic setting within which the Milk Board history is situated. Both sections offer
an outline of the contextual variables that have influenced the history of the organisation of
the domestic milk sector. The chapter concludes with a summary discussion of the value of
corporatist arrangements to the effective organisation of milk economies and what the
corporatist theoretical model can offer to the process of milk industry construction.
7.2 The Rise and Decline of Corporatism in the Milk Industry
\-
The restructuring of the domestic milk industry in the 1980s through the withdrawal of state
assistance for agriculture marked the end of the corporatist alliance between farmers and the
government. The bond that had existed between the farming community and government was
redefined. Farmers' traditional access to governmental decision making structures had been
sustained through an affiliation to the National Party and exemplified by the Minister of
Agriculture's position in Cabinet, serving as Deputy Prime Minister from 1949-60. However
by the second term of the fourth Labour government the Minister of Agriculture and
Fisheries was relegated to the 18th position (Britton, Le Heron, Pawson 1992:95). The
subsequent National Government did not seek to institute agriculture's customary structures
of political power. The liquid milk sector was particularly affected by this realignment of
political forces, demonstrating the powerful influence of the former corporatist alliance in
the industry.
Corporatism has been used by analysts to explain the relationships that have arisen between
the state and the agricultural sector in western economies. Perry suggests that Cawson's
69
concept of "bilateral monopoly" best describes the nature of organised interests within the
meso corporatist relationship between the state and farmers found in post-war New Zealand
(Perry 1992:43). Historically the political system in New Zealand can be characterised as
providing
"associations or interest groups with the opportunity to gain access to the
policymakers and to make known their proposals or demands." (Biggs 1965:15)
Thus sector specific corporatist arrangements were observed to have mediated between the
state and interest groups, providing each sector with a distinctive structural position in the
decision making arena. In addition to the organised interests of labour, small and medium
capital, transnational corporations and international financial institutions, farmers have also
been key actors in the political arena. As a corporatist partner with the state, producers have
shared in the administration of their sector, empowered by mechanisms of delegated public
authority to govern their members through some form of self regulation.
The rise of corporatism had its origin in the development of agricultural marketing structures
as the following review shows. Typical of most western nations, New Zealand politics have
been dominated by the agricultural lobby and its agenda. The significant position of
agriculture's representation in Parliament assured access to the key decision making
structures in government and the prominenGe of the agricultural program in government
policy determinations. In particular, corporatist arrangements provided the political
machinery of the agriculture sector with the opportunity to promote its own interests within
the framework of the general national interest (Weststrate 1959:55). With the economic
wellbeing of the agricultural economy perceived as a fundamental national concern, the state
was able to intervene in agricultural markets "in the public interest" (Myrdal1960 cited in
Biggs 1965:8), public funds could be used for large subsidies to agricultural industries, and
agriculture's leadership granted public authority to administer regulatory schemes over their
industries.
During the international crises of World Wars I and II, the government's temporary
regulation of the agricultural economy had facilitated a preference by both state and fanner
for interventionist policies. A new concern for public economic welfare had encouraged the
state's initial support for producer boards. Moreover indirect state control through the board
system provided the state with a legitimate and efficient mechanism for intervention.
Organising the agricultural lobby was also a means by which the state could "prevent the
industry from becoming an irresponsible pressure group." (Biggs 1965:42). It relieved the
pressure and criticism on the government from a particular interest group through its co-
option into the decision making structures.
Initial producer opposition to state involvement in agricultural organisation was derived from
the premises of a staunchly individualist ideology that typified the early farming community
spirit. However the agricultural sector became more amenable to government intervention
when the favourable returns of the state controlled war economy were compared to the lower
prices received by the independently operating producers in the post-war markets of the
1920s. The board system was initiated in an era of prosperity where overseas markets were
believed to be inexhaustible yet manipulated by the trading countries. The first four boards
established did not possess extensive powers and thus did not require a high level of
government supervision. The agricultural crisis arising from the depression of the 1930s
70
created further apprehension over agriculture's dependency on the market. Direct control
by the state at that time was politically as feasible as the regime implemented during the war
and was achieved through the implementation of the Agricultural Emergency Powers Act of
1934 and the Labour government's Marketing Department.
Stabilization policies had been first promoted by sector leaders as a measure to safeguard
produce prices and fanners' incomes against the fluctuations of a protected overseas market.
The dairy industry was an early advocate for a structured interventionist organisation and
perceived government regulation as a means to secure their interests in the face of overseas
processing and transport monopolies and importers. There had also been a greater awareness
of the interrelatedness between all forms of state activity. For instance the price of butterfat
would influence the cost of living, affect the government's Budget, be a consideration during
wage award negotiations and reflect in the prices for other primary products including the
price received for milk (Biggs 1965:48).
However not all agricultural sectors favoured state interference, the meat and wool industries
refused involvement with government sponsored programs until World War II. Moreover
the more widespread control of agriculture by government in the 1930s and 1940s was soon
met with demands from producer associations to manage their own affairs and have a greater
role in policy making. By 1947 with the Dairy Products Marketing Commission, the
relationship had been reconstructed to allow greater producer participation ahd contemporary
producer boards ensued.
In reaction to Labour's regime of political control of agriculture from 1935-45, producers
entered into informal corporatist relationships with the state where the government delegated
some authority to producer bodies. They now sought to develop a connection between the
mechanisms of government and their industry's functional democracies. Public corporations
and boards were not, in New Zealand,
"a means of introducing administrative autonomy into state marketing enterprises but
as a means of enabling producers to share the responsibility for the centralized
economic management of their industries." (Biggs 1965:50).
Corporatist organisation was established through the pressure and the approval of most
agricultural actors. While the principle function of these arrangements was depicted as
securing the stabilisation of the market, other political objectives were pursued by the actors
involved. Producers, vendors and processors all sought to establish or strengthen their
linkage with the state. Corporatist structures facilitated access to state resources and
provided the group with greater market potency over less successful lobbyists. Powerful
monopolies within agriculture were encouraged through the government's relationship with
selected groups. According to the power and structure of the industry's lobby and its
significance for the national economy, each board was assigned its own statutory powers and
methods of operation.
However there remained fundamental differences between the New Zealand experience of
corporatism and other nations' arrangements. No enduring fonnal tripartite corporatist
structure existed between the state and the key actors of the participating agricultural
industry, like the Australian Accord. The mediating committees, boards and public
corporations all contained a greater measure of government representation and did not always
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possess an autonomous regulating power (Biggs 1965:26). In agriculture the crucial sphere
of policy making lay in the fonnulation of producer prices. For most producer boards the
role of the corporatist agent was confined to maximizing its influence in price negotiations
while the guaranteed prices were detennined by the government.
The dairy industry had been an early participant in the political sphere, effectively lobbying
for greater government involvement, culminating in one of the first boards in 1923 and a
brief period of direct control of the export market (1926-7) . Liquid milk became an
independent sector distinct from the export dairy industry as the crisis of domestic milk
supply escalated in the 1920s and 1930s. The inclusion of milk on the national political
agenda occurred through the efforts of the health lobbyists and the demand for milk from
visiting American troops in the early 1940s. The symbolic importance of milk to the public
was soon aroused facilitating a ready acceptance for the highly regulated and heavily
subsidized liquid milk regime. Poor supply conditions had elicited attempts at administration
of the town milk by local municipal councils, the most effective in Wellington and Auckland,
and culminated in the legislative sanction of the producers authority in 1944.
The Milk Act of 1944 extensively reorganized the relationships within the sector and between
the industry and the state. Political power was transferred from the vendors to the
producers. The Milk Commission had earlier noted that the industry under the control of the
vendors reflected their commercial interests ~nd had failed to provide a regular supply of
high quality milk to the consumer. The vendors would seek to purchase milk at the lowest
price and this commercial priority had extensively shaped the organisation of production
activities. In Christchurch for instance, the business concerns of the vendors controlled the
level and standard of production, detennined the prices, contract tenns, supplies to be used
and the seasonal adjustment. The consequential poor quality supply, low returns to the
producer and severe conflict between organisations within the industry all typified the effect
of vendor monopoly.
As the new environment facilitated by the Act insulated producers from the variable nature
of external circumstances, it enhanced the organisation of powerful producer associations.
Market security was achieved through a statutory regime of price controls, government
subsidy, a surplus milk scheme and quota rights to contractual suppliers. The National Milk
Scheme administered through SllPply Associations controlled both milk production and who
could participate in the industry. Access to government resources was limited to those in the
Milk Scheme and quota allocation remained at the discretion ·of those aIready within the
system. Other producers found it difficult to enter the program and their discontent forced
the establishment of an appeal committee to hear disputes over supply applications. A code
of conduct was also devised by the Board and the Producers' Federation to prevent
discrimination against new entrants. However as the code remained recommendatory and
was not enforced, it appeared to serve as a mechanism to maintain the corporatist agent's
legitimacy as representative of the producers.
The Milk Board perpetuated this partiality towards producers in its composition. The
fanning background dominant in both the industry representatives and the government
officials allowed the board to consistently reflected the producers' concerns. The first
Council was composed of government officials, the Minister of Health as Chair and two
other Health representatives, two producer nominees and one person from the New Zealand
Municipal Association. The Board structure under the legislation of 1953 continued with the
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Minister as Chair, two appointments from the Departments of Welfare and Agriculture, three
producer representatives and a member each from the New Zealand Municipal Association
and the Vendors Federation. While in 1967 the structure favoured an increased consumer
voice with four members from the Municipal and Counties Associations, the power balance
reverted to a strong industrial representation in the amendment of 1980. In this final
permutation the three producer nominees were joined by one from the treatment stations and
two vendors representatives. While the government officials of the past had often shared the
same background as the producers the Chair and the Deputy were now both chosen from the
industrial representatives.
The Board further strengthened the producer organisation through the amalgamation of small
associations and the establishment of committees of associations in bigger centres. The new
power structure was also replicated in the processing sector where many plants became
producer owned. When the government re-equipped the milk treatment stations and
financially assisted the sale of the stations to local companies in the 1940s and 1950s,
producer companies were formed at this time to purchase and operate these improved
facilities. Thus the structured relationships of the milk industry created in 1944 featured
monopolist agencies of key economic actors, in particular the dominant producer sector. The
producers' monopoly that was initiated by the state as a control on commercial interests
continued to dominate the industry until 1984.
During its forty year administration the Board was able to implement programs of
modernization and rationalization through this structure of monopolist producer associations.
With no alternative agency to represent liquid milk suppliers, the Board had a sole claim to
financial and political resources provided by its relationship with the government and could
impose a regulatory structure to dictate conditions of supply to its members. Their ability
to regulate producers' behaviour allowed them to govern the sector in accordance with what
was perceived as in the best interests of the industry and, by implication, of the nation.
Legislation committing the industry to quality milk production facilitated the introduction of
several internal voluntary and mandatory quality schemes. To stay within the milk industry
producers had to comply with the quality standards imposed. Thus the National Milk
Scheme developed into a regular and good quality supply by means of a regulated
organisation and a differential price regime that included seasonal, regional and quality
schedules. The Board sought improved hygiene standards and a constant supply through
education, penalty rates, bonus systems and inspections. When the composition and quality
of milk was more readily tested, the administrators encouraged voluntary internal
improvement programmes before the adoption of national payment on quality schemes. For
instance, the standards for milk treatment and containers were initially encouraged by an
educational strategy directed at both the producer and the consumer. As pasteurization and
bottling facilities were introduced the Board pursued more stringent regulations. Through
its liaison officers and inspectors problem areas could be identified and effectively
approached. While the Minister of Agriculture possessed the power to regulate for the use
of sealed containers in certain districts, the Board's method was usually preferred. Bottled
pasteurized milk was to become a universal standard.
The rationalisation of the industry was another feature of the Board's agenda which again was
implemented through the Board's program of liaison with the targeted sector, surveillance
and financial incentive, supplemented by direct government regulation. The rationalisation
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of the processing sector was achieved initially through direct government investment after
the Milk Act of 1944. When the local companies acquired ownership of the stations they
continued to reinvest in the upgrading and expansion of facilities. Laboratory facilities,
station hygiene standards, bottling and pasteurisation procedures, were all readily
incorporated in treatment stations by the companies involved.
Producers had responded well to self regulation programs for milk composition, to the
mandatory grading system that penalized poor quality supplies and to the national program
standardizing hygiene and container requirements. The Board also had little difficulty in the .
adoption of their rationalisation agenda for the processing sector. Their efforts were
encouraged by the growth in milk consumption that continued until the 1970s. The ease of
policy implementation in the processing sector perhaps reflects the producer dominance in
the ownership of many stations and their affiliation with the objectives of the producer-based
Milk Board.
The distribution service proved more difficult for the Board to influence. Rationalisation of
distribution was complicated by the Board's relationship with the vendors. The strong
vendor organisation had not been incorporated into the new administration's structure yet
remained a crucial party to the success of the milk supply. The Milk Authorities sought to
administer the regulation of the vendors through licensing individual distributors, zoning the
vendor rounds and fixing the maximum goodwill permitted in the sale of vendor business.
However the price established by the Board as the maximum goodwill in effect became the
minimum price threshold as vendors continued to undermine the administration's authority
in their business. The vendors also maintained an earnest resistance to Board initiatives
perceived as injurious to their business. While pickup and delivery time schedules to protect
the quality of milk were implemented, a stiff campaign was waged against the authorities'
efforts to impose vehicle covering regulations. The canopies were seen as both expensive
and an impediment to a rapid delivery service and were not adopted by many vendors during
the Board's program of voluntary implementation. When the instalment of canopies had
become mandatory in 1963, the vendor's Federation joined the Board to successfully lobby
the government for a legislative amendment that provided an increase in the vendor margin
to compensate for their losses when canopies were used.
Corporatist arrangements did Rot remove the element of political control, merely made the
government's role less formal. With the proliferation of board structures, the only
administrative agency that was able to enforce a consistent policy across the organised
activities of the producers was Cabinet. Control was facilitated through the demand for an
annual audit and the boards' annual report to be read in Parliament and the government's
power to introduce legislation to revoke the board's statutory powers (Biggs 1965:55-8).
Moreover the crucial sphere of policy making lay in the formulation of the producer price.
In most boards guaranteed prices were determined by the government while the corporatist
agent sought to maximise its influence in price negotiations. The government retained its
control over liquid milk prices and persisted in linking the town milk price with the price
received for the export milk supply. The Milk Board and the producer's Federation
constantly petitioned the government to change the formula used to determine the annual
producer's price received for milk and to include the Board in future negotiations. The
Board's power to determine special allowances and subsidy allocations remained the only
financial role it had in the industry.
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The evolution of the corporatist relationship between the producers' Board and the state had
been a means of sharing the responsibility for the economic management of the industry.
However once the role of government becomes obscured through informal channels of
political power, preferred by the state and its industrial partner in their mutual effort to
preserve their legitimacy in their respective electorates, the degree of autonomy enjoyed by
the Board remains difficult to determine. The changes in legislation over the years did afford
the Board greater administrative scope : beginning with their authority over the producers
in 1953, the distributor's sector in 1967 and more control over affairs of the processors in
1980. The governance of the sector remained in accordance with the policy negotiated
between the state and the industry's leadership with the government retaining overall power
through its control of price determination. During the protracted negotiations prior to the
deregulation of the liquid milk sector in the 1980s, the vulnerability of the corporatist
industry became apparent. The collapse of the state's alliance with the producers emphasised
the dependence of the corporatist partner on a specific political and economic environment
to sustain its privileged access to the state. In reviewing the contextual features prior to
deregulation it will be possible to assess the durability of corporatist structures and appreciate
the circumstances that had supported these arrangements between the state and the milk
industry.
The original rationale for a highly regulated and statutory governed town milk service
became redundant under conditions of the contemporary agricultural economy. A constant,
high quality supply had been achieved through the implementation of industrial reform and
installation of new technologies. The accomplishments of the milk industry thus allowed the
regulated producer administration to seem irrelevant to the industry's future. Agriculture no
longer commanded the same status in the national economic agenda as the country's
dependence on the sector's exporting power declined. Many agricultural industries were
finding it more difficult to justify the investment of public funds in their subsidized trade.
High subsidies for the town milk service were now considered an excessive burden on the
tax payer. Criticism of the milk subsidies also reflected the broad ideological shift against
government intervention in business transactions. Moreover, the industry was no longer
served by milk's representation as a symbol of the nation's health. Excessive consumption
of dairy products now concerned health specialists and the public. New milk products were
demanded and the trend in declining consumption continued to threaten the industry.
Consumer's sensitivities to the new health agenda had even prompted the renaming of the
'milk fat' content of dairy goods to 'milk solids' in 1992. Thus the organizational demands
of a perishable product, the economic importance of milk to the society and its symbolic
nature that were the foundation for the regulated milk regime had become irrelevant to the
new economic environment.
Rejection of a subsidized milk service indicated the powerful opposition to the government's
intrusion in the national economy. When criticism of state intervention and market control
becomes a significant feature in the political culture, regulatory and stabilizing arrangements
are necessarily reappraised. The financial burden of protected industries was a key argument
against government regulation. Moreover, in a "survival of the fittest" scenario, market
forces were said to serve the economy better by sustaining the most efficient, competitive and
consumer-responsive industries. As opinion moved against government intervention in
agricultural industries, the efficiency of protected sectors came under scrutiny. The regulated
liquid milk industry was criticized for its excessive financial cost to the taxpayer, its
structural rigidities that prevent implementation of new products and technologies, and its
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inefficient management of the sector. The debate over intervention in the agricultural
economy has been characteristic of all states' relations with their farming sector. In Grant's
analysis of the British milk marketing system he suspected that both the growing political
concern of the acceptability of corporatist forms of regulation and changes in the economic
conditions of the sector do not guarantee its continuance (Grant 1985a:191-5). Thus while
there is agreement that indirect state intervention is beneficial to the industry and the
consumer, corporatist arrangements may persist. A change in the ideological climate will
severely test the flexibility of regulatory bodies. (No effort is made here to explore the
extensive literature on this issue. For recent discussion of regulation in the New Zealand
agricultural economy see Birks and Chatterjee, 1988; Bollard and Buckle,1987; Britton, Le
Heron, Pawson, 1992; Deeks and Perry, 1992; Gibson, 1988; Sandrey and Reynolds, 1990;
Wallace and Lattimore, 1987.)
The corporatist structures that had been implemented 40 years ago allowed the state to secure
market stability, contain industrial conflict and institute programs of restructuring and
rationalisation of the milk economy. The state relied on the authorized agents of the industry
to execute policy in favour of the government's economic agenda. At the inception of the
regulated milk organisation, the Board and the affiliated associations acted as modernising
agents stabilizing the market, reconstructing the sector and rationalizing the industry. They
also developed a vested interest in maintaining the structures of their political status. When
alternative milk packaging was first promoJed, the industry remained opposed to the
innovation in concern for the preservation of the home delivery system. Government
demands for the implementation of sector rationalisation, adoption of new technologies and
support of new economic agents were criticized and resisted by the vested producer interests
of the regulated sector. Their entrenched position served to marginalised the traditional
industry in the new economy and signalled the demise of the former corporatist partner.
As the industry's representatives failed to implement state-responsive policies they suffered
a reciprocal reduction in organisational power and political status. The government's
appointment of an Industries Development Commission to determine the future of the milk
industry, indicated that the corporatist channels between the state and the sector were no
longer functional. That the government imposed extensive structural changes on the industry
through its deregulation process demonstrated the corporatist partner's ultimate political
impotency. New economic actQrs were involved in the transformation of the milk sector.
The loss of the producer Board's former public status was apparent in the acknowledgement
of the competing lobbyist's agenda and was further emphasized in the adoption of the
processing sector as the key industrial agent under the 1988 legislation. Moreover the
struggle between the Board and the processors indicated the failure of the government's
intermediary to remain effective in managing the conflict in the industry.
Studies of the milk industry's incorporation in the policy making process have suggested that
a unique set of conditions exist in the sector which have permitted this mode of self-
regulatory governance by the private associations. That corporatism requires a specific
environment to flourish questions the durability of such relations. Several aspects of the
scheme suggest a vast potential for instability is contained within the corporatist form of
organization. While external conditions may alter the fortunes of the corporatist milk sector,
other causes of instability originate within the corporatist structures. Thus in the regulation
of the milk industry it was recognised that a necessary balance had to be sustained between
pursuance of the sector's concerns and consideration of the needs of the whole economy.
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That corporatist agents were compelled to pursue their government-sponsored functions to
avoid the loss of organisational and political power, indicates their weaker status in the
equation. In a changing economic environment or political culture the corporatist agents and
their agenda may even become less relevant demanding a more flexible response from
regulatory bodies. Underlying tensions which were contained through the government
sponsored statutory structures persist and play an influential role in the power relations of
the state-sector alliance. The recent conflict between producers and processors was to
determine the nature of the industry's structured relationship.
7.3 Deregulation and Corporatism
After the milk subsidy was revoked in 1984 and the packaging controls were lifted in 1986
the government implemented legislation to facilitate further deregulation of the industry. It
sought
"to provide for the continued home delivery of milk; and to reduce in other respects
the regulation of the processing, supply, and distribution of milk for human
consumption." (Milk Act 1988).
This partial restructuring was perceived as a transitional measure until full deregulation of
the industry was achieved when the Act expired in March 1993. A three member New
Zealand Milk Authority was established under the Milk Act of 1988 to monitor the industry,
to determine retail price differentials, licence milk processors and supervise quality control
of the home delivery service. The functions of the abrogated Milk Board were transferred
to the milk processing companies. Processors were now responsible for production, pricing,
promotion and distribution of the town milk supply. They negotiated contracts for supply
with the producers and they controlled the vendors. Significantly, the powerful monopoly
enjoyed by the producers was completely undermined in the deregulation of production.
Structural changes prior to the Milk Act of 1988 had encouraged the entry of new powerful
economic actors into the industry such as packaging companies, bulk distributors and in
particular, conglomerate processing companies. The ownership of many stations had already
been transferred from producer co-operatives to the new participating companies in a series
of takeovers and mergers after the Industries Development Commission report was issued.
These changes in ownership of the processing sector were pronounced in the Auckland
region. Accounting for half the nation's town milk consumption, such trends in Auckland's
milk business were a significant indicator of the political realignment in the milk industry.
The Auckland trade had been divided between the Ambury's Milk Company and the
Auckland Milk Company (AMC) in the regulated milk economy. Ambury's was both the
largest town milk company in the country and a subsidiary of the dominant national dairy
company, the New Zealand Co-operative Dairy Company (NZCDC). The other key player
in the region was the Dairy Board which had entered the liquid milk sector through acquiring
a significant holding of the AMC in 1985. At this time the NZCDC had overshadowed the
northern districts through the purchase and closure of smaller stations, acquiring privileged
control of five North Island milk districts. NZCDC's takeover of the remaining shareholding
of the AMC (60%) was authorised by the Commerce Commission in 1988, significant in that
the Commission had thus sanctioned "a merger that brought together the largest dairy
77
manufacturer, the largest town milk company, and the Dairy Board." (Sandrey 1990:119).
The Commission had believed that "the detrimental effects of town milk dominance were
more than offset by rationalisation gains and likely cost savings from a new winter milk
scheme." (Commerce Commission 1988.) In the Wellington and Canterbury regions
particular companies within the town milk sector emerged as dominant forces in processing.
However,
"geographical isolation, residual regulation protection and a hint of collusive
behaviour have protected most of the remaining milk stations, with almost no
processed milk crossing boundaries." (Sandrey 1990: 121).
(For further details of the ownership changes see Moffitt and Sheppard 1988:27-9).
The merger between NZCDC, Ambury's and the Dairy Board was significant in that it
established the monopoly of the Auckland and northern region's liquid milk trade by the
dairy industry. While the Milk Act supported the processors control of the milk sector,
deregulation had permitted the domination of a significant portion of the industry by large
dairy conglomerates. As the producers' power was usurped by the processors, it also
effected the rapid integration of the two branches of the dairy industry: the liquid milk sector
and the manufacturing suppliers (Sandrey 1990: 121).
The expressed intention of those advocating a deregulated agricultural sector was to subject
the industries "to the disciplines of a more competitive trading environment", the
presumption being that more open market conditions would encourage business decisions that
would better serve both the consumer and the national economy (Moffitt and Sheppard
1988:15). However for some commentators, the new economic climate merely facilitated
the restructuring of the industry for the benefit of new monopolies and little advantage was
seen by the consumer (Sandrey 1990, Consumer 1989).
Once the statutory corporatist alliance between liquid milk producers and the state was
annulled, the new legislation facilitated control of the industry by large corporations engaged
in the processing sector. In becoming the new agent responsible for ensuring a home
delivery service, the processor was provided with the conditions to extend structured relations
of its monopoly power throughO{.lt the sector. Each processor was granted sole rights to the
home trade within its designated delivery district and could be licensed for more than one
district. Given the high prices paid for exclusive milk zones in company takeovers, Brian
Kimpton's comment that "licences could attain a spurious value based on unalienable rights
bestowed by legislation" seems pertinent (Kimpton, 1988).
The major recipients of licences were processors within the liquid milk scheme prior to its
restructuring. In Bollard's 1986 analysis of the Auckland company merger he referred to
obstructions within the system that already prevented other companies from participating in
the industry. In particular while it remained difficult for a new entrant to guarantee a
constant milk supply, any authority would be disinclined to transfer rights of a delivery
district from an established processor-supplier. The industry's incumbent processors were
able to maintain their dominance by means of the regulations in the Milk Act which served
to prevent the involvement of other companies. This was apparent in the supermarket and
bulk user trade. Although competition in this market was designed to act as a control on
processor's retail prices, the experience in Auckland prior to the company merger indicated
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little rivalry between major processors. In the first years after deregulation few supermarkets
had shifted their trade to new entrants outside the region. Access to the bulk user and
supermarket trade was conditional on the possession of a licence which prevented competition
in the industry from occasional suppliers. Entry into a new market was also obstructed by
the costs of transport and quality maintenance. Thus the Milk Act insulated existing
processors from rival claims to the market and strengthened their dominance in the industry
by maintaining their exclusive rights to the trade with little competitive restrictions on price
setting (Moffitt and Sheppard 1988: 15-17, 23-25). Consequently,
"the competitive pressure on the incumbent to perform competitively, efficiently, and
minimize prices to consumers would be very weak." (Bollard 1988 cited in Moffitt
and Sheppard 1988:24.)
Deregulation was promoted as necessary for the advancement of the milk scheme into a more
efficient, modernized and consumer-responsive service. However the reputable Consumer
magazine expressed public concern over the deleterious effect of deregulation on the milk
service. Under the new regime it was claimed that the consumer suffered higher prices,
fewer product options, an irregular and limited distribution service and a variable quality
supply. Early price movements adjusted the milk price to a comparable level with overseas
services. Price increases were extended to cover company movements and the instalment of
new technology, endeavours designed to eRhance the efficient operation of the milk sector.
However no savings from these efficiency measures were passed onto the consumer. For
instance, the transference of projected savings from AMC's rationalisation program was
regularly deferred. Two years after deregulation the largest processor in New Zealand,
AMC, was charging the highest price for milk in the country (Consumer 1989:29).
Variations in prices throughout the country indicated an absence of competition between
processors. In approving one price increase for bottled milk the Minister of Agriculture had
also commented that the government "objective of competition in the industry is not being
met." (Moffitt and Sheppard 1988:22). While milk processing monopolies controlled the
supply, price competition did not exist and milk became more expensive.
Capital investment in the new technologies shaped the packaging options for consumers.
While the preference for milk in glass bottles still surpassed the demand for alternative
packaging, consumers in th'e Auckland region lost their bottled milk supply. AMC's
motivation for the phasing out of the traditional bottle was expressed as a response to a fall
in demand. However, a consumer survey taken in the region indicated that 60% still
preferred milk in glass (Sheppard 1988:19). The Consumer suggests that the market was
"manipulated" by the AMC's monopoly of the industry to serve its business concerns. Brian
Kimpton director of AMC noted
"Present decisions (of milk processors) ... are no longer made by or in consultation
with a statutory body but by boards of directors who must make commercial decisions
to be judged, not by the public... but by shareholder/suppliers in terms of a return on
capital." (Consumer 1989:30)
Both the quality of the vendor service and the milk product were also affected by
deregulation. Large milk corporations engaged in rationalisation programs reduced the
number of vendors in their districts. While some consumers lost their daily home delivery,
the quality of the service suffered when vendors were required to distribute over a larger
round. The use of the new containers was initially marked by problems in maintaining the
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milk's quality, including a public health scare concerning dioxin in cartoned milk. Moreover
when the processors replaced the more expensive all year round supply with winter milk
production contracts they introduced some variation in the quality of milk through drawing
milk from different parts of the lactation time.
In general, deregulation of the town milk service provided the opportunity for extensive
modernization of facilities and the rationalization of the processing sector. However the
consumer appeared to receive few benefits purported to be associated with the new agenda.
As commercial considerations were to shape the conditions of production once again, the
continuation of a constant, high quality and consumer responsive service was at times in
doubt. Deregulation heralded the demise of the statutory corporatist alliance between the
producers and the state and facilitated the restructuring of the industry's power relations. It
undermined the authority of the producer and the vendor in their business in favour of the
processing sector, supported the control of the industry by large corporations, and advanced
the integration of the liquid milk sector into the exporting dairy industry. Many critics
believed the deregulation program merely served to facilitate the restructuring of the industry
for the commercial benefit of new monopolies at the expense of other participants. There
was little pressure from the market for the new managers of the service to "perform
competitively, efficiently, and minimize prices to consumers... " (Bollard 1988).
While outside the confines of this particular report, it would be pertinent in the study of these
cases where corporatist alliances have persisted to further examine comparisons of the New
Zealand industry with the history of the US milk industry, that underwent deregulation
earlier, or with the UK and European domestic milk sectors, which have persisted as
regulatory bodies in spite of significant political pressure to reform their organisation. The
history of the New Zealand industry is an example of how vulnerable a corporatist agent may
be in the alliance with the state, how important it was for the corporatist agent to remain
responsive to the government's agenda and the value of a mechanism to intemalise the
harmful effects of organisational restructuring. It remains uncertain whether the Board
administration in New Zealand failed to develop these important political elements due to a
structural weakness contained in the producer based organisation, through a political
oversight by the leadership, or because of factors that differ between the farm organisational .
experience of New Zealand and of the UK and Europe.
\.
7.4 The Global Politico-Economic Context
The history of the New Zealand Milk Board often referred to the context within which the
Board was situated, in particular reflecting the general economic agenda followed by the
government in response to international political and economic trends. Both the
establishment and the demise of statutory regimes were paralleled by similar institutional
movements in New Zealand and in the economies of its trading partners. It thus seems
appropriate to place the story of the New Zealand Milk Board in the broader setting of
national and global politico-economic contexts. While many ideological and theoretical
analyses present current economic trends within a historical pattern of capitalist expansion
and development, it serves the purpose of this report to merely identify this present retreat
from the regulatory situation as a general trend of economic restructuring and institutional
experimentation experienced throughout the international capitalist economic network.
Producer marketing boards have provided emerging agricultural industries with an effective
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solution to the problems faced of unstable price regimes, uncertain economic and market
conditions and the redistribution of returns to the different sectoral levels. These structures
reflect the global preoccupation of the post war era for states to protect the development of
national production spheres through regulated economies. This "productionist phase" was
augmented by state sponsorship of the nation's consumption through the social welfare state.
In the New Zealand case, the regulated economies of the 1940s have been suggested by
commentators as a political outcome of a bargain reached at this time between the
government, the manufacturing sector, and the agricultural sector set in the arena of
international trade arrangements. After successfully negotiating an exception from the GAIT
agreement, the New Zealand government introduced import controls to shelter the
manufacturing industries from outside competition. The protection of manufacturers was at
the expense of exporters and was thus perceived to be the impetus for state compensation to
the agriculture exporters and associated industries such as the domestic milk market, by
means of guaranteed price and statutory board systems (Biggs 1965). The regulated liquid
milk economy was the typical form of agricultural economy organisation pursued by the New
Zealand government which was reinforced by subsidized consumption that even included a
guaranteed consumption through its milk in schools scheme. The domestic milk sector thus
appeared to be organised for reasons other than the immediate demands of the industry, and
the implementation of these regulatory structures can be understood with reference to the
broader politico-economic context as suggested above.
What analysts commonly refer to as a restructuring crisis was soon to appear heralding the
next phase of capitalist expansion and development. The participating economies were
required to dismantle their "interventionist apparatus" and provide the circumstances
conducive to new international economic structures. Greater industrial flexibility and
integration of production with international trade and finance was now demanded in the new
cycle. Thus states have pursued the deregulation of national economies to provide for the
entry of economic agents best suited to the new environment. The New Zealand government
had initiated the restructuring process through its effort to expand the export production base
in the period prior to deregulation, 1960-1984. By the 1980s several economic groups had
emerged in the different agricultural industries that were distinguished by their efforts at
internationalizing and diversifying production. The general revision of conditions of
production facing all investors placed economic efficiency and profitability to the centre of
the economic agenda. The new agents were at once prepared for the new economic regime
and were instrumental in facilitating the restructuring of the agricultural economy to enhance
their business environment. By 1984 much of the reconstruction of the agricultural sectors
was already was in progress. The deregulation of agriculture was merely a reorientation of
the predispositions of the farming community to the manner in which they operated in their
economic environment (Britton, Le Heron, Pawson 1992:8,92,96).
The New Zealand Milk Board history illustrates this process. The final stage of Board
administration saw the government supporting the emerging involvement of processor
conglomerates, alternative packaging manufacturers and the dairy sector in the liquid milk
business. In 1988 these actors were already entrenched in the domestic milk sector and were
instrumental in the reconstruction of liquid milk processing, distribution, and organisation
according to their needs. Particular ideological constructs were incorporated in the new
actors' campaign to reorganise the milk industry. The emerging regime was always
supported with reference to the economy's need for structures of efficiency, rationalisation
and flexibility. The deregulation ethos reflected the business interests of the new actors in
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the milk sector and became the new mentality expected of the producers who wished to
remain in the domestic milk sector. The restructuring crisis created the new agenda for
participation in agricultural economies and rationalised the involvement of the new actors.
7.5 The Value of Corporatism to the New Zealand Milk Industry
The corporatist relationship between the producers' Board and the state was a means of
dividing the burden of administering the industry. Public corporations and boards were not
in New Zealand
"a means of introducing administrative autonomy into state marketing enterprises but
as a means of enabling producers to share the responsibility for the centralized
economic management of their industries." (Biggs 1965:50).
Corporatism did not remove the element of political control, merely made the government's
role less formal. Indirect state control through the board system provided the state with a
legitimate and efficient mechanism for intervention. Organising the agricultural lobby
relieved the pressure and criticism on the government from a particular interest group
through the sharing of responsibility for the sector and thus the state could "prevent the
industry from becoming an irresponsible pressure group." (Biggs 1965:42,63).
Corporatist organisation was established through the pressure and the approval of most
agricultural actors. Agriculture's political machinery was organised to promote its interests
within the framework of the national interest and to afford its agents with public status
(Weststrate 1959:55). While the principle function of these arrangements was depicted as
securing the stabilisation of the market, other political objectives were pursued by the actors
involved. Producers, vendors and processors all sought to establish or strengthen their
linkage with the state. Corporatist structures facilitated access to state resources and
provided the group with greater market power over less successful lobbyists.
As an explanatory model for the structuring of milk industries in liberal democracies,
corporatism also proved a valid representation of the New Zealand milk marketing system.
While identifying the actors, structures and political processes invoh:edin. the establishment
and maintenance of a regulatory economy; the corporatist theory ofters a perspective from
which to critically analyze state. sponsored regulatory bodies. At the inception of the
corporatist arrangements in the New Zealand milk industry, these structures were the most
efficient means of organizing the sector. The system sustained the industry while
safeguarding the needs of its participants: ensuring the implementation of policy and
avoidance of market conflict and political controversy as demanded by the state; providing
income security for the producers; and guaranteeing supply and quality control for the
consumers. Corporatism allowed the successful management of conflict in the sector. It also
equipped the industry with an effective problem-solving capacity. Corporatist structures
provided mechanisms for the government's program of industrial rationalization, restructuring
and modernization. In presenting corporatist arrangements as an interaction between the state
and its partner within a specific environment, it has been possible to appreciate the political,
ideological and economic requirements for regulatory economies and recognize the
vulnerabilities of these structured relationships.
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Criticism has been directed at the effect of corporatist arrangements between the state and
the targeted agricultural sector. The inequities built into the system allow one group of
actors to develop exclusive, government sponsored monopolies within the industry at the
expense of other potential participants. The regulated milk industry of New Zealand
furnished the liquid milk sector with higher returns than the exporting dairy sector. That the
town milk service was more lucrative was evident by the excess demand for supply contracts,
many from manufacturing supply farms, and the capitalization of quota rights into the land
prices. The vendors were also able to capitalize the benefits of the allowance system and
their exclusive rights to a distribution sector which was demonstrated in the "goodwill"
demanded in the sale of milk rounds. The monopoly structures profited certain participants
in the milk industry at cost to tax payers funding the scheme.
The structural inequities indicated that. the regulated milk scheme was unnecessarily
expensive. The net returns for participants in the scheme exceeded the return available for
other uses of these resources. Moreover to secure adequate supplies for the winter through
the payment of the town milk price for the surplus quantities that were redistributed in the
manufacturing sector, the scheme effectively paid for more than was consumed (Veeman
1972:240). The privileges gained within the town milk scheme provided little incentive to
adjust production, distribution or processing behaviour in response to changing market
conditions. Consequently the regulatory marketing system was associated with rigid
structures and inefficient practices. Veeman criticizes the board administrations where,
"in some instances board operations have had deleterious effects on the efficiency of
resource allocation - tendencies not confined to, but most evident with, domestically
oriented boards." (Veeman 1979:116).
Criticism of the corporatist structures only threatened the continuance of the state-sector
alliance when these arrangements failed to meet the demands of the government's agenda and
of the changing politico-economic environment. The structures of corporatism that were
once crucial for the successful administration and development of the milk industry had
become redundant and were now a liability to the restructuring program for the domestic
milk sector. Through the creation of vested interests such as the Supply Associations, the
board administration instituted structures of opposition to future rationalisation or
restructuring policies. Many instances of resistance to severe change were noted in the
history of the Board's reign. The suggestion of any radical method of securing the town
milk supply would naturally be opposed by the Board.
"The Milk Board is a long established body which one would naturally expect to have
vested interests in its own maintenance as an administrative and controlling body."
(Veeman 1972:251).
In the later years characterised by entrenched producer opposition to the reconstruction of
the liquid milk industry, an inherent bias against the introduction of new technologies and
actors was evident in the system. Thus the value of corporatism to the milk industry's
management was lost when the corporatist arrangements failed to respond to the demands of
the changing market.
These were the many issues of concern that lent support to the partial deregulation of the
milk industry in 1988. However it appeared that one system of inefficient monopoly
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structures was replaced by the noncompetitive, inefficient and unresponsive monopoly of the
processing conglomerates. As the political climate begins its reassessment of the value of
regulated/unregulated economies, perhaps a balance could be achieved between the
commercial needs of the liquid milk sector and consumer requirements. While both systems
purported to be established for the benefit of the public, in the end it is the consumer that
has often not been well served by the privileged agents of the corporatist system or by the
powerful business interests of the post-regulation town milk service.
In hindsight the replacement of the producer monopoly regime with another monopoly
structure did not necessarily serve to enhance the efficiency, consumer-responsiveness or
economy of the sector. Although beyond the parameters of this report, it is possible to
perceive that a more viable domestic milk service may be achieved through a compromise
between security attained through regulation and the economic accountability arrived at
through a more open market. Moreover as the debate over sectoral independence and
government intervention will continue to colour agricultural planning, further institutional
experimentation seems imminent. Thus an informed statement on the alternative forms of
milk industry management would require a comparative study of the different scenarios that
are suggested by any combination of regulatory and free market administrations.
7.6 Conclusion: Corporatism and Statutory Board Systems
The narrative history of the New Zealand Milk Board has described the development of
political structures that were instrumental in the advancement of a constant high quality milk
service. Statutory regimes of experimental institutional arrangements gradually provided the
Board with greater administrative power over the industry. Through the vehicle of
government-sponsored Supply Associations, the sector implemented an agenda of sector
restructuring, modernisation and rationalisation. For the formation of an effective quality
national milk service the structured relations between the state and producer interests
appeared the most viable option within the regulated agricultural economy. However the
dissatisfaction of the state and the public over the expensive scheme that was expressed in
the 1980s was to highlight the redundancy of this entrenched political configuration to the
demands of a new politico-economic context.
The theoretical constructs of tha,corporatist model were valuable in understanding the state-
sponsored collaborative arrangements with the authorize~ producer associations that were the
foundation of the Milk Board administra!ion. It identified the actors, structures and political
processes involved in 'the establishment and maintenance of this aspect of a regulated
economy. The administration of the milk economy seems to have been well served by the
regulatory board system in its initial development stage. The statutory body secured market
stability, contained intra-sector conflict, provided the industry with an effective problem
solving capacity and equipped the milk sector with mechanisms for implementing government
agricultural policy. Overall the National Milk Scheme sustained the emerging industry while
safeguarding the needs of its participants.
Corporatist theory has also provided an appreciation of the vulnerability of statutory board
administration. The collapse of the state's alliance with producers in the restructuring
program of the 1980s emphasized the dependency of the corporatist partner on a specific
political and economic environment to sustain its privileged access to the state. The
accomplishments of the milk industry had ironically made the regulated producer's
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management obsolete to the needs for an industry responsive to the changing global politico-
economic climate. What also became apparent through this narration of the New Zealand
milk industry's history is how the Board administration became associated with rigid
structures of inequity and inefficient practices. The inequities built into the system granted
one group of actors the means to develop exclusive, government sponsored monopolies
within the industry. These structures of privilege were expensive to the taxpayer and
provided little incentive to adjust production, distribution or processing behaviour in response
to changing market conditions. Political arrangements of the vested producer interests were
defended by instituting structures of opposition to industrial reconstruction. The Board's
administration thus became characterised by an inherent bias against the introduction of new
technologies and actors to the scheme. When the Board became an obstruction to the
implementation of state agricultural policy, the government pursued its privilege of political
control over the statutory regime - withdrawal from the corporatist alliance.
In employing the corporatist model to describe the relations between the state and producer
interest groups, it has been possible to appreciate the politico-economic context which both
facilitated statutory board administration and forced its dissolution. In effect this study found
corporatism useful as an indicator of the value of statutory organised domestic milk industries
and an anticipation of the inherent limitations within this form of organisation. The theory
provides a guideline to the political and economic variables best suited for corporatist
organisation, the structural demands required for the maintenance of a regulatory economy,
the political crises to be expected in a corporatist domestic milk industry, and the difficulties
inherent in a dismantled regulatory economy. In effect the study of the corporatization of
the New Zealand domestic milk industry serves as a useful illustration of the management
of a liquid milk sector by a statutory board and in particular assists the government and
producers of newly emerging domestic milk industries with their assessment of the role of
a milk board in the changing politico-economic climate.
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APPENDIX 1
OFFICE BEARERS AND MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL MILK
COUNCIL AND THE NEW ZEALAND MILK BOARD: 1944-1988
Chair
1953-1956
1956-1978
1978-1980
1981-1984
1984-1988
W B Tennent
L V Phillips
E G Ogier
DC Lane
B F Kimpton
Council Members 1944-1953
Minister of Health as Chair
H Innes
M Bell
W J Rogers
H D Lambie
C McFadden
Director of Milk Marketing
Government (Health)
Municipal Association
Producers' Federation
Producers' Federation
Board Members 1953-1988
1953-1958
1953-1959
1953-1963
1953-1965
1953-1970
1953-1973
1953-1974
1958-1980
1960-1971
1963-1980
1965-1974
1968-1971
1968-1971
1971-1978
1971-1978
1971-1980
1971-1988
1973-1988
1974-1977
1974-1988
1977-1988
1977-1988
1978-1980
1981-1984
1981-1984
1981-1986
R B Tennent
L E August
H D Lambie
P T Jamieson
P Dowse
C J McFadden
M Bell
L G Purser
N H K~nnedy
A W Montgomerie
V J Cottle
R W Bennett
R J Calvert
C L Bishop
E W McCallum
K W Blackmore
P J Beamont
E F Stokes
I A Ross
M R Till
GJ Guy
A G Spratt
G Gee
R C Brake
R W M Johnson
I H McLaren
Government (Agricuture)
Federation of Vendors
Producers' Federation
Producers' Federation
Municipal Association
Producers' Federation
Government (Social Welfare)
Government (Agriculture)
Federation of Vendors
Producers' Federation
Producers' Federation
Counties Association
Municipal Association
Municipal Association
Counties Association
Municipal Association
Federation of Vendors
Producers' Federation
Producers' Federation
Government (Welfare/Consumer)
Producers Federation
Counties Association
Municipal Association
Federation of Milk Stations
Government (Agriculture)
Federation of Vendors
1981-1988
1984-1986
1985-1988
1986-1987
1986-1988
1987-1988
eM Gordon
S Rajasekar
N M Brooks
C Douglas
I M Murray
R A Sandrey
NZ Dairy Board
Government (Agriculture)
Federation of Milk Stations
Government (Agriculture)
Federation of Vendors
Government (Agricuture)
General Managers
1953-1974
1974-1979
1979-1981
1981-1988
D J Henderson
R D Williams
G MacPherson
H G Turnball
APPENDIX 2
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LEGISLATION FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
NEW ZEALAND MILK INDUSTRY 1881-1988
Dairy Regulations 1881
Food Hygiene Regulations 1883
Milk and Dairies Regulations 1895
Dairy Industry Act 1898
Food and Drugs Act 1908
Milk Supply Act (Wellington) 1910
Milk Supply and Markets Act (Christchurch) 1914
Milk Supply Act (Wellington) 1919
Auckland Metropolitan Milk Act 1933
Dairy (Milk Supply) Regulations 1939
Milk Act 1944
Milk Board Election Regulations 1945
Milk Treatment Regulations 1945
Dairy (Milk Treatment) Regulation 1946
Milk Amendment Act 1947
Milk Amendment Act 1951
Milk Amendment Act 1953
Milk Marketing Order 1955
Milk Amendment Act 1956
Milk Amendment Act 1962
Milk Act 1967
Milk Price Order 1967
Milk Marketing Order 1968
Milk Price Notice 1968, 1969
Milk Producers and Other P{ices Notice 1969-1974
Milk Amendment Act 1970 .
Milk Amendment Act 1971
Milk Amendment Act 1973
Milk Marketing Order 1973-1979
Milk Regulations 1973
Milk Production and Supply Regulations 1973
Revocation of Milk Producer and Other Prices Notice 1975
Food Hygiene Regulations 1974-1981
Milk Price Notice 1975-1977
Dairy Industry Regulations 1977-1982
Milk Amendment Act 1978
Milk Price Notice 1978-1979
Milk Order 1978
Milk Stations Regulations 1979
Milk Amendment Act 1980
Food (Hygiene) Regulations 1981
Milk Amendment Act 1982
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